Review Article: The Shadow of Freud: Is Daniel Stern still a psychoanalyst? The creative tension between the present and the past in psychoanalytic and existential psychotherapies, in Daniel Stern’s *The Present Moment*, and his humanistic—existential partners in dialogue

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This paper surveys the implications of Daniel Stern’s new book on ‘The Present Moment’, in conjunction with a parallel collection of Gestalt Therapy papers on creativity. I consider how Stern both demarcates himself from, and places himself in a subtle relationship with, classical psychoanalysis, whilst at the same time mapping a model of implicit intersubjective knowledge of ‘the present moment’, in psychotherapy, which gives him strong affinities with approaches in the humanistic—existential tradition—affinities he courageously owns in this book. I further suggest, drawing from both literature and the work of Julian Jaynes, that some of the oppositions he invokes in this book are, as such, still within the classical psychoanalytic tradition and way of thinking, that he simply has inverted them, and that, on a wider, societal and historical view of human reality, it is possible to achieve a comprehensive concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger), for which the psychoanalysis/existential approach antithesis collapses, and which, nevertheless is still psychodynamic in the fundamental sense. Stern’s work is a major pioneering work in its own right.


What’s in a name?

What’s in a title? ‘A rose by any other name would smell as sweet’, says Juliet in Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*.

Here is Daniel Stern’s immensely important, indisputably major, new book on ‘the present moment’, authoritatively straddling the spectrum encompassing psychoanalysis and psy-
chotherapy, adult and child, neuro-science and phenomenological philosophy, and much else, a book which summates many years of preoccupation, and collaborative labour (much of it also involving the Boston Change Study Group), on his part, in a most lucid, concise, and comprehensive way.

Yet, suddenly, in the title we notice, possibly,—but is it? or isn’t it?—a reminiscence; and immediately we remember Freud’s ‘The Psychopathology of Everyday Life’. Why, then, is there a reminiscence of Freud,—if there is! and how could we know, what would it mean to know, but how could he not be aware of it?!—in the title of a book about ‘the present moment’?

This somewhat lateral and deconstructive question nevertheless epitomizes the issue at the heart of this book, and I shall amplify its implications throughout this review article. This book is both a book in the lineage, and also, as we shall see, of the calibre, of the great early pioneering Freud, and, simultaneously, in its title, it reflexively, but implicitly (that too is relevant, but it is, against Stern’s grain, a verbal implicitness), epitomizes its own theme and problematic:—the theme of how the past is implicated,—or not implicated?!—in the present of ‘the present moment’. It is a book from within psychoanalysis, by one of the central and most formidable members of the psychoanalytic community, one of those whose words carry most weight within it, even if sometimes disconcertingly to the orthodox, a regular contributor to major psychoanalytic conferences, the author of major pioneering works on infancy, childhood and motherhood, arguably the successor of the great pioneer psychoanalytic ethologist, Bowlby.

I shall let its central theses and positions emerge through sequential quotation and discussion in what follows. It is one of those books whose unfolding implication—and invitation to dialogue and difference—is inexhaustible, and I am left with the frustration of the sense that anything less than a commentary and cross-connecting on the whole work will be a caricature.

Yet it is also a book which here moves towards a partial, but significant, breakout from classical psychoanalysis, and envisages a great deal more than a glance towards other approaches, existential, process, and body based approaches, from within the para-analytic and humanistic community, such as Gestalt. (From now on I shall summarize these as ‘humanistic – existential approaches’, but the more complex description must be presupposed. Stern is closest to very present-tense, process-based approaches, such as Gestalt, and Core Process Psychotherapy, cf., Donington, 1994).

For the psychotherapist in such traditions, it is far the most significant active movement towards rapprochement yet offered from within the psychoanalytic community, a gesture, a step, of immense courage, importance, and significance.

A Janus-faced, double aspect, book

Yet it is also, in its great clarity, nevertheless a Janus-faced book (one remembers Freud’s Janus-faced genius, cf., Wilkinson, 2003b) which, on the one hand, moves cautiously, looking backwards over its shoulder at classical psychoanalysis. And, on the other hand, it is yet one which, in significant ways, only partially grasps and understands what it is reaching for, particularly within Gestalt psychotherapy, with whose practitioners, particularly the Siracusa Gestalt group led by Margherita Spanuolo Lobb and Giovanni Salonia, Stern has nevertheless forged a deep working relationship (Stern describes it in ‘Creative License’ as falling in love), of both dialogue and lively difference. This is a relationship which, again, is emblematic of the pivotal shift this book represents.

Here I refer, and cross-reference, to the second book touched on in this review article, where that difference is manifest, a collection of high calibre by some of the finest Gestalt Therapy
writers in the field, including Gordon Wheeler, Malcolm Parlett, Joseph Zinker, Sonia and Ed Nevis, and Carl Hodges, as well as the Siracusa group already mentioned. I am, however, mainly using it as an excellent foil to the issues raised by Stern, for which it is admirably suited, though it deserves to be recognized in its own right, for it is also of very high calibre in its own right! Within ‘Creative License: the art of Gestalt Therapy’ (hereinafter ‘Creative License’), Stern participates, and is represented, as one of the contributors, and it is clear that the enterprise of that book is significantly shaped by the Siracusa group’s encounter with him. In the Preface (ppxiv–xvii) of ‘The Present Moment: In Psychotherapy and Everyday Life’ (hereinafter ‘The Present Moment’), Stern indicates a sequence of working titles of the book (ending with the present title, and without mentioning Freud)—one of which is very close to the paper contributed to ‘Creative License’, ‘On the Other Side of the Moon: The Import of Implicit Knowledge for Gestalt Therapy’, a discussion especially of implicit knowledge, which is a major theme in ‘The Present Moment’. That paper also synoptizes much that is developed at much greater length in ‘The Present Moment’. So the alliance and sense of affinity between them is strong. (It is also worth catching the fact that the title of this collection is also a signifier, a deliberate double entendre; its suggestion of a touch of outrageousness is highly relevant to the contrast I am making here!)

Yet there are, nevertheless, elements in ‘Creative License’ to which Stern does not seem to have much direct access in his own sense of style, as articulated here, such as are illustrated in Margherita Spanuolo Lobb’s paper following Stern’s, on ‘Therapeutic Meeting as Improvisational Co-Creation’, elements which immediately display the enormous and poignant power of the dialogical method (here in Gestalt), exercised in a free and untrammelled way. These are generally exhibited by practitioners within the humanistic and existential community, who are free, within their frame and established boundaries, to work in dialogue; for instance, here:

I chose to share my emotion and said: ‘Did you notice that I was moved a moment ago when you told me about what happened on the beach?’ (‘Therapeutic Meeting as Improvisational Co-Creation’ in ‘Creative License’, p. 47)

[The dialogue continues; the client’s hiddenness opens, in response to respectful transparency on the part of the therapist, into tears, and she is then able to receive the therapist’s poignant poetic affirmation.]

