Editorial: Psychotherapy, fascism and constitutional history

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Abstract This World Congress issue is much concerned with the political unpreparedness of we psychotherapists. Is ‘professionalization’ a mask for anti-constitutionalism? The processes of psychotherapy are a microcosm of the essential power situation, and our tendencies to take constitutional short-cuts alienate us from the roots of our values. Power issues in these papers include how we deal with our disagreements by hegemonic theoretical manoeuvres (Dr Shnecko); the alienating roots of the fragmentation, and the primitive fascist and racist reactions, in political organization in central Europe (John Salwendi); the non-negotiated character of the normal forms of outcome research in psychotherapy, and the need for a more consensual qualitative model of quality assurance (Chahid Fourati); the marginalization of the schizophrenic client, and the demonstration that non-marginalization is deeply therapeutic (Dr Dorman); the limited degree of specific subtlety in the law which would afford clients and psychotherapists appropriate protection (Annabel Bell-Boulé); and other briefer relevant contributions. The lack of constitutional ground on which to face our radical power issues and differences, in psychotherapy, leaves a vacuum for power-mongering, and marginalization, paralleling the wider vacuum in our political world as a whole. Orwell evoked this in Nineteen Eighty Four, and these trends are alive in the modern, post-Hitler, era, though no longer called ‘national socialism’. Heidgger is a major example of how serious the attraction is even for the most brilliant. The fault line which opens the doors to National Socialism is the political equivalent of loss of memory, involving a direct alliance of central leadership (Führer principle) and populist base. This fascist defence against isolation is mirrored in the forms of schizoid concreteness experienced by the marginalized. But rational political norms winnow through our better values in the long run. Our psyche is also a constitutional psyche, which has entered upon the social contract. Our psychotherapy politics fail to honour this at their peril.

‘Wisdom gives strength to the wise man more than ten rulers that are in a city’. Ecclesiastes, Ch. 8, V. 9.

This issue coincides with the Second World Congress of Psychotherapy. It is concerned in a major way with psychotherapy and power, the issues of power and of alienation. Psychotherapists deal often quite confidently with matters of personal power, yet are often naively unaware of political and constitutional implications of what they do, and what they are setting in motion.

By default we psychotherapists are frequently prone to three related types of errors or vices; we become:

(i) naive causal reductionists in the arena of predictive explanation, and intervention;
(ii) indoctrinationists in the realm of knowledge and ideology; and
(iii) centralists, if not fascists, in the realm of politics.
Fascists? An absurd and extreme claim, surely? Whilst recognizing the clumsiness of language in charting new and unknown waters, it will become less absurd as we consider the implications of constitutional history. But, so much the worse for constitutional history, if it leads to such absurd conclusions, one may argue. Why on earth should psychotherapists be constitutional historians and politicians? Have we not got enough on our plate without such irrelevances?

Or are such reactions an avoidance? Do psychotherapists now need to be constitutional historians? Should this even be part of the training curriculum? Is there a level of ignorance or avoidance of political implications amongst psychotherapists, which can only be remedied explicitly within the training process? Are these merely ironical questions, or are they truly serious questions we should face? Are we democratic psychotherapy organizations destined, if we avoid these questions, to end up as mere bureaucracies, more or less united or disunited? Is the current catchword slogan of ‘professionalization’ a mere mask for anti-constitutional, anti-democratic, centralism and autocracy?

Recreation of identity and essential power situations

The processes of psychotherapy—phenomenological processes essentially of the reconstitution of identity, radical, powerful and potentially invasive—are inevitably a microcosm of the wider political processes of our world, and of the forms of its political identity. This explains how, as is well known to all of us, whether we like it or not, issues of power and authority get right into the depths, into the very tissue, of all aspects of psychotherapy and psychotherapy training. Psychotherapy trainings are a veritable laboratory recreation of the essential power situation in all its aspects, or some would say, a transferential re-enactment of it. But such a re-enactment, with its extraordinary opportunity to explore power issues, is commonly reduced to personal historic or family terms, instead of the power situation as such. Even those psychotherapies, such as Gestalt, which take frame, field or systemic conditions seriously, in theory, often fail to make such knowledge active in the political sense. Andrew Samuels’ work (e.g. Samuels, 1993, 1996) is one fine exception.

