Abstract. This dialogue, the first of two (the second will illustrate the thesis via Jaynes' theory of the creation of consciousness), contrasts a radical thesis and integration regarding causality in psychotherapy, labelled 'phenomenological causality' with the standard model of causality, linear causality. With this positivistic or physicalist/neuro-scientific models of causality conform, and hermeneutic models contrast themselves, excluding causality, in favour of personal agency, synchronicity, expression of meaning, and so on; illustrations from the literature are given. Phenomenological causality is a model of causality, not linear, but a synthesis of the other two positions, involving: (1) a multi-tense, multi-time-directional, transtemporal recapitulation account of the time process involved; (2) an integrative multi-causal matrix model of causality in the realm of consciousness as such, compatible with insights and data from neuro-science and neural Darwinism; (3) a concept of primary interrelatedness, interaction with all levels of being, participation in world-creation (regarded as madness and blasphemy in the West), and its shaping through core metaphors; (4) a pure process-based model; permanencing and thingness being simply the forms/ metaphors which pure process takes.

Psychotherapy, and integration, thus obtain a philosophical basis in their own right; superseding borrowing from the major philosophical strands, psychotherapy is free to come of age.
Tell me about your controversial thesis about causality in psychotherapy, which you believe will make possible a unified field theory in psychotherapy. That's a very big claim. I want to begin with a basic challenge and question.

Theories of change and theories of causality

Your theory at the least has to be a theory of change in psychotherapy. Now, every psychotherapy has a theory of change, and this is one of the defining elements of psychotherapy. What can you add? Why is a theory of change not a theory of causality in psychotherapy? To open this up, why don't we start from, at least in outline, an example, or at least a type of example.

Philosophical Psychotherapist

By all means.

Working Psychotherapist

It's a very familiar situation in our work, when a significant shift, or change, or healing moment, for our client, occurs. It may be through a challenge; or an insight; a freeing from shame about some aspect of experience; an acknowledgement of mistake or of invasiveness; a deep recognition; or simply through a spontaneous expression of love or concern; but in some such way one of those moments happens, of deep change in therapy, which we experience from time to time.

Change situations

Now, each psychotherapy theory will have its own concept in context of what happens here. Significantly, they will be able to track it in detail, with concurrent or (e.g. using video) retrospective, running commentary; examination transcript method, as well as supervision itself, is based on this! Such low level theory-based conceptualizations might be: reduction of transference; alteration in self-messages; internalization of the good object; symbolic transformation within the signifying chain; assimilation of the archetype; strengthening of the therapeutic alliance; increase in contact or awareness; redecision at the level of script; experience of reparenting; reframing; and so on. They will have a detailed theoretical framework making sense of the moment of change (cf. e.g. Straker & Becket, 1997). The measure of parallelism which enables detailed description in different frameworks is also striking.

So it is an open question whether the theoretical differences between these may be differences of substance, or simply more of dialect. As the differences of methodology deepen, this will feed back into the content of the work, reducing the parallelisms. Dreams reflect differences in the content of approaches and their symbolisms, as is well known; Jungian clients dream Jungian dreams and Freudian clients dream Freudian dreams. Active prescriptive therapeutic methodologies, such as Neuro-Linguistic Programming or Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy, determine the content of client work to a significant extent; nor are non-prescriptive therapies neutral. Transpersonal approaches will be prone to evoke certain kinds of content. And so on. This might indeed almost afford a working criterion of the degree of difference or affinity of diverse psychotherapies. There are deeper level patternings less affected by surface divergences in terms of content and process. Whether a higher level model of causality is redundant

None of this much matters, for our purposes. There are many familiar questions: how we
negotiate those differences between theories of change in psychotherapy; how we verify in terms of outcome measures, or process measures of change within sessions, that change has occurred. We are both aware there are many competing middle level meta-models making sense of the change process, e.g. emphasizing the relationship--attachment theory, and so forth--as the basis of change (cf. again, Straker & Becker, 1997), but also traditional psychodynamic formulations, formulations from learning theory, as well as ones emphasizing body energies. All we need to assume is that there is a coherent realm of discourse in the field which is gradually working towards the clarification and reduction of these theoretical differences and confusions.

Now, none of this requires a meta-theory of causality as such in psychotherapy, in the sense of a higher level analysis, if that is what you are offering. I don't have any sense of what this would be, beyond what I have mentioned. I don't see how any position could be above the battle, not involved at ground level in the arguments between orientations. So what is this all about? You believe understanding the causality involved in psychotherapeutic causal process radically modifies: our view of the mind (or body-mind); of psychotherapy; of causality itself; and the nature of explanation and causal explanation. For me, I'm not sure I even understand what you are claiming.

Philosophical Psychotherapist

Despite your optimistic view of a 'coherent realm of discourse in the field which is gradually working towards the clarification and reduction of these theoretical differences and confusions', the lack of a genuinely accepted meta-theory of the field seemed to be felt as a lack.