...‘I can see the great love you have for your daughters and how, although you are a very different sort of mother from what your mother was to you, you still hide your song of love for them. I can also see the chance you gave me to see such an intimate part of you, which is your song of love for life.’ (p. 48)

**Psychoanalytic institutional caution**

One imagines that Stern, in part, is moving thus more cautiously, in order to carry with him a significant portion of the more thoughtful members of his own psychoanalytic community. Though much less prominent in the psychoanalytic community, Darlene Bregman Ehrenberg’s *The Intimate Edge* (Ehrenberg, 1992), to which Stern refers as one of the two closest in the psychoanalytic community to his approach (pp. 139, 186), exemplifies a similar tension, although Ehrenberg makes a strong, reasoned, and courageous case for the psychoanalytic character of her own approach (Wilkinson, 2003a)! Of course, this is not an absolute difference; examples Stern gives in both his book, and his paper, convey their own poignancy, too. But, despite Stern’s appeal in his own work to dance, music, and choreography as both metaphor and reality in his thought, when I turn to the papers in
‘Creative License’ I feel a sudden shift from immensely patient deliberateness to spontaneity, to a greater dance and freedom and fluency in the Gestalt community’s access to the dialogical, as illustrated here. As Spanuolo Lobb remarks, implicitly but pointedly indicating that Gestalt is free of the either/or of verbal/non-verbal I shall be exploring here:

Working through and verbalising relational experiences (at an emotional, body, intellectual, and spiritual level) is part of Gestalt’s ‘normal’ praxis. I believe this praxis must make a difference to the process of change. (‘Creative License’, p. 48)

Again, it is not that Stern pays no attention to such process of consolidation; indeed, he pays much attention (e.g, ‘Present Moment’, pp. 188–192) to the non-verbal element in consolidation after interpretation in classical psychoanalysis, and would certainly not dismiss the reverse emphasis; but there is still a different centre of gravity here. Classical psychoanalysts would be wary of all this, as Stern realizes, and no doubt that is in the background.

Thus, for instance, one notes the similarity of his position, in respect of intersubjectivity and intentionality, another of his major themes, to that of the ‘heretic’ Alfred Adler, all those years ago!

Adler places the whole significance of ‘Intersubjective Intentionality’ at the heart of his thinking. What Freud relegates to secondary gain, Adler makes central (Adler, ‘Individual Psychology’, 1933, p. 3), thus for instance:

We must remember that the person under observation would not know what to do with himself were he not oriented toward some goal. As long as we are not acquainted with the objective which determines his ‘life-line’, the whole system of his recognised reflexes, together with their causal conditions, can give us no certainty as to his next series of movements. They might be brought into harmony with practically any psychic resultant. This deficiency is most clearly felt in association tests. I would never expect a man suffering from some great disappointment to associate ‘tree’ with ‘rope’. The moment I knew his objective, however, namely suicide, then I might expect that particular sequence of thoughts—expect with such certainty that I would remove knives, poison, and weapons from his immediate vicinity. If we look at the matter more closely, we shall find the following law holding in the development of all psychic happenings: we cannot think, feel, will, or act without the perception of some goal. For all the causalities in the world would not suffice to conquer the chaos of the future nor obviate the planlessness to which we would be bound to fall a victim. All activity would persist in the stage of uncontrolled gropings; the economy visible in our psychic life unattained; we should be unintegrated and in every aspect of our physiognomy, in every personal touch, similar to organisms of the rank of the amoeba.

In that paper Adler makes very modern comments on the maintenance factors in phobias, impaired memory functions, breakdowns in relation, and so on, in that light.

This emphasis upon intentionality or goal-directedness (teleology) was of course also one of the grounds of the parting of the way with Freud, of Jung, in what became ‘Symbols of Transformation’ (Jung, 1956).

Compare, then, with Adler’s text, Stern on intentionality:

We see the human world in terms of intentions. And we act in terms of our own. You cannot function with other humans without reading or inferring their motives or intentions. This reading or attributing of intentions is our primary guide to responding and initiating action. Inferring intentions in human behaviour seems to be universal. It is
a mental primitive. It is how we parse and interpret our human surroundings. If one is unable to infer the intentions of others, or profoundly uninterested in doing so, they will act outside of the human pale. Autistic people have been assumed to be in this position. So have some schizophrenics. ... Recognising and deciphering intentionality is a reasonable starting point for adaptation and survival.’ (‘Present Moment’, p. 87)

So his caution is understandable! Guilt by association plays an unfortunately large role in our field! Of course, the idea that Adler can be dismissed by psychoanalysis, would be, in the light of the later developments in Object Relations, Self-Psychology, Ego Psychology, and the Interpersonal movement, a foolish one.

**Stern’s relation to psychoanalysis**

I believe that Stern does, however, pay a partial price for this caution, not only in respect of his capacity to access the insights and work of his humanistic-existential colleagues, but even in respect of his accessing and fully recognizing the potential psychoanalytic dimension itself, of his own position. For the rest of this review article I shall work my way towards indicating what this is, via the route of a gradual exposition, as full as I can make it, of Stern’s position. It may be, to be sure, that the psychoanalytic dimension in question, to which I shall appeal, might not be able to win easy acceptance amongst his colleagues, for reasons I am beginning to indicate.

Thus, in illustration, Stern alludes here to the current marginalization within classical psychoanalytic circles of intersubjectivity theory, a central element in his own account, which he quietly compares to the fate of attachment theory:

At one extreme, Psychoanalysis proposed only two over-riding major systems (the life and death systems). This tended to absorb all other important motivational systems, thereby blurring their boundaries and preventing them from being considered in their own right. The case of attachment theory is instructive. For many decades psychoanalysis either rejected attachment theory, or assimilated it out of existence. In spite of the fact that this major motivational system originated in part from a psychoanalytic perspective. Only more recently is psychoanalytic theory taking a comfortable place in mainstream psychodynamic thinking. I see intersubjectivity as occupying a position similar to what attachment previously had. (‘Present Moment’, p. 147)

Nevertheless, there may be a security in accepting full-bloodedly the implications of one’s own thinking, which would provide him, in a way, with a more secure and comprehensive platform for demonstrating his continued psychoanalytic credentials in the discussions he would wish to have.