As we engage in the processes of acquiring power as a Profession, we are inevitably caught up with all the issues of the practice of power, including the most questionable. In the institutional context, our naiveté and ignorance, our tendencies to deal with issues of power simply by control, our quietistic tendency to bury our heads, politically, ostrich-like, in the sand, our failure adequately to inform and consult, and our consequent tendencies to take constitutional short-cuts, are all trends which alienate us from the roots of our values. They also seriously expose us the critique of those, like Jeffrey Masson (Masson, 1990), who would hold that psychotherapy is essentially a means of subjugation, indoctrination and abuse of the client. For if the power structures of psychotherapy are totalitarian, how can our practice fail to be contaminated in significant measure by them?

Power issues and the papers

The five main papers in this Second World Congress issue bear on the degree of our awareness and educated understanding of the power issues. Power issues at stake in these papers include:

- our tendencies to deal with our disagreements by hegemonic or imperialistic theoretical manoeuvres based often on a quasi-medical model (including integrationism in this), rather than a genuine idiographic phenomenological pluralism which would enable us genuinely to explore and confront, not simply avoid, our differences (Dr Shnecko’s paper, On harvesting diversities into a dynamic directedness);
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- the alienated, and alienating roots, of the fragmentation, and the primitively conflictual responses to it, leading to fascistic and racist reactions, in political organization in central Europe (John Salvendy's paper, *The dynamics of prejudice in Central Europe*);
- the *non-negotiated* and imposed character, and implication, of the normal forms of outcome research in psychotherapy, and the need for a more consensual, *communally* negotiated, and qualitative, model of quality assurance to replace them with (Chahid Fourali's paper, *Quality assurance in psychotherapy and counselling*);
- the marginalization of the schizophrenic client, and of their personal world, in orthodox psychiatry, and the demonstration that the opposite of marginalization is radically therapeutic (Dr Daniel Dorman's paper, *Successful psychotherapy of schizophrenia: patient and therapist look at a process*);
- the perilously limited or ambiguous degree to which we can rely on the kind of *specific* (idiographic and phenomenological) subtlety in the law which would afford both clients and their psychotherapists appropriate protection and support, and bring about a genuinely negotiated and principled judicial outcome (Annabell Bell-Boulé's paper, *Psychotherapy and the law*).

The on-going dialogue in response to Denis Postle's paper, arguing the hegemonic style of United Kingdom Council for Psychotherapy in particular, and by implication the national and international umbrella organizations in general, carries within it a *cry from the depths*, a cry of protest at elements of fascistic modes of marginalization—for instance, *Totschweigen*, the German, as Denis Postle notes in this issue, for 'deadly silence', an active, lethal form of silence, *ignoring something to death* (Totton, 1999)—which elements, the cry says, have even entered the pages of this Journal.

**Constitutional slippage and constitutional vacuum in psychotherapy**

So, on one side, there is implicit in all these papers, in varying degrees, a sense that there is no sure constitutional and political ground, no basis in our established forms of organization, training and practice, upon which we may clearly stand to face our radical power issues and differences, in psychotherapy. In this respect psychotherapy, probably far more than the established professions, becomes a potential creative *barometer* for society and politics at large, akin to the reluctant European federal solutions in e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, Ireland. And this lack of a grounded constitutionality leaves a vacuum for both competing paranoid power-mongering at the centre, and for apathetic withdrawal or marginalization in the general community of the profession—a vicious circle of extremes between the individual, and the institutionalized collective, leaving the vacuum which annuls the constitutional centre.

The full significance of this vacuum only becomes understandable in the light of the wider society and politics of which psychotherapeutic politics and society is a microcosm. For it parallels the wider vacuum in our political world as a whole.