Change theories internal to psychotherapy theories

You had to assume it, at least as an heuristic goal, which we can anticipate, and towards which we are moving. You offered hints of some kind of core patternings (cf. Stem, 1995), or core phenomenology, and therefore of higher level analysis, making possible the parallelisms which enable the detailed tracking of the change process within the theories. This assumes as a basis that a good deal of the phenomena are not orientation-description-relative. The orientations' theories, tracked in the descriptions, presuppose that a description could be given, not using the language of any specific orientation. In short, all the ordinary psychotherapeutic theories of change--especially if this is a criterion of degree of difference between the psychotherapies!--are internal to the theories of the orientations, with their specific models of human nature, and therefore often also reductive or one-dimensional, linear causal (see below). So it is hard to see how any more general theory of change, at the level of the theories of change, can avoid becoming the basis for another orientation, which of course has happened time and again in the development of the psychotherapies. Orientation-based reasoning is circular.

If you are making the stronger claim, that a higher level or more inclusive analysis cannot remain immune from the ground level arguments, and this is valid, then the implication will be that the bigger or more comprehensive the higher level theory, the more it will feed back into, and alter our sense of, the first level realities. I do claim my thesis alters our sense of the basic level reality, how we think about explanation in psychotherapy, and how we frame our methodologies of intervention--very radically! Its essence is to break the trap of circularity.

Why inclusive hypotheses get missed

This level of inclusiveness may be hard to grasp. Freud hid his hugest innovations, often, in papers which hardly amount to more than footnotes, and are offered with a deceptive simplicity, such as A Note on the Mystic Writing Pad (see Derrida, 1978), yet the
implications of which still haven't been fully unpacked after 70 years and more. It is slowly
dawning how much Freud, who had an extraordinary sense of psychic layering, and of
internal systems of boundaries and interfaces in the psyche, has to offer the burgeoning
field of consciousness studies, for which these issues are cardinal.

Working Psychotherapist

You're happy to compare yourself with Freud, then? What he got away with, and what you
can get away with, may be two different things!

Philosophical Psychotherapist

Freud didn't, of course, 'get away with it' at first; virtually no one read The Interpretation of
Dreams Freud, (1961) for years and years. There are major works which remain very
unavailable, difficult to grasp, because their scope is so vast, explosive, connects with so
many spheres, that they cannot be grasped within the frameworks and tramlines necessary
to teach psychotherapy, and for the majority of practitioners to function with some kind of
sureness and safety. One such will be the topic of a follow-up paper: Julian Jaynes' The
to me out of my thinking about Jaynes' hypothesis of the extremely recent emergence or
rather creation, of reflexive consciousness as, since Socrates and the Buddha (roughly
speaking), we know it, through a combination of social construction and metaphoric
reshaping of experience.

I'll outline the thesis in three steps. In summary, what I want to say is this:
Three steps: positivistic; hermeneutic; phenomenological causality

Firstly, our model of causality is normally assumed to be exclusively linear causality, or the
explanations of linear causality in terms of causal law. Secondly, in consequence, nearly
always, causality regarding the mind (body-mind), consciousness, or the psyche, either is
reduced to the above standard model of linear causality which applies to physical objects or
states of affairs, or else not regarded as causality (for instance, meaning; intention;
synchronicity; field totality; unity consciousness; cognitive mental structuring; quite diverse
alternatives). It's a forced choice between positivism and hermeneutics (cf. Wilkinson,
1998), I illustrate only the second of these, as what the former signifies (physicalism), as a
solution to how consciousness is related to causation, is straightforward enough. Proponents
of the second positions express a valid uneasiness about reductive models of causal
explanation, but an alternative model of causal explanation does not occur to them. The
'either linear causality or no causality' position is both simplistic, and also liable to press
dogmatic intent into moulds formed by Newtonian physics.

The positive thesis says there is a third model of explanation, which synthesizes the first
two; causality regarding the body-mind, consciousness, or the psyche not only really is a
species of causality, but also compels us radically to revise our models of causality, of time,
of process, of the interconnectedness of the psyche and the world, and of psychotherapy as
an expression of the religious impulse. One of the reasons, I am sure, why this issue is
neglected is that the hidden or latent religious, metaphysical, or, at least, belief-inducing,
intent of most of the psychotherapies, including the cognitive-behavioural, would have to
come out into the open if it was not.

I call this phenomenological causality, since it is the species of causality which includes
operation within (though not confined to) the level of phenomenological awareness as such.
Phenomenological awareness amounts to subjective experience within awareness, or
capable of awareness; the argument is that this participates in the complex of causality.
This includes body-mind, consciousness, the unconscious, the psyche, and embodied selfhood, including also our entire perception of the world (and therefore the basis of the edifice of science), as aspects. It includes the unconscious, since, despite Freud's remarks on the limitations of 'consciousness philosophy' in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920), the process of accessing unconscious experience, though intelligible, must be intelligible in terms of criteria within consciousness. Nor are these merely principles of inference, but of partial identity; there have to be criteria for the assimilation of unconscious experience, and the relevant transitions from unconscious to conscious states of mind.