But it would also entail for him more radical revision and transformation of psychoanalytic theory than he fully adumbrates in this book, which, in a peculiar way, drifts towards offering a kind of apartheid solution for the relations between psychoanalytic and humanistic–existential approaches, as we shall shortly consider, rather than the integration of them which is possible.

In the light of this the possible reminiscence or echo of Freud’s title takes on a greater possible significance; in one respect, it seems like a way of not cutting himself off from his base, even as he is moving away from it. And, as a signifier unmoored from its source and origin, it illustrates the fate of significance in psychoanalysis, which is precisely not to be tethered to the present moment of relational speech, and non-verbal interaction; it emblematicises that which is indefinitely deferred in our relation to meaning and our world.

In the context of Stern’s theory of time, for instance, this is doubly significant. For deferral, despite appearances, is at its heart.

And it also implicates *that which is implicit in verbal communication and explicitness themselves*. I am dropping hints, no more for the moment, of a post-modern critique, or relativization, of his position.

**Stern’s own breakthrough haunted by Freud**

But the possible reminiscence also has a more positive significance than just that. Though we shall come, below, to that aspect of Stern’s demarcatory ‘settlement’ with the classical psychoanalytic tradition which is conservative and evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, Freud has a way of haunting those who are evolving his positions in subtle and unexpected ways! Thus, even, or now especially, in Stern’s ‘heartland’, his enquiry into the ‘present moment’, we sense the presence of Freud:

> I was prepared to see present behaviour as an instantiation of larger behavioural and psychological patterns. That is the essence of the psychodynamic hypothesis. However, I was surprised to see larger psychodynamic patterns reflected in units as small as present moments. This realisation opened up the way to consider the present moment, *like a dream* [my italics], as a phenomenon worthy of exploration for therapeutic purposes. (‘Present Moment’, p. 18)

And this then connects, as we shall see shortly, with his emphasis on the implicit sacredness of the ‘present moment’ as ‘a world in a grain of sand’ (another of Stern’s working titles), which invokes the significant presence of William Blake, significant for deep reasons to which I shall return. But, suddenly, we glimpse that the demarcation settlement to which we shall be turning is not the whole story; the present moment itself is *also* become the theme of psychodynamic enquiry (not non-psychodynamic enquiry). And the possible cross reference and analogy to Freud is the remark in ‘The Interpretation of Dreams’ that:

> And even when it happened that the text of the dream as we had it was meaningless and inadequate—as though the effort to give a correct account of it had been unsuccessful—we have taken this defect into account as well. In short, *we have regarded as Holy Writ what previous writers have regarded as an arbitrary improvisation* [my italics], hurriedly patched together in the embarrassment of the moment. (Freud, 1900/1961)

Stern is going to treat ‘the present moment’ as Holy Writ! (Only it is *not* ‘writ’, he thinks; it is in fact Holy Writ which is pure present revelation in itself)

He, however, to my sense of it, oscillates between the ‘demarcation’ model, and one which carries a sacred, Holy Writ, emphasis, made absolutely fundamental, on its focus on the present—one which is potentially much *more* full bloodedly psychodynamic, one within which the ‘demarcation’ would deconstruct, and one which takes us on to a ‘third position’ of psychodynamic integration, to which I shall eventually come.
An apartheid between psychoanalysis and existential approaches

I begin, however, my commentary on his position with an attempt to elucidate what I have dubbed this ‘apartheid’ position. Like Freud, Stern (skilfully and profoundly, with a fine dialectical scalpel) invokes dualities or dualisms, which he then pursues and explores dialectically, but retaining not dissolving or deconstructing them.

The most central one, as intimated, is the contrast of the experiential reality of ‘the present moment’ with recollection of the past, (or reflection on the moment, and so on, anything which annuls immediacy, and which always involve recollection, or comparison, in some sense). In relation to psychoanalysis this contrast immediately lines up with two others. Thus the experience of ‘the present moment’ is one of which we have implicit knowledge, and one which is nonconscious, but not unconscious as repressed. In classical psychoanalysis, on the other hand, the past of the unconscious, with which we are concerned (and primarily concerned in classical psychoanalysis), is repressed, and our task is to retrieve it in the form of explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is verbal, insight based, interpretative, and so on. Our search for it is met with resistance, due centrally to repression, and the verbal analysis of resistance is at the heart of classical psychoanalysis.

A major difference in the psychoanalytic position on free association and interpretation, and his, he indicates as follows (here is one of the references to the ‘grain of sand’):

The first [difference] lies in the assumption that that the present moment (even as told) reveals a ‘world in a grain of sand’ clinically worth examining in and of itself. In contrast, the more traditional assumption is that the present moment, as told, serves mainly as the raw material from which an associative thread can be picked up to create an associative network. It is then the associative network that contains ‘the world in a grain of sand’—the sought-after meanings. The actual experience-as-lived does not have to be exhaustively examined to permit the operation of free association and then interpretation. Often when the (psychodynamically well-trained) patient starts to tell about a present moment, as soon as he comes upon a sentence, feeling, image, or word that leads to an associative pathway, he is likely to take that path. This means that the exploration of the experienced-as-lived gets interrupted by associative work that leads away from the original present moment . . . I suggest that there is great value in a more lingering interest in the present moment. This is not to say that the associative networks need to be replaced by a focus on the present moment, or that the two are theoretically in competition. They are different and complementary. Which to follow at a given moment is a technical decision . . . When therapy is viewed micro-analytically with the present moment and sequence of present moments as the focus, one starts to see it unfolding somewhat differently than we [this is the psychoanalytic ‘we’!] usually do. The understanding of process moves closer to the foreground, and the search for meaning moves more to the background. The result is a greater appreciation of experience, and a less hurried rush to interpretation. (‘Present Moment’, pp. 138–9)

Any experienced, psychodynamically informed, integrative psychotherapist (and Gestalt and Transactional Analysis, for instance, are, in this core sense, integrative approaches) is familiar with this difference.

The consequences of drawing this distinction are radical:

The nature and enlarged scope of implicit knowing has several implications for the clinic. One of the more inclusive concepts use in traditional psychoanalytic treatment is that of
resistance. A simple and broad definition of resistance comes from Laplanche and Pontalis: “the name ‘resistance’ is given to everything in the words and actions of the analysis [something omitted here I think, such as Freud’s words, ‘that interrupts the progress of analytic work’] and that obstructs his gaining access to his unconscious” (Freud, 1967/1988, p. 394). 