**A social vacuum leading to a new kind of fascism: individual versus collective**

A useful weathervane of this vacuum in our social fabric is offered by Ernest Gellner. Gellner's posthumous work, mentioned in the last issue of this Journal, *Language and Solitude* (1998), identifies 'the Hapsburg dilemma' faced by Wittgenstein and Malinowski, the dilemma between (i) radical libertarian individualism and (ii) 'volk-ish' anti-liberal collectivism.

He illustrates the failure to recognize the possibility of a third position. There is, on his own hypothesis, for him nothing between the two, although in Britain he thinks they are *combined*
in all party traditions. He has no recognition of the constitutionalism of the third position, in its forms of either a constitutional conservatism of the patriotic past, a genuine historical-constitutional conservatism, or a constitutional liberalism, or socialism of the left, which still recognizes constitutional evolution not revolution, with its own appeal to history (e.g. Tawney, 1990; Hill, 1997). Gellner is lacking the category of the rationally communally constitutional. He is left solely with the anti-historical anti-rational ‘volk-ish’ or populist nationalism form of rightism, to which revolutionary socialism in practice, as in the Soviet Union, China and Cuba, tends to revert. This sets out, deliberately or by default, to destroy both constitutionality and historic communal memory, the memory of national and transnational civilization. Orwell’s evocation of ‘Big Brother’ and of ‘Doublethink’ in Nineteen Eighty Four (1949) catches well both the universal reliance on the Fuhrer (Leader) principle, and the methods of annihilation of memory.

The failure to recognize constitutionalism in Gellner’s very representative work is a symptom of the very loss of memory in question. It exemplifies by default the abolition of memory creeping anti-constitutional fascism tends to induce. Once again, I am using ‘fascism’, ‘national socialism’ and ‘anti-constitutionalism’ for a universal trend which takes different forms and is hard to either name or define accurately, but whose essence is the active and nihilistic destruction of historically grounded constitutionalism of both right and left. It is overlooked that apparently ‘progressive’ trends in politics and social mores may possibly be ‘national socialist’ in the above sense, and that every populist cry for ‘something must be done’ strengthens populist centralism. Thus, in present-day Britain, New Labour ‘Blairism’ increasingly exhibits many such characteristics, whether in the pressure which led to the sacking of a national football manager, the populist exploitation of the death of a princess, an enquiry into racism in the police, or the media presentation of a building to celebrate the Millenium, the Dome. Certainly none of this type of data is yet conclusive, yet, despite the increasing sophistication of modern electorates, such as that of the United States during the Clinton impeachment saga, and the robustness of the American Constitution in withstanding the impeachment process, the age of constitutional democracy, more and more plausibly, is apparently dying. The new ‘national socialism’, if this perception is valid, will not now be called by that name. Nevertheless, here it becomes necessary to remind ourselves squarely of what we would understandably wish to forget, the significance of Adolf Hitler.

The constitutional safety net

‘We are all national socialists now’, says John Lukacs (The Duel, 1991; The Hitler of History, 1997), the émigré Hungarian master historian,1 whose latest book and fine summing up, The Hitler of History (Lukacs, 1997) gives us the current state of historical thinking about what Hitler means for us today—reminding us that in deep historical terms, euroucentrically at any rate, this short, brutal and genocidal century (1914–1991, First World War to German Reunification) is, and is still, Hitler’s Century. Lukacs (cf. also Goldberg’s arguments, 1996, in this Journal) also reminds us that to treat Hitler as mad, purely warped by his upbringing, demonic, or as inspired idiot, are all avoidances of the moral and political questions he presents, and which we still face—including, in the present context, the recognition that ‘we are all national socialists now’. Hitler marched right into the void of Gellner’s ‘Hapsburg dilemma’. He appeared to offer a short-cut out. Highly intelligent and profound major thinkers and