Linear causality

So, firstly, we have a basic model of causality; causality is normally assumed to be exclusively linear causality, or the explanations of this in terms of causal law. A billiard ball strikes another ball; the second ball moves away at a certain velocity and angle. There is a linear sequence in time, as well as space, of these events, which we represent in spatial terms. We postulate a linear causal sequence in parallel with the actual temporal sequence (like a wave going 'along reality'). We then say that the impact of the first billiard ball caused the movement of the second. (There is a causal connection: 'The cause of the explosion was a gas leak.') This construct, however simplistic, is so deeply embedded in our instinctual and reflex construing of the world, that our entire pragmatic, or instrumental, mastery of the world is based upon it, from our fear of fire, or a hot stove, our ducking when a missile is thrown at us, to our building of vast engineering projects or sending rockets into space. Any evidence which challenges this construct of ordinary causality, whether paranormal, or from quantum physics, disputable or indisputable, is extremely disconcerting (cf. Goffman, 1974, on our need for 'primary frameworks' of belief).

A little thought shows that there is no actual causal chain, because we only infer causal connection in a general causal context ('Coal gas combines with oxygen to ignite if brought into contact with heat above x degrees'); so we hypothesize general laws and systems of feedback cycles or fields. But nothing of our complex assumption and causal reflex is seriously affected by the hypothesis of universal lawlikeness, laws of gravity, mechanics, electricity, etc., or by the 'circular causality' of feedback loops (even in such a simple case as a bell-push) about which Bateson (1979) writes. Whether it is touched by field theory is more complex. But even here we clearly do not, in our ordinary dealings, doubt the causal efficacy that is involved in a magnetic field, for instance, whether it generates electricity for an ocean liner or creates a pattern of iron filings in a child's play.

Even the sceptic Hume (1961), held that, however beyond rational justification, our principles of belief in causal inference are totally and inescapably embedded in our nature and cannot be suspended; we avoidably make these assumptions, at the instinctive animal level, in our lives.

Working Psychotherapist

All this is very well, and may open up some specialized philosophical questions--but what relevance has this level of causal reasoning to psychotherapy?

Philosophical Psychotherapist

This is the standard model of reasoning about causality; it is almost all-pervasive and inescapable, and so, nearly always, causality regarding the body-mind, consciousness, or the psyche is either reduced to the above standard mono-causal model of linear causality which applies to physical objects or states of affairs, or else not regarded as causality (how could something as insubstantial as consciousness or volition be a cause?).
Psychotherapy's reliance on the linear causality map

In the light of this, the reluctance of psychotherapeutic theories of change to tackle causality as such, is their reluctance to take responsibility for a psychotherapeutic metaphysic in its own right. They seek to belong on the already existing map. This is predominantly a physical, linear causality, mono-causal, map, still. If they did not accept this map, which is in the popular mind the map of secular science, then the religious dimension of psychotherapy would emerge openly, since it is only repressed within customary bounds by the objectivity model of reality which has dominated the West since Descartes and Newton (cf. Boadella, 1998). In effect this keeps psychotherapy within the bounds of commonsense. It likewise alleviates the fear of madness which goes with the territory of psychotherapy. Psychotherapy has to portray itself at least as sober science: as medicine, cognitive psychology, human science, or at any rate as art, certainly not as religion, and is increasingly required to sell itself in economic terms to governments and business corporations and insurance companies. To acknowledge it as religion would not help its compatibility with positivistic science, and its presence in the public eye as at least a human or quasi-technology.

Freud's struggle with linear and non-linear causality

Freud wrestled with this lifelong, never freeing himself from the linear causal analogy, nor yet embracing the hermeneutic model, or ever able unequivocally to acknowledge the religious dimension of his work, despite the demonstrable parallels with Protestant and Talmudic models of revelation which his work exhibits (cf. Derrida, 1987; Bakan, 1990). Therefore the extraordinary 'sign', or 'revelation', of the discovery of transference process, has been deeply misconstrued and trivialized, both by psychoanalysis and its opponents (Freud, 1920, 1957; Jung, 1966; Winnicott, 1949: Searles, 1979, being impressive exceptions, among others). It has been largely construed in reductive terms. The reduction of psychic patterns to some notion of the primacy, or dominant reality, of past origins has bedevilled thinking about transference, both in psychoanalytic circles, and in those of their rivals, who end up throwing the baby out with the bathwater, and denying the validity of transference altogether (offering alternative mono-causal simplifications of their own); all these are part of the legacy of the model of linear causality here, though progress is gradually being made. The positivistic ambitions of cognitive psychology towards explanation in terms of physical neural pathways are explicitly reductive.

A liberating framework regarding transference

One way in which recognizing phenomenological causality feeds back into the actuality of psychotherapeutic process, is that it gives us a wider framework, which enables us to free ourselves almost totally, from the usual log-jammed oppositions and dichotomies here. This is because at the heart of phenomenological causality is the notion of recapitulation, in the musical sense, which embodies both the notion of the presence of the past in the now, and the present transformation of the self in the light of new experience, and the opening to the future in anticipation (cf. again, Straker & Becker, 1997). This notion both incorporates, and transmutes, the concept of transference, within a concept of multi-directional temporal connectedness.