The problem now facing us is that implicit knowing is not dynamically unconscious and thus is not withheld from consciousness by resistances (repression). It is not conscious for other reasons I have mentioned. The concept of resistance does not apply to implicit knowing. This limitation takes on even greater importance when we consider the enormous scope of implicit knowing both in everyday life and in psychotherapy. Implicit regulatory memories and representations play a constant role in shaping the transference and the therapeutic relationship, in general, as well as in making up much of our lived past and symptomatic present. (p. 143)

The recognition of the crucial element of implicit knowing in transference/countertransference is one of the points where the antithesis begins to dissolve, on Stern’s own account, and where a more fundamental, but still psychoanalytic, conception of the psychodynamic process comes into view.

Likewise he says:

The clinical relevance of implicit knowing looms large. Implicit knowing is ‘descriptively (topographically) unconscious.’ The term ‘unconscious’ should be reserved for repressed material where there is a defensive barrier to entering consciousness. More precisely, implicit knowing is nonconscious. It is not repressed. In contrast, the psychoanalytic ‘dynamic unconscious’ is not conscious because the force of repression actively keeps it out of consciousness. Repression is presumably not acting on implicit knowing [my italics]. Accordingly, the implicit is simply nonconscious whereas repressed material is unconscious. (p. 116)

Here, again, there is a clue about the ‘apartheid’ solution. Here Stern adroitly supplements Freud’s own account of primal repression (cf., e.g., Freud, 1915/1984) by making the link to implicit knowledge. It is one of his many brief condensed insights which are presented as such obvious commonsense, ‘dazzling glimpses of the obvious’, that we can easily miss its significance. ‘Repression is presumably not acting on implicit knowing.’ Here he has succinctly welded together the Freudian metapsychology of repression with a post-Freudian phenomenological/Gestalt Psychology recognition of the all-pervasiveness of the implicit, and at the same time suggested a way in which this is intelligible without getting into all the tangles Freud got into over the question of ‘the mental (ideational) representation of the instinct’, in virtue of the fact that Freud predicates nothing in the (instincts)drives which has original intentionality in the first place, on which a (re)presentation can be brought to bear (Freud, 1915/1957, cf. Totton, 1998, Wilkinson, 2000):
Now we have reason for assuming a primal repression, a first phase of repression, which consists in a denial of entry into consciousness to the mental (ideational) presentation of the instinct. (Freud, 1915/1984, p. 139)

And thus Stern has adroitly grafted on to the Freudian rootstock the huge range of phenomena concerning the present moment, implicit knowledge, the ‘lived story’ and ‘vitality affects’ structuring of temporal experience, the intersubjective regulatory context, and so on, which are what he is emphasizing, in line with many of the humanistic–existential approaches, but mostly more explicitly and systematically.

And, on the basis of this, he can offer, firstly, a demarcation—if one is wanted—and, secondly, a great deal of detailed attention in the later, clinical, part of the book, to the unobtrusive regulatory, maintenance, incremental, alliance-building, cumulative change factors in therapy, the middle ground of all therapies, those elements which have been again and again demonstrated as therapeutic factors by the psychotherapy research, but have rarely been subjected to the kind of sustained and lucidly accessible micro-analysis Stern offers here.

Parallel tracks, parallel concepts: implicit and explicit knowledge

So why am I carping about the demarcation? What is the problem here? In offering the demarcation Stern simultaneously questions it, as follows:

These considerations [critiquing the traditional psychoanalytic concepts of acting out and acting in] raise long-standing questions about the division between the more psychoanalytic therapies and the body, action, movement, and expressive therapies. Given the traditional position of psychoanalysis, with its concentration on the verbal, it was inevitable that therapies privileging the physical would arise. At this point in time, no one can claim a royal road to the unconscious. The dream, free association, the present moment, body sensations or expression, and actions are all, if not royal, still good enough routes into the mind, including the unconscious and the implicit. (’Present Moment’, p. 147)

Stern is much too sophisticated to make the kind of hard and fast psychoanalysis/psychotherapy distinction many have tried to make in the current debate about the boundaries of psychoanalysis (e.g., Kernberg, 1999, cf., Wilkinson, 2003b). Nevertheless, the faultline and demarcation is indicated, is there—and is almost left hanging. And it serves as a fulcrum around which the book is organized, in conjunction with the implicit knowledge/explicit knowledge and non-verbal/verbal distinctions, and the nonconscious/unconscious one. And in this there is an oversimplification of both the verbal and the ‘implicit knowing’, the ‘lived story’, of the ‘present moment’. If this is so, why does there need to be? When there is no intrinsic antagonism, but, not only a complementarity, but even a tapestry potential of profound interweaving? It is not that Stern does not recognize the possibility of interweaving—as in chapter 11 on ‘Interweaving the implicit and explicit in the clinical situation’. But the two concepts/realities are conceived as running cheek by jowl, instead of deconstructing them altogether, in any but the more simple cases.

First, to note the difficulty with the verbal Stern evokes. Here, as often, his writing is tacitly mythic, Blakean, bicameral (see below). He quotes from his Diary of a Baby (Stern, 1990) in discussing whether there is a resistance that appertains to implicit knowledge, the nonverbal, as such, the other half of his non-conscious/unconscious dualism (again, we are reminded of Freud, Freud’s last ditch invocation of Aristophanes’ myth of the sorb apple,
when he is discussing the ‘drive-ish’ character of Eros in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud 1920/1984):

> In the *Diary of a Baby* (Stern, 1990, p. 122) a fictional 9-month-old infant plays in a patch of sunshine falling on the wooden floor. It makes a rich, multimodal sensory-feeling world for him. He tries to lick the sunshine on the floor. His mother stops him abruptly and says, “That’s just sunshine, honey. It’s just to look at. It’s only light on the floor. You can’t eat this sunshine. It’s dirty.”  

If the fictional child could have understood her words he would have thought something like: ‘Each of her words is a muffled blow that cracks my space into pieces. “Just sunshine”—but it was my pool, a special pool! “It’s just to look at.” I heard it. I felt it too! “Only light on the floor”—How? “It’s dirty.”—I was in it.’

When she stops talking the pieces of his world lie scattered all around. That original world is gone.