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1 Neglected author of major worked on our epoch and upon the epistemology of historical consciousness, such as The Passing of the Modern Age (1970), Historical Consciousness—or the remembered Past (1968), The Last European War (1976), The Duel (between Hitler and Churchill in 1940, 1991), and a variety of others on related themes and also some of personal witness to his experience. A joint review of both Language and Solitude and The Hitler of History is envisaged for the next issue.
artists followed him there. The case of Heidegger starkly faces us with this. Gellner is right in catching that the dilemma for many in central Europe, particularly in Germany, has been that there was for them no constitutional ‘middle term’ between volkish populism/collectivism and pure individualism. Both for Hitler and for Heidegger this was so. Lukacs notes that a wise West German parliamentarian from 1946 to 1950, Heinz Krekeler,

... opposed the fundamental sentence ‘all state power derives from the people’ in the West German constitution—with a simple argument that my colleagues found very convincing. The making of popular sovereignty absolute—means that the sovereign people may again dispose of democracy and introduce a dictatorship again. There must exist something that limits popular democracy, and these are the basic values and basic rights of [our constitution]. (Lukacs, 1997, p. 20)

Lukacs comments (ibid.)

An edifying instance of true conservatism, inspired by the then recent memories of Hitler and the Third Reich.

The long, slow, laborious, hesitant, cautious, dilemma-ridden, constitutional march of the European community towards political union, towards the indissoluble linkage of France and Germany in particular, aiming to make the vindictive mistakes of another Versailles Treaty impossible forever, shows nevertheless in a similar way that the lessons have been taken very seriously. Neither can any part of Europe alone or indeed America alone intellectually exercise what F.R. Leavis called ‘the Athenian function’, however brilliant in parts in isolation, without the risk of either being marginal, or being racially hegemonic, let alone being able to explore our affinities and differences with the experience of, for instance, the Arab peoples, India, China, Tibet, Japan, Africa. Whether in European federal union, or in the ‘Europe des patries’ of de Gaulle, a constitutionalism of difference is necessary.

Significance of Heidegger as a Nazi

The alternative is an absolutization of national characteristics, for instance in Heidegger’s representative attempt to combine a racial emphasis on the capacity for primal originating creativity of the German spirit, with that of ancient Greece and the pre-Socratics and tragedians. The greatest philosopher of the century, pioneer of the existential grounding of knowledge and action, and of the rediscovery of the question of being, was a Nazi. In Heidegger and Nazism Victor Farias (Farias, 1989) shows fairly conclusively that the ‘authentic individual’ of the Being and Time of 1927 (1961) had become at a stroke by 1933 the ‘authentic Volk’ of Nazism, identified with, and recognizing itself in, its Führer (cf. Farias, 1989, pp. 157–158). The first philosopher of the age Martin Heidegger remained an adherent to Nazism to the end of his days (1976), an adherence not accidental but congruently central to his philosophical stance.

Despite the sickening aspects of this, as with Hitler, it would still be well not to end the matter with the reflex knee-jerk condemnations of Heidegger which usually follow, but to turn it round: what is it about National Socialism or Fascism which attracted so many of the greatest writers of the century, as Orwell pointed out at the time? What made it seem something far more than backwoods politics, then, is related to what makes the emerging blandly modern forms of it—not labelled thus—seem powerful, popular and massively electable, now. Heidegger was but the most dramatic case; Yeats, Jung, Pound, Joyce, Wyndham Lewis, D.H. Lawrence, T.S. Eliot, Ortega y Gasset, Paul de Man, and others, were all in varying degrees drawn in. What is the fault line that made, and still makes, this vision, despite its genocidal brutality, so powerful, far more attractive than the now more or

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less dead vision of communism? Are we indeed, as Lukacs says, 'all National Socialists now'? Is Tony Blair the successor of Oswald Mosley? Yet another socialist turned National Socialist? Why in this century has our hold on constitutionality turned to quicksand? For the annihilation of 'cumbersome' constitutionality is the heart of National Socialisms, old and new.