In psychotherapy, even where the linear causality model is disputed, it is mostly so on the basis of leaving causality (conceived exclusively as linear causality) to its own devices, on its own territory, so to speak. This also leaves the approaches liable to revert to type, to the mono-causal, linear causality paradigm, when unclear, or in a tight corner in their work. The non-causal model cannot be fully assimilated and integrated into the model of human nature, in which linear causality remains as a defiant unassimilated foreign enclave. Hermeneutic models which by-pass causality
Thus, for instance, an author as sharply able to ask the sophisticated and unexpected questions as Andrew Samuels, offers a pluralism-based integration of dual strands (this goes back to Kant), which nevertheless relegates causality to the realm of the linear-developmental, supplementing it with an eternal or synchronous dimension:

If the synchronous/vertical model were to be more securely established, then we would have something with which to balance causalistic accounts of personality development.... The more comfortable we feel with a synchronous model, the better chance there is of using a causal-deterministic one in tandem. (Samuels, 1989, p. 36)

On the physics and Psychology of the Transference as an Interactive field (Mansfield & Spiegelman, 1996) also subtly and powerfully contrasts synchronicity with causality in Jungian fashion, going so far as to deny the appropriateness of causal concepts to the transtemporal 'entanglements of particles' in quantum physics, and postulating that 'rather than causal interactions there are...acausal expressions of meaning' (p. 194).

Next, Kenneth Wright, in Vision and Separation, (1991), offers a subtle psychoanalytic position, much influenced by Winnicott's concept of transitional space, and the 'third realm'. He again seems to place causality outside consciousness:

Psychological phenomena that imply a person or an agent are mixed [by Freud] in with terms more appropriate to biology or physics, with the result that one feels thoroughly confused. For example, consciousness itself is a psychological attribute, and the giving or withholding of attention would seem to be something that a person or part of a person does--there is an agent who looks or attends to something. A distribution of cathetic energy, however, would seem to be something that occurs in accordance with forces and laws in a biological or physical system. (Wright, 1991, pp. 148-149)

This implies that consciousness (and agency) as a psychological attribute is not subject to causality; causality is physical or linear.

This kind of shift from the psychic to the physical or physiological--as if this were no longer phenomenological--is also to be found in a very phenomenological post-Freudian therapy, Gestalt. For instance, as offered by Jacobs, the rationale is existential, drawing on Buber and Dilthey, and the contrast is made in terms of subject versus object perspectives; the essential effect is similar:

From a natural science perspective, external observable behaviours, such as interactions with others, are studied. From a human science perspective, the meanings to the experiencing subject are explored.... both subjects become intimately involved in the attempt to understand one subject from the perspective of his or her experience.... The mode of relatedness in the natural sciences is the I-It mode of subject to object. The mode of relatedness in the human sciences is the I-Thou mode of subject to subject. (Jacobs, 1995, p. 144)

Even Derrida, in both Freud and the Scene of Writing (in Derrida, 1978) and Introduction w Husserl's The Origin of Geometry (1989), makes the same separation:

But on the other hand, traditional development [by which Derrida means all cultural human reality, thus inevitably including psychotherapy], from which every culture acquires totality at each moment...does not have a causal style of genesis. In the world of natural reality subject to a causal type of development, sedimentation is not that of an acquired sense that is continually and internally recapitulated. There is no natural history for Husserl any more than for Hegel, and for the same reasons. (Derrida, 1989, p. 57)
Thus this hermeneutic compromise position (ultimately derived from Kant's pure/practical reason contrast) is extremely prevalent. It is as if psychotherapy hiddenly knows that a full acknowledgement of the radical character of causality in its sphere would leave nothing untouched. It would have to acknowledge its hidden territorial ambition--both in its knowledge claims, and with respect to its hidden religious ambition. And so it guiltily (or stealthily!) puts up a 'do not trespass' sign--before itself!! Only some areas of psychotherapy, which have tapped into a very different tradition, such as the transpersonal and psychospiritual traditions, which draw from Eastern, especially Buddhist, religious metaphysics and experience, recognize something here; though the common denial of time in the absolute, as by e.g. Wilber (1979), of course rules out causality. (I will address the relation of the thesis to these traditions in psychotherapy when discussing Jaynes' thesis in the second of these two papers; but, cf. the survey in Boadella, 1998.) The Gestalt field theorists, who, despite the anti-causal aspects touched on above, also partly glimpse something here, often also have one foot in mysticism (cf. Perls et al., 1951, e.g.p. 427), besides naturalism and physics, as similarly does Bion (1970), despite the hermeneutic Kantian formulations of his position.

Phenomenological causality a positive non-linear model of causality

The positive thesis accepts with the anti-causal theorists that linear causal models are inadequate, but further holds that: causality regarding the body-mind, consciousness, or the embodied psyche not only really is a species of causality but also compels us to revise our models of causality.

Working Psychotherapist

If this is different, or goes further than theories of change, how is it so, and what does it add that is useful?

Philosophical Psychotherapist

I'm coming to it. Though I really don't want you to underestimate the power and restrictiveness of the linear causality model. As the quotations have illustrated, the tendency of it is to sweep the field of causal reasoning. Alternatives to it have to be construed as non-causal--as if it owned the territory!
The multi-causality thesis challenges commonsense assumptions

There are four major aspects of the positive thesis: firstly, the transmomentary character of temporality, which is connected with the core notions of recapitulation, the process model, and the understanding of the radically distinctive, systematic, character of phenomenological causality; secondly, the actual causal character of consciousness and conceptualization, which goes with the fundamental importance of the (non-hierarchical) layering, and multi-causal, multi-strandedness, of experience, and thence with the understanding of the nature of integration; thirdly, the implication that, in a far more than metaphorical sense, we each create the world, participating in primary creation; this is connected with the recognition that our experience is organized via primary metaphors, which there is no going behind; and the difficulty of all these is summed up in the difficulty we have in thinking about time and process with our ordinary concepts at all.
Quantum physics of the phenomenological realm

I realize that some of this may at first seem as irrelevant as the concepts of particle physics to the 'folk physics' of chairs and tables in everyday life (cf. Dennett, 1989). But let's remember that, for instance, both biologists and cryogenic physicists/chemists are beginning to invoke quantum effects in practical science. I claim that something comparable
happens here. The thesis is in effect a parallel quantum physics of the phenomenological self (or no-self).