Something is gained and something is lost when experience is put into words. Is there some kind of resistance operating to counter this loss—a resistance that keeps some experiences protected in their richly complex, non-verbal, nonreflectively conscious state? Perhaps it is an aesthetic and moral true-to-self resistance, an existential resistance against the impoverishment of lived experience. [and then he hesitates] In any event, with the realisation of the nature and reach of implicit knowing, the scope and applicability of the concept of resistance has been significantly curtailed. (‘Present Moment’, pp. 144 – 5)

One wants to say, words don’t have to be like that! This book itself is replete with illustrations of sensitive and poetic verbalization in therapy situations, some with children. Stern also himself, in the context of discussion of developing emotional momentum, offers a lovely illustration from Dr Seuss’s Sam-I-Am in *Green Eggs and Ham*:

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I do not like them
In a house
I do not like them
With a mouse
I do not like them
Here or there
I do not like them
Anywhere
I do not like Green eggs and Ham
I do not like them
Sam-I-Am
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And so it goes on. Of course we do understand, along with Wordsworth (‘*Ode on Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Child*’) (Wordsworth), Stern’s concern, the loss of immediacy and innocence of primal perception that were ours in infancy:

> Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:  
The Soul that rises with us, our life’s Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar:
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home:
Heaven lies about us in our infancy!
Shades of the prison-house begin to close
Upon the growing Boy,
But he beholds the light, and whence it flows,
He sees it in his joy;
The Youth, who daily farther from the east
Must travel, still is Nature’s priest,
And by the vision splendid
Is on his way attended;
At length the Man perceives it die away,
And fade into the light of common day.

But there is a one-sidedness here, nevertheless; extremes are taken here for the paradigm. If we turn to two very different expressions, first Wordsworth again, how could the inexhaustible depths of interfused meaning and feeling in one of his very greatest, yet briefest, poems, a poem which is veritably is a European answer to the haiku, be considered to impoverish experience in some way (‘A Slumber did My Spirit’)?

A slumber did my spirit seal;
I had no human fears;
She seemed a thing that could not feel
The touch of earthly years.
No motion has she now, no force;
She neither hears nor sees;
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course,
With rocks, and stones, and trees. (Wordsworth)

We feel the earth’s ‘diurnal course’ here! Or, to turn to a more sombre Homeric utterance, the great late Yeats of ‘The Circus Animals’ Desertion’:

III
Those masterful images because complete
Grew in pure mind, but out of what began?
A mound of refuse or the sweepings of a street,
Old kettles, old bottles, and a broken can,
Old iron, old bones, old rags, that raving slut
Who keeps the till. Now that my ladder’s gone,
I must lie down where all the ladders start
In the foul rag and bone shop of the heart. (Yeats)

How could this incomparable bardic utterance, heart-rending culmination of a life’s work, Homeric in its savagery and grandeur, be considered as abstraction, in the way Stern caricatures language as being in the above passage? The overwhelming telescoping of images in
the final crushing sentence is precisely the sort of interfusion he has said above that language destroys! Of course, he would not deny this. But it is as if he forgets it, and we must discover why this is.

**Stern’s atomism: positivistic elements**

And on the other side, more surprisingly perhaps—again the similarity to Freud, who discovers the ‘poetic’ nature of the unconconscious and primary process, and then ambivalently attempts to model it partly in terms of a positivistic paradigm, is striking!—Stern’s account of the non-verbal and of the core elements of the ‘present moment’ is decidedly atomistic and positivist, despite its substantial phenomenological elements, in three ways.

First, he maintains the strong ‘logical behaviourism’ (thus, opposed to mystical and telepathic accounts of projective identification, e.g., in Stern, 1995, p. 42) which has characterized Stern’s writing consistently:

We are capable of ‘reading’ other people’s intentions and feeling within our bodies what they are feeling. *Not in any mystical way* [my italics], but from watching their face, movements, and posture, hearing the tone of their voice, and noticing the immediate context for their behaviour. We are quite good at this ‘mind-reading,’ even though our intuitions need verifying and fine-tuning (Whiten, 1991). (‘*Present Moment*, pp. 75 – 6)

This element is in tension with Stern’s partial recognition of direct mimetic mutual resonance:

A sort of direct feeling route into the other person is potentially open and we resonate with and participate in their experiences and they in ours. (‘*Present Moment*, p76)

This tension is taken even further when, driven by the implications of intersubjectivity, he moves towards the recognition (in line with the modern ‘distributed mind’ concept of, for instance, Damasio, and with the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and many others) that the *social basis* of mind is prior to, and the logical presupposition of, individual conscious awareness and mentality:

The neurobiological perspective asks the modern version of Descartes’s question: What brain structures ‘receive the report’ to somehow make it conscious without the intervention of an homunculus? As yet, there is no accepted central site of consciousness in the brain. And many have suggested that none exists—rather that consciousness is a collective attribute of the entire body in its motoric and mental engagement with the environment . . . . An engagement with the environment includes, importantly, interactions with other people’s minds, as well as with the culture.

This line of reasoning leads to a more social perspective, where the question, ‘Who receives the report?’ is opened up beyond one person’s mind or brain. (‘*Present Moment*, p. 127)

This is developed further by Stern in what follows, and I shall come back to its implications.

Second, he maintains a very simple experience/neuro-process dualism, so that neuro-processes are treated as functionally equivalent to personal phenomenological processes; thus, speaking of his core concept of ‘vitality effects’, he says:
Exactly how the nervous system executes this transformation from the temporal contours of stimulation to the vitality effects of our subjective feelings is not yet fully understood. Tomkins (1962) suggests that the temporal contour of stimulation evokes a corresponding temporal contour of the density of neural firing in the nervous system [followed by further examples and reasoning, mainly along this track] (‘Present Moment’, p. 65)

This is heading towards either the simple dualism of Chalmers (1996) or the simple ‘distributed mind’ reductionism of the earlier Damasio (1994), instead of towards an interactionism so thoroughgoing that it begins to relativize the position of neuroscience from a phenomenological position:

To study physiology with a clear conscience, one must insist that the sense organs are not phenomena in the sense of idealistic philosophy; as such they could not be causes! Sensualism, therefore, at least as a regulative hypothesis, if not as a heuristic principle.