Constitutionality, self-limitation of power, memory as identity

The fault line which opens the doors to National Socialism is the political equivalent of loss of memory. That is the direct link with individual psychotherapy. The loss arises on the basis of the loss of the consciousness of history, and it substitutes pure unmediated intoxicated identification with the upsurge of primal power—a not uncommon implicit model in modern psychotherapy. The equivalent of memory in the political domain is constitutionality, mediation, the basis of continuity, and the possibility of history. Personal memory presupposes, then maintains, a coherence of identity, created from childhood onwards by a complex process of implicit negotiation (graphically described by Daniel Stern in particular, 1995). As psychotherapists well know, any achievement of coherence by serious lop-sidedness, tyrannizing of one part of the forms of identity by another, or fragmentation and inconsistent and unsustained coherence, will also impair, narrow or even jeopardize memory processes. Splitting of personality, dissociation, at its very heart is splitting of memory structures. The psychotherapeutic healing of trauma from Freud onwards has therefore, of its essence, included the healing of memory. Without coherence of identity as the basis of memory there can be neither personal narrative and history, nor any scientific definition of knowledge and reality. This has been epistemically established in the West at least since Kant. 'Show me your concept of memory, and I will tell you what your concept of identity is.'

In parallel with this, States that lack constitutional forms of one kind or another—these are not to be conceived simply in terms of modern Western forms—will lack the conditions for history, for truthful political narrative, and long-term co-operative activity. This is the sense in which all types of government that work long term are types of government by consent. The last 500 years in both West and East have seen the gradual transition from Mediaeval, to democratic and egalitarian, forms of constitutionality. The most powerful forms of political counter-movement of this century have indeed been those whose essence has been the direct annihilation of constitutionality, but upon a direct alliance of central leadership (Führer principle) and a populist base, offering the apparent short-cut to political identity which by-passes the laborious process of creating or maintaining constitutionality.²

Alienation, fundamentalism and powerplay

But, why by-pass constitutionality and the forms of historical memory? The extremes of external and internal exile, loneliness, vengeful woundedness, and alienation drive us to it, as John Salvendy suggests in his paper. The basis of co-operative communication is lacking at a communal level, except still, and transiently, at peak historic moments like the breaching of the Berlin Wall (it already seems such a very long time ago). Most of what any of us ever desire to communicate to anyone is lost. Co-operative communication, actual mutual person-to-person communication, is the exception at best, not the rule. Some, such as Proust (needless to say, in a mere six parts!) would say—the exception which never happens. There is no constitutional paradigm which is rootedly believed in, which will carry the mutual recognition of, and communication between, difference.

²Graphically illustrated on all sides in the current Balkans conflict.
But, this is one of the aspects of the human predicament which lies behind the recourse to fundamentalisms. But it is not only fundamentalisms to which human beings unable, or in fear of being unable, to communicate, resort; pragmatic powerplay, amoral pursuit of power for power's sake, is another major option. Both fundamentalism and powerplay are also forms of concretization, in Piaget's sense, something well-known to us in psychotherapy, which prevent mindfulness, thinking, the full historical awareness, or memory, of events, and by the same token awareness of the present moment too. As Dr Dorman's comments in this issue: 'Change in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia is, I think, the gradual superseding of primitive perceptions and adaptations to that state with more reality-based (more abstract, more conscious if you will, perception of the internal and external worlds) adult thinking and feeling.'

Thus a link is made between the political responses to failure to communicate, and personal retreat into schizoid concreteness. The defence against isolation taking the form of attack exhibited by fundamentalism and powerplay is mirrored in the forms of schizoid concreteness experienced by those most alienated and withdrawn and most unable to counter-attack. This partly explains the temptation to use the word 'schizophrenic' as a label for Hitler, and Heidegger. The lack of the mediation which the capacity for thought provides at the personal level is the equivalent of the loss of constitutionality at the political level. Concretization is the short-cut in thought which parallels the fascist short-cut in politics.