Social-psychological risks of the aspect of human creationism

The creationist aspect places this thesis, though in a very down to earth and basic way, in the traditions of Eastern and Western mysticism which postulate an identity between the human and divine creative acts. Because of the monotheistic-eschatological (other-centred and given its goal by God alone) character of Western theism, especially Protestantism, the recognition of this in the West has been largely blocked by the fear of blasphemy and heresy. This has latterly, in our culture, significantly been transmuted into the fear of madness (cf. Pirsig, 1991).

This was reinforced by the monumental influence of Kant, who had achieved a partial recognition of the creationist aspect in his doctrine of the 'imaginative synthesis' of human time-structuring in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1964), which he abandoned when he revised it in the second edition (cf. Heidegger, 1990).

The nub of phenomenological causality, when all of this is taken account of, involves, what Freud grasped so well, the (non-hierarchical) layering of the psyche--in temporal terms, in ontological terms, in relational terms, and in body-mind terms. We have to realize that what phenomenological causality involves is huge; namely (a) the causal interchanging between all the aspects of body-mind; (b) the engagement of the whole of time and of past and future with the present (and the transtemporal); (c) the engagement of body-mind as body-mind with what is other in the world (the internalization and recapitulation of the worm in the self), which takes us into the realm of philosophical theory of knowledge and being; (d) the thoroughgoing embracing of the process model or point of view.

A total integrative way of thinking

In short, the phenomenological causality thesis cannot in the end fall short either of a radical philosophical restatement of a whole philosophical position, or of a systematic revisioning of psychotherapy. It is not a piecemeal change of vision. It is, I believe, also the most complete metapsychological formulation of an integrative position yet achieved, but this is integration in a positive sense, not parasitic on (though certainly influenced by) existing theories, integration as a total philosophical position. The phenomenological causality hypothesis is not a single hypothesis, more a total way of thinking.

Working Psychotherapist

I am beginning to get some glimmers of what you are driving at, but this still remains very abstract. Why don't you see if you can relate it also to practice--to the kind of change-process we began with?

Philosophical Psychotherapist

I was about to suggest that, since, although the formulations came to me as a result of exploring the implications of Jaynes' work, the real motivation for them has in fact been to create a mental space to accommodate the growing range of my work with clients. This would need to provide a systematic criterion of how to maintain the boundaries of a process which I take (with Ekeland, 1997) to be a special kind of performance of a rite, with its own intrinsic frame, fundamentally protected by the incest taboo; and yet to be free not to ground that criterion in, or reduce it to, translate it into, the content of the work.

The multilayered aspect of the phenomenological causality hypothesis readily lends itself to an understanding of the frame of the rite as frame. For the content needs to be free; trying
to define psychotherapies mono-causally and circularly in terms of their contents has been the bane of the field, and has led to many familiar kinds of reductivism, normativism, and stereotyping of method. Process and structure, which also yield frame insights—patterns (cf. Bateson, 1979)—afford more fundamental criteria.

An integrative matrix

In general, the thesis or model affords a radically integrative understanding, in that it offers a kind of matrix of possibilities and potentials which can be taken in any direction the work requires, a near infinite set of pathways offering great freedom, and access to which is only limited by the resource and skill limitations of the practitioner. As such, as indicated, its fundamental trend is intrinsically integrative; it offers a systematic underpinning for integrative approaches.

Time process, temporality and recapitulation

This is the most fundamental aspect of the thesis. With respect to our time structuring:

(I) In terms of the thesis, in our work and methodology all dimensions of time are equally privileged; there is no bias in favour of, or prioritising of, the past, the present or the future. Techniques which enhance awareness of, or accessing of the resources of, one dimension or another, exclusively, such as classical psychoanalysis’ emphasis upon the past, or Gestalt’s focussing upon present awareness through e.g. the use of the present tense, are not used dogmatically and mono-causally, but only if they seem appropriate to help movement in the living context of the work, and on a basis of contractual negotiation. The assumption here is non-linear temporality which nevertheless remains temporality.

(II) Likewise, both in terms of the logic of time, and in the mode of experience, tense-transcending awareness of time can be achieved and used as a resource and process. The awareness of temporality invoked fluidly transcends the present moment or any fixed path-way of awareness, enabling both very immediate focussing of experience or a focussing that invokes as vast a scale awareness of time transcending the moment as one may wish. This latter taps into both archetypal and mystical awarenesses, but it is also as basic as recognizing that, in speaking a sentence, one is aware of the whole sentence, not just of the individual units of sound or meaning--the figure/ground distinction is relevant here; this is in a sense a Gestalt psychology model on the cosmic scale. The causality involved in psychotherapeutic process, like that involved in music, overturns the whole conventional concept of time and the present, because it affirms that every moment of such experience embraces the whole of a span of time and implicitly the whole of time, so that each moment of experience is causally related to all the others, but forwards, backwards, and sideways! In other words, it abolishes linear time concepts and linear concepts of causality.