What? And others even say that the external world is the work of our organs? But then our body, as a part of this external world, would be the work of our organs! But then our organs themselves would be the work of our organs! It seems to me that this is a complete reductio ad absurdum—assuming that the concept of a causa sui is something fundamentally absurd. Consequently, the external world is just the work of our organs—(Nietzsche, 1886 Beyond Good and Evil, §15)

Third, and for my present purposes most important, (for this one is within the phenomenological realm and is still atomistic) there is the central atomistic postulate of basic experiential units, conceived of as constituted in ‘the present moment’ by way of a ‘lived story’ (the concept which, on the grounds that there just is a story, with no ‘proto’-version, replaces the ‘proto-narrative temporal envelope of experience’ of The Motherhood Constellation, Stern, 1995):

The present moment as a lived story can also be shared. When that happens intersubjectivity starts to take on flesh. The moment when someone can participate in another’s lived story, or can create a mutually lived story with them, a different kind of human contact is created. More than just an exchange of information has occurred. That is the secret of the here and now. [Here is his intersubjectivity postulate.] We shall return to this later.

The present moment carries within its brief existence a lived story, a sort of ‘world in a grain of sand’ [that image again!]. Usually, the size or duration of a told narrative structure is larger and longer. This is especially so in the clinical domain, where we talk of life narratives or even transgenerational structures. Yet, larger narratives are made of smaller ones that are embedded in them. The size of the smaller nested life stories is not usually explored in detail. This leads to the question: Are there minimal lived stories from which all larger narrative structures are built? I am going to answer yes, and propose that present moments are the basis building blocks. [my italics] (‘Present Moment’, p. 58)

In Stern’s view all the essential elements of plot, the elements which can be found in the first sentence of any good newspaper story, can be discerned in a present moment (‘Present Moment’, p. 62), Who? When? Why? What? How? Where? Central to this account is that already mentioned long-standing concept in Stern’s work, of ‘vitality effects’, and their ‘temporal contours’, which, as rhythmic pulses, constitute the basic temporal building blocks
of present moments, the core of his concept, and which constitutes his implicit account of consciousness as intermittent periodic pulses:

*The present moment has a psychological function.* A subjective experience must be sufficiently novel or problematic to enter consciousness and become a present moment. Present moments form around events that break through ordinariness or violate expected smooth functioning. . . . All of this can happen with very small magnitudes of novelty or problem. For instance, in the first breakfast interview from Chapter 1, the first present moment begins with an implied problem that is not exactly novel but unexpected. ‘There is no butter.’ Hardly a severe violation of expectancy, but a violation all the same.

The present moment, thus, has psychological work to do. Its work is the very mobile task of constantly dealing with or preparing to deal with what is happening in an almost constantly changing world. It takes the sequences of small, split-second events that the world throws at us and pulls them together into coherent units that are more useable for adaptation. (‘*Present Moment*’, pp. 34 – 5)

This reminds us of Freud’s account of consciousness, but without the neurology (Freud, 1925/1984). But, as containing all the elements of a narrative, *even present time in Stern’s sense is determined by ‘deferral’ in the Freudian sense,* and there is a continuum from that to a work like Joyce’s *Ulysses*, which carries deferral and cross-referencing of signifiers to almost infinite lengths.

This powerful atomism, like all atomisms from Democritus to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, is very seductive; when we are caught within its perspective it seems impossible to imagine an alternative. It has the same status as the drive in Freud’s system, another coercively imposing reductive system; once again, we note Stern walking, and walking worthily, in the tracks of Freud’s giant footprints! It may seem odd that I should describe as reductive someone so deeply wedded to phenomenology, and so deeply committed to honouring the phenomenological process of the actual experience in psychotherapy work, and those things are undoubtedly true of him, but of course Husserl (the dominant phenomenological influence on Stern, cf., ‘*Present Moment*’ pp. 94 – 5) is also reductive in his own way, which is why Heidegger fought for a larger and more spacious, more fully world-contextualized, conception in *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 1962). Such a conception would embrace and transform both the polarities of Stern’s ‘demarcation’.

Gestalt flows a similar pathway as Stern here; it too transforms Freud’s drives (Freud the unrepentant neuroscientist hovering in the cusp of the conceptual tension between desire and motor energy) into structured experiential intentional patterns of seeking for contact (Stern’s ‘inherent intersubjectivity’). But ‘Creative License’ evokes more fully—in Wheeler’s paper on the Gestalt Contact Cycle in context, for instance (‘*Creative License*’, pp. 163 – 177)—the *field conditions and cultural context* than Stern does; even though he has a fine grasp, in his discussion of the regulatory field of intersubjectivity, of the potential scope of context, and is too fine a mind not to recognize this if challenged, yet the narrowness of focus on the present moment as Holy Writ enables him to miss the *full force of context*.

For it is not only the presence of the past, in the psychodynamic sense, that is underemphasized in this book; *that* is fully allowed for, as the psychoanalytic foil to his position, in the way we have seen. But the full social and symbolic socio-cultural context is underplayed. In the omission of this dimension there is another kind of narrowness of the psychoanalytic kind, in the concentration (however hiddenly ambiguous) on the present moment (Gestalt at one of its extremes has erred in this direction also).
Resolving the dilemma: the history of consciousness in context (Jaynes)

What, then, would happen if we brought all that in, and allowed it to play across both the ‘present moment’ dimension, which Stern may be taken to have established irreversibly in this book, and the psychoanalytic interpretation of the past, dimension?

I will approach this by picking up in this connection the thread concerning the social nature of the mind. In another of his fascinating mythic and metaphoric moments in this book Stern asks:

I had hoped to find a god or goddess from antiquity who held the gift of mind-reading (not future-telling) and could offer it to a human. This gift would make others’ minds transparent. I have yet to find such a deity. My colleagues knowledgeable in such matters assured me that my search is in vain. At least in Western antiquity, the mind was not confined to and imprisoned in the head or in the heart of one person. The mind circulated more freely, constantly receiving input from nature and the gods. It did not belong to someone as secret, private property. There was little need for making others’ minds transparent. (‘Present Moment’, p. 94)

Julian Jaynes, in ‘The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind’ (Jaynes, 1990) takes this even further and at the same time explains it. His hypothesis is the apotheosis of the above mentioned position, that the social basis of mind is prior to, and the logical presupposition of, individual conscious awareness and mentality.

As we have seen, when Stern is evoking the vitality affects which contour the present moment, in great things as in small (with a similarity of pattern in both), he indicates a process of disturbance of equilibrium, a continuous wrestling between stability of expectation and the unexpected contingency, which, for us, evokes consciousness, as we strive to come to terms with the undigested novelty, whether painful or pleasant (this is the conception of consciousness shared by Nietzsche, Freud, and Gestalt). But Jaynes argues that, for a Mycenean Greek, the stress of the unexpected would have been liable to evoke the visitation of a god or goddess—in vision or hallucination, which is Jaynes’s concept of the ‘bicameral mind’—and that this was how decision was then taken, not in the conscious sphere of personal volition, but in obedience to the command of a god, experienced in vision (as Joan of Arc experienced her angels, and—here is my reason for regarding Stern’s references to him as obliquely significant—as William Blake experienced his prophetic visions!).