When, then, fundamentalism and pragmatic powerplay are combined the result in this epoch is that we get populist nationalism—national socialism in its many forms—which always carries with it concretizing elements of both extreme pragmatism, and fundamentalist absolutism, in combination. How we wrestle with the issues of 'constitutional rationality', and its opposites, in both psychotherapy and its applications within the wider community, are at the heart of the contributions in this issue. Constitutionality, and historical awareness, of course, like rationality itself, are not the creators of the values they protect; they can only be the servant of other, more primary, and, so to speak, more proto-rational, values. But, like rationality itself, even though in one sense neutral about the content of values, they also gradually establish, in Kant's sense, 'transcendental' criteria as a medium though which those other, proto-rational, values are slowly historically sifted, scrutinized, and brought into evaluative juxtaposition with one another, where there is conflict between them. This is what is lacking in the Fuhrer principle of a Heidegger, which by-passes the social contract, leaping straight from originarially collective intuition, to its social absolutization in the Fuhrer principle. But this emphasis on rationality does not entail preference of 'head over heart', denial of the wisdom of the body, exclusion of faith, intuition or phenomenological data, or the supersession of religion by science; all of such issues are themselves encompassed within the wider dialogue of reason in this generic and ecumenical sense. And the task, likewise, of therapeutic constitutionality is to square the circles of giving a voice to radically incompatible fundamental values and interests, without their suppressing others—an only partially realizable aspiration, by definition.

Constitutionality, then, is to political dialogue, including in psychotherapy, what rationality is to scientific, philosophic and religious. Their Voltairean function is to enable dialogue, and to provide criteria of aberrations from it, not to prescribe content in the mode of fundamentalism or pragmatic powerplay—national socialism. Both constitutionality and rationality presuppose the function of memory, and so of reflexive historical consciousness, whereas populist nationalism and ahistoricism, as Orwell already saw in Nineteen Eighty four (Orwell, 1949), are grounded in the denial, suppression, and annihilation of historical memory.

None of this implies that political units will not behave unconstitutionally or unlawfully even if they are constitutionally established, and the forms of constitutionality itself may be deeply arbitrary and partially unjust, as in the British state founded upon the Monarchy, the
Hereditary principle, and legality rooted in the common law, with its bias towards archaism. Memory itself is inherently in part an archaic form. But the creative paradox of this is that, if the American Constitution came well and robustly through the Clinton Impeachment crisis perhaps this too was through the compellingness of its well-established archaic authority. In Jaynesian terms (Jaynes, 1990) truthful memory itself stands in need of authorization. Therefore, the hostility to the past as past deprives us of the one neutral basis we may have for non-arbitrary forms of mediation.

An international journal like this, too, then, cannot escape being slowly forced to recognize and face what a thin line divides taking up and advocating a pluralistic position protected by constitutional rationality, and holding a brief for a particular partisan position. I will not draw explicit parallels with what is happening or may be held to be happening in the organizations with which I am familiar, including the UKCP and the EAP, which underwrites this Journal. But we enter the power vacuum between private individualism and blind collectivism, of which Gellner writes, at our peril. The Strasbourg declaration’s emphases upon independence, freedom, scientific validity and multiplicity of method, which the wisdom of the founders of the EAP has given us, cannot be carried forward other than constitutionally; it implies constitutionality.

This must be more than lip-service; and this is why we psychotherapists must begin to become constitutional historians, and embed this awareness in our trainings. We must learn to give our members, and our trainees and students, the means and the tools with which to supersede us and overcome us.

Approaching the Second World Congress of Psychotherapy

And as we approach the Second World Congress, the papers in this expanded issue reveal a pan-European and International flavour; they face our predicament.

Thus the papers are also about:

1. The deliberate exploring and contacting of what is ideologically foreign to us, for resolving conflict in psychotherapy (Dr Slunecko’s paper), which he calls strangification (‘entfremdung’ in the German).
2. The roots of European political conflict and prejudice (John Salvendy), and steps towards understanding and overcoming them.
3. The shift from externally applied outcome studies of evaluation in psychotherapy, to a more participatory, consensual, yet rigorous, quality assurance model (Chahid Fourali).
4. Our understanding of the power and simplicity of the radical therapeutic process of long-term psychotherapeutic treatment of schizophrenia (Dr Daniel Dorman).
5. Our increasing exposure as psychotherapists to legal processes and the difficult yet still potentially creative implications of this (Annabel Bell-Boulé). There are also: briefer papers from Japan, on diversified task-oriented psychotherapy, which offers a very wide concept of integration, and from Siberia, on group psychotherapy seeking to understand the roots of homosexuality without stigmatizing. Denis Postle ripostes to Michael Pokorny’s comments on his paper published in the March 1998 issue (with a letter from Richard House on the same issue), and Postle protests on this Editor’s publishing them unchallenged, with the unpluralistic marginalizing and dismissive tendency Postle analyses, and which might perhaps, without being precious, serve as a significant example of what I am speaking of in this editorial. There are documents commemorating the EAP Conference in France last year; brief reports of conferences attended by the editors (brief contributions of this type are welcomed from our readership), and notice of a watershed legal judgement in a judicial review involving the UKCP in the United Kingdom.
We are all as psychotherapists different/mutually foreign, now, and in working with our mutual strangeness lies our chance of progression, Thomas Slunecko tells us in his searching paper. Europe carries such huge burdens of ethnic cruelty and mutual injustice from its history that it is almost as if we are all refugees now, and need a relevant psychotherapeutic enabling, to learn to live together, John Salvendy's wide-ranging survey of the European situation of plural diaspora seems to imply. We are all under quality appraisal now, or need to be, Chahid Fourali indicates: is this alien or can we be at home with it and draw out its true communal and managerially affirmative potential—is it a different concept of evaluation or a foreign one—and how does it sit with outcome research? It is consensus-based and participatory, he suggests, and not to be feared; and in the process he offers this Journal a glimpse which has hitherto been rare, of the performance and style of a form of cognitive-behavioural psychotherapy. We are all (or all could be) schizophrenic now, Dr Dorman intimates, in Jaynesian style, yet however alien we can be reached, and the failure to reach us would make us, or did make us, schizophrenic. Again, Annabell Bell-Boulé tells us we are all exposed to unwitting vulnerability to legal accusation now, all liable, like Kafka's K, to arrest for an unknown crime or fault—unless we make the law our friend rather than an instrument of alienation—and this, from American experience, is a double-edged sword, although she shows that there are aspects of United Kingdom law, in the idiographic character of its common law appeal to cases and to specific precedent, which gives it analogies with phenomenologically based psychotherapy.

The constitutional psyche

Let us take seriously, what Andrew Samuels (1993) points out was true from the beginning for Freud in psychotherapy; our psyche is a political psyche (for Fairbairn the Scot we may add, it is even also a legal psyche), and we must accordingly treat it and ourselves as enfranchised. For our psyche is also a constitutional psyche, which has entered upon the social contract. Our psychotherapy politics fails to honour this at its peril.

References


Résumé Ce volume dévolu au Congrès mondial s'intéresse tout particulièrement au fait que nous les psychotérapiètes sommes si peu politiquement préparés. Le professionnalisme serait-il un masque pour l'anticonstitutionnalité? Le processus en jeu dans la psychothérapie est un microcosme de
l’essentiel d’une situation de pouvoir et nos tendances à prendre des raccourcis constitutionnels, nous aliène des racines de nos valeurs. Les problèmes du pouvoir dans ces articles comprennent entre autres: la manière de résoudre nos désaccords par des manoeuvres d’hégémonie théorique (Dr Slunecko); les racines aliénantes de la fragmentation et les réactions primitives, fascistes et racistes dans l’organisation politique d’Europe centrale (John Salvendy); le caractère non-négocié des formes normales d’aboutissement de recherche en psychothérapie et le besoin d’un modèle qualitatif plus consensuel de garantie de qualité (Chahid Fouraid); la mise en marge du client schizophrène et la démonstration que son intégration est profondément thérapeutique (Dr Dorman); le degré limité de subtilité spécifique de la loi qui donnerait aux clients ainsi qu’aux thérapeutes une protection adéquate (Anabell Bell-Boulé); ainsi que d’autres contributions plus brèves mais tout aussi pertinentes.