(III) The implicit structuring of time, as Kant partly grasped in his account of 'imaginative synthesis', as the basis of time structuring of experience, in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1964; Heidegger, 1990), is also in a deep sense prior to our actual experience of time-succession, and is intuited and partly inferred rather than experienced; the basis of causality is beneath and outside the time-sequence. I shall refer to this dimension of the phenomenological causality hypothesis as grounding causation. This is confirmed by the findings of quantum physics, of course; however, it is also involved in time process, so that the endeavour to locate an absolute non-temporal, non-causal dimension, which would allow linear causality to proceed unhindered, in dual track fashion, is misconceived. In general, the phenomenological causality hypothesis is opposed to dual or multi-track models, such as illustrated by Samuels (1989), Lacan (1988), or Grotstein (1997), regarding them as, perhaps oversimplifying, residual efforts to preserve a finite secular realm which will be protected from the engulfing religious infinite.
Human experience (personal and beyond) is therefore an inextricable and intricately layered tapestry of temporal, causal, transtemporal (grounding causation), and semantic/syntactic, intentional-volitional, and structural factors, and this is the nature of human historical causality.

This includes psychotherapeutic causality in an exemplary way, especially in change sessions such as we are thinking about. These exhibit that extraordinary combination of the indescribable, unique, elusive and unpredictable, with a core intelligibility and inevitability of the process in retrospect (cf. again, Straker & Becker, 1997). The experience is one of both totality, and indescribability (in virtue of the transformation of core assumptions at the level of grounding causation). Here something corresponding to Bion's (1970) affirmation of the coming to pass of the unknown ('O') is to be found--but not as a 'thing-in-itself' beyond experience, rather wholly interwoven with the tapestry of experience.

Working Psychotherapist

I can't get my head round this. What about agency here?

Agency and causation

Take the expression of intention. If, for example, I mean something by, say, a sentence or a gesture, that is a personal relation, not a causal relation, surely. I don't cause meaning, I just express it. I don't cause the genuineness of my intention to keep my promise; I intend it genuinely. To talk of causality here is a category mistake, as Ryle (1954) pointed out. Even, I don't cause my arm to rise; I just raise it. I just do it. I am an agent.

Philosophical Psychotherapist

This is just where the enlarged notion of temporality frees us up to see how much fuller the matrix is than mere intentional causality suggests. For here it is obvious that these objections and questions only arise on the assumption of linear causality--that cause is past pushing present, in a straight line, so to say (there is a mechanical or hydraulic metaphor hidden in there). This leads us to think that we as subjects, as persons, 'I's, are not causes, which would be, for instance, in the realm of Buber's 'I'-'It'. How can 'I' be a mere linear cause, in the time sequence? Apart from vanity, the 'mere' here is misleading. Our habits lead us to think that causality is purely an impersonal realm. For instance, the historian and philosopher of history, John Lukacs, in Historical Consciousness (1968), argues that purposes are more fundamental in history than causes. The root notion here is that of personal agency, that the causes of events are events and that an agent is not an event, and perhaps not even in the chain of events. Also entangled with this is the difficulty, in intentional causality, of accepting the future can cause the present. In agency, we relate, as wholes, to the whole future, in the context of the whole of being. It seems absurd to suppose that this is part of a linear chain of causes; it is certainly of a different order. Hence reductivists (cf. e.g. Dennett, 1991) will argue that certain events in a person's neuro-physiology, which precede in time the conscious awareness of intention and deed, are the 'real causes'. But such arguments collapse when we recall that this itself is all measured in the existential time frame, of past, present and future. The reduction of the future in neuro-scientific physicalism is thus offered in a context that invokes and presupposes the future irreducibly. I conclude that causality is a legitimate, irreducible, and not merely linear, aspect of a total interrelatedness, which does not contradict the reality of personal agency.

Causality of consciousness, conceptualization, layering and integration

Therefore also this thesis can accommodate and assimilate the emphases of many
approaches, though, of course, minus the exclusivism that appertains to them, and plus of course the inclusive temporal basis which enables a non-arbitrary assimilation within a wider framework or field theory. Developmental models, dialogical models, transferential models, archetypal, transpersonal and psycho-spiritual models, process models, therapeutic alliance-based models, cognitive-prescriptive models, socio-political models, embodiment-based models; all these can be woven into the tapestry (cf. for some of these, e.g. Clarkson, 1991, 1996). Experience always has focal form; but it is a profoundly individual matter whose focus may be chosen or emerge in a given living situation, and the fixed linear causal and normative models of the types of relationship dissolve, with the associated pathology and diagnostic models, deconstruct and transform themselves, melting into one another, until layering recapitulation, as the ultimate generic model, is all of which we can speak.