Here is the locus classicus, for Jaynes, at the start of the Iliad, where, as we would say, Achilles commands his temper when humiliated by Agamemnon; but, for the Greeks, the goddess appears and overrules him. This is not a metaphoric account:

And Agamemnon answered, ‘Fly if you will, I shall make you no prayers to stay you. I have others here who will do me honour, and above all Zeus, the lord of counsel. There is no king here so hateful to me as you are, for you are ever quarrelsome and ill affected. What though you be brave? Was it not heaven that made you so? Go home, then, with your ships and comrades to lord it over the Myrmidons. I care neither for you nor for your anger; and thus will I do: since Phoebus Apollo is taking Chryseis from me, I shall send her with my ship and my followers, but I shall come to your tent and take your own prize Briseis, that you may learn how much stronger I am than you are, and that another may fear to set himself up as equal or comparable with me.’

The son of Peleus was furious, and his heart within his shaggy breast was divided whether to draw his sword, push the others aside, and kill the son of Atreus, or to restrain himself
and check his anger. While he was thus in two minds, and was drawing his mighty sword from its scabbard [my italics], Athene came down from heaven (for Hera had sent her in the love she bore to them both), and seized the son of Peleus by his yellow hair, visible to him alone, for of the others no man could see her. Achilles turned in amaze, and by the fire that flashed from her eyes at once knew that she was Athene. ‘Why are you here,’ said he, ‘daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus? To see the pride of Agamemnon, son of Atreus? Let me tell you—and it shall surely be—he shall pay for this insolence with his life.’

And Athene said, ‘I come from heaven, if you will hear me, to bid you stay your anger. Hera has sent me, who cares for both of you alike. Cease, then, this brawling, and do not draw your sword; rail at him if you will, and your railing will not be vain, for I tell you—and it shall surely be—that you shall hereafter receive gifts three times as splendid by reason of this present insult. Hold, therefore, and obey.’

‘Goddess,’ answered Achilles, ‘however angry a man may be, he must do as you two command him. This will be best, for the gods ever hear the prayers of him who has obeyed them.’

He stayed his hand on the silver hilt of his sword, and thrust it back into the scabbard as Athene bade him. Then she went back to Olympus among the other gods, and to the house of aegis-bearing Zeus. (Samuel Butler’s translation of the Iliad, Greek god names replacing the Latin)

In the breakdown of the bicameral mind, private consciousness, in the form of deception and concealment,—and deferral,—was learnt for the first time, and it is precisely this for which a myth has to be provided. That mythic narrative is The Odyssey:

And as this series of stories sweeps from its lost hero sobbing on an alien shore in bicameral thrall to his beautiful goddess Calypso, winding through its world of demigods, testings, and deceits, to his defiant war whoops in a rival-routed home, from trance through disguise to recognition, the whole long song is an odyssey toward subjective identity and its triumphant acknowledgment out of the hallucinatory enslavements of the past. From a will-less gigolo of a divinity to the gore-splattered lion on his own hearth, Odysseus becomes ‘Odysseus’. (Jaynes, 1990, p. 277)

The situation, then, is even more dramatic than Stern envisages, on Jaynes’s account; total communal consciousness mediated by the gods, the apotheosis of the primacy of the social and its authority systems (Wilkinson, 1999) is the norm until very late in human history (around 1000 BCE), and it is the discovery of privacy and concealment which requires a myth. Doubtless Jaynes’s view exaggerates, but it does offer a radically more intelligible way of making sense of pre-philosophy and pre-history.

We didn’t simply keep quiet about the forms of reflective consciousness; we just didn’t have them in a developed form. Stern intimates his awareness of this history in his section following reference to a possible god of mind reading (‘Present Moment’, pp. 94–5).

Now, the antithesis of nonconscious and unconscious, with which Stern demarcates the field, rests upon an acquiescence in the Freudian unconscious, and a correlated notion of consciousness as primary, conceived as of as repression (see above), and a correlated notion of consciousness and its self as primary, in the post-Cartesian sense, and accordingly he leaves the Freudian unconscious alone to study the, in his view, more neglected consciousness (‘Present Moment’, p. 122). But it is the whole opposition which is one-sided, and his starting
assumptions, within the metaphysics of objecthood and discrete entities, about consciousness are priorly determined by this. The past and the present emphases take in each other’s washing! Stern is writing centrally in the frame of the classical psychoanalytic formulation of the problematic; it is simply that,—quite rightly!—he has turned it on its head!

Stern goes a long way towards tacitly recognizing this, but, because of his lack of focus upon the wider social dimension, he does not have an alternative to hand to put in place. The locus of the meaning of any of our acts and expressions lies in the total social-cultural context, not in either purely in individual consciousness or in individual history, in the psychoanalytic sense. With his emphasis on primary intersubjectivity, and the correlated emphasis on the presence of all the elements of lived story already, in our understanding of the ‘lived story’ nature of the present moment (‘Present Moment’, pp. 58–62) Stern has already tacitly accepted the Gestalt character, the non-atomic character, of his basic building blocks. In Heideggerian terms (Heidegger, 1962) we are free to acknowledge the total encompassing co-relatedness of our being-in-the-world, as a whole gestalt, with all its elements spanning the nature/culture gamut.

This opens the way, in the light of the history of consciousness offered us by Jaynes, which enables us to understand the derivative nature of ‘privacy’ in a Wittgensteinian way (Wittgenstein, 1967), to take a view from a wider perspective. In our total perspective, from where we are now, we have reflexive consciousness; we have access to the poetics, the epos, of language, which can evoke the sensory-implicit in the way Stern thinks we have lost, as well as the prose abstractions and general logic aspects of language; we are able to grasp that the kind of partial repression of signifiers with which the most subtle psychoanalysis is concerned invokes a many layered conception of language which is entangled with the time concept through deferral (see, e.g., Poe, op. cit., or Macbeth, the great speech at the beginning of Act 1, Scene 7, and, on time structuring, the whole play (Shakespeare)), and that, therefore, the ‘present moment’ is only very rarely, if at all, totally ‘present moment’ (subject to reservations from the field of mystical experience, to be sure); we can grasp that there is the most subtle play between forms of relationship in therapeutic work (Clarkson, 2002), the transferential, the therapeutic alliance, the I–Thou of dialogue, the developmentally corrective, the sacred or alchemical relationship in the context of religious rite or process, in some sense, (of which arguably the psychotherapy relationship is a low-key instance); in the subtle interplay of all of these the depth of process emerges in the work, and the shifts are manifold and unfathomable. It seems a gross narrowing of perspective, then, to say this is either primarily conscious (non-conscious, implicit), or primarily unconscious; both concepts have their place, but so does that of a total communication network, in frame, partly fictitious, partly actual or real (in the mentioned paper in ‘Creative License’ Wheeler explores this skilfully), of which the overt ‘present moment’ relationship is but one manifestation, and which remains comprehensively the medium of psychodynamic effects.