L’absence d’un terrain constitutionnel sur lequel on pourrait, en psychothérapie faire face aux questions radicales de pouvoir et de différence, crée un vide occupé par les politicoallieries et la mise en marge et qui reflète le vide bien plus large dans notre monde politique en général. Orwell à évoqué ceci dans “1984”, et ces tendances sont actives dans notre ère moderne, post-Hitler, bien qu’elles ne soient plus appelées “socialisme national”.

Heidegger est un exemple frappant de la force de cette tentation même pour les hommes brillants. La ligne de fracture qui ouvrira les portes au socialisme national est l’équivalent politique d’une perte de mémoire nécessitant l’alliance directe d’un pouvoir central (principe du Führer) et d’une base populaire. Cette défense fasciste contre l’isolement est reflétée dans les formes schizoides très concrettes qui sont l’expérience de ceux qui sont en marge. Mais les normes politiques rationnelles, en fin de compte, passent au crible nos meilleurs valeurs. Notre psyché est aussi une psyché constitutionnelle qui fait parti du contrat social. Nos politiques psychothérapeutiques ignorent ceci à leur peril!

Zusammenfassung Diese Ausgabe des Weltkongress beschäftigt sich eingehend damit, daß Psychotherapeuten häufig politisch unvorbereitet sind. Ist ‘Professionalisation’ eine Maske für Anti-Konstitutionalismus? Die Prozesse in der Psychotherapie stellen einen Mikrokosmos der essentiellen Machtsituation dar, und unsere Tendenz zu konstitutionellen Abkürzungen entfernt uns von den Wurzeln unserer Werte. Hauptpunkte in diesen Artikeln behandeln u.a. wie wir mit unseren Diskrepanzen umgehen, indem wir hegemonisch theoretische Manöver vollziehen (Dr Slunecko); die entfremdeten Wurzeln des Gedankenzerfalls und die primitiven faschistischen und rassistischen Reaktionen innerhalb politischer Organisationen in Zentraleuropa (John Salvendy); den nicht bestimmten Charakter der Standardformen der Ergebnisforschung in der Psychotherapie und die Notwendigkeit eines einheitlicheren qualitativen Modells der Qualitätssicherung (Chahid Fouraid); die Eingrenzung des schizophrenen Patienten und der Beweis, daß Nicht-Eingrenzung sich äußerst günstig für die Therapie erweist (Dr Dorman); der begrenzte spezifische Subtilität der Gesetzgebung, die Klienten und Psychotherapeuten gleichermaßen Schutz bieten kann (Anabell Bell-Boulé); und weitere relevante Kurzbeiträge. Das Fehlen einer konstitutionellen Basis, auf der wir uns unseren radikalen Machtausdruck und Differenzen stellen können, hinfällt; in der Psychotherapie ein Vakuum für Machthandel und Marginalisation parallel zu dem größeren Vakuum in unserer politischen Gesamtwelt. Orwell beschwor dies in seinem Bestseller 1984 und diese Tendenz ist in der modernen Nach-Hitler-Ära immer noch lebendig. Sie wird jetzt jedoch nicht mehr als ‘Nationalsozialismus’ bezeichnet. Heidegger ist ein Beispiel dafür, daß selbst für den brillantesten Geist die Versuchung groß ist. Die Störung, die die Tür zum Nationalsozialismus öffnet, ist das politische Äquivalent zu Gedächtnisverlust, die eine direkte Allianz von zentraler Leitung (Führerprinzip) und einer populistischen Basis mit sich bringt. Solch faschistische Abwehr der Isolation spiegelt sich in den Formen schizoiden Konkretisierung, wie von Eingegrenztene erlebt, wieder. Aber rationale politische Normen filtern auf lange Sicht unsere besseren Werte heraus. Unsere Psyche ist auch eine konstitutionelle Psyche, die die gesellschaftlichen Normen anerkennt. Unser politischer Standpunkt in der Psychotherapie schenkt diesem Punkt nicht genügend Aufmerksamkeit, was zur Gefahr werden kann.

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