Easy overlap with neuro-scientific researches

Here the thesis of phenomenological causality runs cheek by jowl with that of neural Darwinism, and Daniel Stern's very Kantian (but also logical sensory-behaviourist) hypothesis of 'proto-narrative temporal envelopes' of experience (Stern, 1995). Materialist, neural Darwinist or physicalist models of consciousness and experience (e.g. Dennett, 1989, 1991) philosophically run aground on their assumption of realism in respect of knowledge and a corresponding physicalist reduction of the dualist problem. But they exemplify a thoroughgoing interactionism in practice which means they share vast areas of their data with the present approach, which can readily 'do business' (including research) with modern neuro-cognitive psychology. The Chilean cognitive psychologist, Francisco Varela's, work, as quoted in Boadella (1998), who talks of 'enactive cognition as an embodied form of active knowledge', illustrates the openness of cognitive approaches to radical transformability in the direction of phenomenological causality. Dennett's multiple drafts model of consciousness (so very similar to that of Freud, e.g. Freud, 1920, 1925), again, is a fascinating example of a modern approach to consciousness whose layering emphasis is profoundly congruent with the subtlest developments in modern psychotherapy (Dennett, 1991). The difference is that the phenomenological causality thesis locates the layering within consciousness itself, not in a (supposedly identical) neural substrate, which has in fact only the accessibility (real enough, but not reflexive in the mode of consciousness) of the physical worm to consciousness.

Working Psychotherapist

So, then, how does this transfer (if that's the word) 'outside' the psyche, in the psyche's relations with others and the world?

Philosophical Psychotherapist

This comes next.

Primary interrelatedness; internalization and recapitulation of the world in the self; core metaphors and their shaping of our world

From the perspective of phenomenological causality, as on many other views (such as Gestalt's, or Whitehead's or Buddhism's), everything is connected to everything else. However, the phenomenological causality hypothesis takes seriously the sceptical problems of knowledge based upon perception (of the 'external world', of causality, of 'other minds') raised by philosophers since Descartes, especially Hume, and regards it as necessary to create or transform the assumptions necessary to solve these problems. In the 20th century it has become customary in the West, both in the Anglo-Saxon world, and the European mainland, to treat these issues as dissolved (Whitehead's work is a big exception), and as not requiring a solution beyond an ordinary inhabiting of the experiential assumptions of our
common experience. Psychotherapists, whether basing themselves on neuro-science, or on Martin Buber, also very readily comfortably assume Descartes and Hume are refuted and we have all--obviously!--gone beyond their errors. But, the phenomenological causality hypothesis sets itself the task of explaining how the primary interconnectedness can be possible. That means making sense of the process, rather than simply accepting it as a primary given, unquestionable, self-evident, even ineffable, in some sense. It accepts a moderate rationalism, as compatible with mystical intuition, and this is my assumption here.

So what the phenomenological causality hypothesis has to say here is three-fold:

(I) Every new interconnection, above all that of consciousness in its relation to everything else, involves fundamental shifts and transformations at the level of grounding causation; the whole of the structure is changed. In the sequel paper we shall take Jaynes' (1990) monumental causal hypothesis (the most graphic of all demonstrations, if valid, of the phenomenological causality hypothesis), about the creation of consciousness, as a major illustration of this recognition. In a related way, in all significant psychotherapeutic change, the client's world 'waxes and wanes as a whole' as Wittgenstein (1961) puts it--there is implicit (sometimes explicit) change in the relation to all being.

(II) However, it is not sufficient to treat this type of transformation as if it were simply a mechanical change in an already existing mechanism, though this is what tends to get said. For this is a change at the level of the framework of what can be said; consciousness creates its world. That is why also, in Buddhism, enlightenment involves an absolute transformation of consciousness, which is the emergence (or rather recovery or noticing what was always there) of a different world.

(III) Therefore, from these recognitions of the primary and grounding character of the basis of our interrelations, there is created freedom for the recognition that, because I don't precede, as an independent entity, my world, there is an identity in difference, that I am my world, and am you, in the mode of difference. The basis of identification is simply identity, not the other way around. The dialectic of identity, differentiation, and projection/projective identification in psychotherapy can never be made intelligible in terms of the absolute identity or autonomy model.

Empirical and paranormal aspects of interrelatedness

This then leaves room for an easy acceptance of the reasonably rationally established phenomena of all kinds of 'entanglement' of separated items, whether, for instance, subatomic particles, or such paranormal phenomena, as the relatives or friends who experience the apparition of their dying loved one (Broad, 1962). This is supported by an appeal at the commonsense level to the all-pervasive degree of interrelatedness which becomes visible once one accepts the identity in difference assumption, rather than the normal (not commonly reflected upon) assumption of absolute ontological difference or autonomy of existence. There is much scope for empirical research here also (cf. e.g. Samuels, 1989).

Metaphors and the shape of experience

Grounding concepts recapitulate and internalize 'reality'--but do so through grounding causational primary metaphors. But of course even the reality we oppose to the metaphors is itself another metaphor. We can only identify our core metaphors by contrast with other metaphors. The totality that appears opposed to all metaphors is just part of the dance of form and absence, in which the cosmos enacts itself as focussed shaping--as metaphor. This will be developed in connection with Jaynes' hypothesis in the follow-up paper. Metaphor is another illustration of recapitulation, the fundamental concept in all of this. We may say that the cosmos recapitulates our metaphors as much as they recapitulate the cosmos; the
cosmos is 'emergent' in our metaphors, but also embodies or enacts them, anticipatorily (in terms of the time frame), and this is not a problem in terms of the time concept of the thesis. Recapitulation is both temporal-successive and atemporal reciprocity, of which the mutual entanglement of particles in quantum physics is the most primitive and absolute form; recapitulation becomes more differentiated and difficult, but also more profound, as the identity of the participants becomes more developed, and more 'layered' (cf. Pirsig, 1991).