In the light of this the ‘present moment’ emphasis becomes an heuristic one, an enormously important methodological emphasis, but part of an integrated approach. Nor does it have quite the metaphysical primacy Stern seems here and there to imply (though that is a long discussion for another time).

The wider sense of psychoanalysis and psychodynamics

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the defining features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the unconscious. In such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum, transference oscillates with dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and unconscious or non-conscious are part of a total spectrum, to which total access even in principle is contradictory, but which exerts its awesome pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study the sacred ‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’,—but in
the company of angels, of the whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’, or the ‘Moment’ of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part III, On the Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883); and all of these are in continuity with what has been known as psychoanalysis; and constant and endless dynamic effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic discovery, *not* repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the light of this, also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies becomes minor, by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments and explorations, and pattern transcendings, in the work.

For economy of illustration, I refer again to my illustration in my discussion of Ehrenberg’s work (Wilkinson, 2003a):

§17. Here, of course, also comes up the whole business of the way we access fantasy, or phantasy, or the imaginal, in our work, our own and that of others, and the whole business of countertransference based interaction. Ehrenberg’s book has many many rich and subtle examples; but I found I needed to reach them from my own intimate intuitions, to make sense of her work, so here is one of my own.

An abused and agoraphobic client, who had progressed well, had made the decision to move to another part of the country and see me more infrequently on trips to where I work. She then came to a session, when she seemed very stuck and ‘back to square one’. I was curious about this and decided not to get drawn in, but just waited and listened and tracked my response. I became aware of feeling subtly hypnotized and seduced. It was rather pleasant, cosy, much belying the ostensible communication content, which was despondent and had returned to old preoccupations and patterns. I remarked to her—(perhaps, to her mind, right out of the blue)—‘she’d make a great seducer’! Then I explained the route by which I had got to the point of saying that, and what emerged, in the dialogue, was that she was feeling abandoned by me, and felt she needed to convey that she was ‘no better’, thereby to hold me in to continue to see her in the new situation. (She had a tendency to believe she could only see me if she had ‘real problems’, so any progress was felt by her as a loss!)

But—as with Ehrenberg’s many examples—the element of *enactment*, timing, and subtle enmeshment went way beyond a simple *verbal* interpretation of a verbal fantasy, for instance: ‘you are feeling abandoned by me’. Had I confined myself to that, it would have been lifeless and stereotyped. The element of seduction, and then of amusement when we both ‘got’ what was going on, and so forth, as with Ehrenberg’s instances, were all there, and essential to it. The element of *timing*, connected to the periodicity to which Freud attached such importance, e.g. *Beyond the pleasure principle* (Freud 1920/1984) and *A note on the mystic writing pad* (Freud, 1925/1984), is one element of ‘good interpretation’ which is *irreducibly present* even on the classical model, and cannot be accounted for by it. Indeed, *interpretations themselves* are in fact a particular, perhaps a unique, type of *performative utterance*, (cf., JL Austin, 1975), and the classical model, in its ideal form, collapses at the outset therefore.

The verbal response was *both* an epitomisation (condensed! homeopathic! As all such interventions are both ‘homeopathic’ by their nature), and was an enactment which *participated* in the interaction, and, of course, is a *combined total communication* which partakes as such of the nature of implicit or phenomenological ‘knowing’ in the Stern/Merleau-Ponty sense. If one were to try to account for all the dimensions of
this interaction—the body dimension, the erotic dimension, the attachment dimension, the eye-contact or absence of it, the mutual delight in the counter-transferential turnaround, the element of logical paradox which comes into such situations, the element of withdrawing to a meta-level perspective which makes such an intervention possible, the element of ‘prescribing the symptom’ in it, etc, etc,—the analysis would be endless (one gets a little sense of what it would or might be from Being and time, Heidegger, 1962). In other words, any attempt to account for this, in terms merely of a verbally articulable content, is a non-starter. (Wilkinson, 2003a)

Conclusion: the implications of Stern’s great work

In this conception the core psychoanalytic discovery of dynamic effects and processes remains undimmed; there is no need for an ultimate distinction between verbal and non-verbal, implicit and explicit; and there is no need for any apartheid between psychoanalytic and humanistic-existential approaches. As, by implication, Stern’s Gestalt colleagues in ‘Creative License’ indicate!

But Daniel Stern, in this great book, has come nearer than anyone else from within the psychoanalytic community to showing us the way to this resolution.

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Résumé  Cet article explore les implications du dernier livre de Daniel Stern sur « Le Moment Présent », ainsi qu’une série d’articles sur la créativité, s’appuyant sur la Gestalt Thérapie. J’ examine comment Stern parvient à la fois à se démarquer de la psychanalyse classique et à se positionner dans une relation subtile avec elle, tout en mettant au point, en psychothérapie, un modèle de connaissance intersubjective et implicite du « moment présent », qui lui confère de grandes affinités avec les approches humanistes – tradition existentielle –, affinités qu’il reconnaît courageusement dans ce livre. De plus, en m’inspirant à la fois de la littérature et des travaux de Julian Jaynes, je suggère que certaines des oppositions qu’il invoque dans ce livre sont toujours, en tant que telles, délimitées par la tradition et le mode de pensée psychanalytiques classiques; qu’il les a simplement inversées; et qu’à partir d’un point de vue élargi, sociétal et historique sur la réalité humaine, il est possible de réaliser un concept complet « d’être-dans-le-monde » (Heidegger), pour lequel l’antithèse de l’approche psychanalytique/existentielle s’effondre, mais qui néanmoins reste psychodynamique au sens fondamental du terme. Les travaux de Stern constituent à part entière une œuvre pionnière majeure.