The totalizing aspect of the hypothesis would lead to charges of blasphemy in some contexts. This element of world creation is at the core of any approach which denies that the world is fixed and outside of us in an absolute sense. Nietzsche, in his affirmation of self, and final projection of himself in his madness as God, merely shrieked this out for all to hear, in opposition to the apotheosis of 'other-centred' religion exemplified by Christianity. He rightly pointed out (Nietzsche, 1966), following Hegel (1977), that science treads in the footsteps of Christianity, as the exemplification of the Christian submission to the 'other', and the Christian concept of 'truth' as the 'other'. But in quantum physics the 'other' has become the one, and the observer now part creates the event. Religious heresy has now become scientific commonsense.

Recapitulation participates in basic unity (Little, 1986), as the mystical traditions have always known. The question put to the deconstructionists of whether the basic reality is text or actuality now becomes a dissolved question (it perhaps is for Derrida, 1978) if we pursue this far enough. The future calls the present and past; we create the past as much as it creates us; and neither outer nor inner has a more primary status. The process perspective

Once this vision is accepted the aspect of permanencing becomes simply the correlate of larger scale process and is made possible by patterning (cf. Bateson, 1979) or ideas/forms in the Platonic sense. It is not things, but concepts/forms, which signify the permanent. 'Thingness', however, becomes irreducible as metaphor, which is why the process model, which becomes the dominant and inescapable model, is unmodellable in its essence; permanence cannot portray process except through negatives. It can only be indicated so far as in practice a relative permanencing is accepted as part of the process. Naming, labelling, the construction of habits, of relative boundaries, adaptive scripts and defences, and so on, in psychotherapy or relationships in general, are all part of the essential process as such, though never absolute.

Thus, at the practice level, a true process approach need not eschew, for purposes of support, the assimilation of large elements of the prescriptive, goal-directed structured, and fixed concept focussed, approaches of the cognitive-behavioural-constructivist type--but recognizing why that particular response to need would be appropriate for that client, and raising their awareness of it to beyond a concrete level when feasible.

The process model might be summarized by saying that, in the realization of self, we grasp (a) that it is pure process, (b) that we may move from unawareness to awareness of this, (c) that, in so moving, a further change occurs, which is the realization of process as process, and that (d) this enables the pure creativity in process to be released, and for the presence of process to be no longer bound in rigid, static, modes, but to be released into its dynamic modes. And that this ultimately is enlightenment (Wilber, 1979; Thich Nhat Hanh, 1988). It is very tempting to state the process model in traditional present time terms--and there is indeed some truth in this--but this misses the paradox of the essential transmomentary character of what unfolds here. The process model is thus also very liable to get reductively translated back into some form of mono-causal, goal-directed, normative, model, as it often is in Gestalt, for instance, using contact as a goal, which hardens the
concrete thinking which unfortunately cements it into a pure presence-based concept of
time. The paradox is that such emphasis on the purely present process actually makes
process concrete as a thing in itself.
Conclusions: a philosophical identity of its own for psychotherapy

Phenomenological causality dissolves many dilemmas of thought and also frees us to meet
our clients where they are, without imposing orientational bias upon them. The well-known
recognition, that the orientation of the experienced therapist becomes less and less
detectable as she or he progresses, is congruent with the freedom the phenomenological
causality hypothesis gives. It creates the theoretical space to make sense of such
recognition, and supports an integrative thrust.

Working Psychotherapist

I feel overwhelmed and more than a little confused. I can sense you are on to something
quite big. Perhaps you might end by returning to the original question of how this differs
from a theory of change.

Philosophical Psychotherapist

Well, theories of change on the whole presuppose existing mono-causal theories or models
of causality, and develop detailed models within them. This means they will remain within
the core philosophical positions--which I believe (oversimplifying) to be: (a) the
positivist-empiricist; (b) the hermeneutic-phenomenological; and (c) the objective idealist
or systemic/structural (including field theory), the nearest to my thesis, which however
synthesizes all three positions. They then develop a detailed theory within the orientation of
a psychotherapy. The linear causal and hermeneutic, positions protect the orientations from
openness to other approaches. Yet we will often find a not fully avowed ambition within a
psychotherapy (such as Gestalt, or psychoanalysis) to change the model of causality itself,
not merely apply the existing ones. What I have done, in making sense of the insights I
have gained from psychotherapy, is to do this systematically and explicitly. This is indeed,
therefore, a philosophical position; but it is one which, I believe, makes sense of the data
that psychotherapy is uniquely able to provide.

Giving psychotherapy a philosophical identity of its own, it helps psychotherapy come of
age, as well as acknowledging and fulfilling an ambition always latent within it.

Acknowledgements

To the members of the Sherwood Psychotherapy Training Institute Consciousness Seminar,
Ken Evans, Peter Orlandi-Fantini, and Geoff Heath; and to Dr James Grotstein for
stimulation of my thinking.

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