Methodological Commentary on
‘The Muse as Therapist:
A New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy’
With special reference to Enactment Theory
Final Submission for Metanoia Institute/University of Middlesex Doctorate in
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# METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST

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Abstract

The Poetic Paradigm is articulated in terms of Enactment Theory, embodying features of *dramatic, iterable, cross-referential, non-paraphrasable, inherently action-mode, non-representational, ontological, potentially epiphanic,* and *past-transformational (not just repetitional)* process, in psychotherapy, poetry and philosophy. I pursue this through: i. general statement and summary of this methodology; ii. linguistic analysis of key elements in the enactment paradigm, as developed in recent psychoanalysis, and in ‘dramatic’ elements in literature and literary criticism, in FR Leavis; iii. history of thought background to this evolution; iv. full description and analysis of the presence of enactive-recapitulative elements: in a live synoptic case description of Stern’s; in a novel of George Eliot’s; and Derrida’s commentary on Freud’s *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.* Thence I develop a full synthesis and synopsis. The repetitional element in enactment is Platonic, the element of intrinsic infinite repeatability, but this relationship to, the past *neither* means that enactment is hostage to the past, *nor* that it seeks to supersede or eliminate its dependence on both the past, and on iterability of meaning. It is a totality, potentially an epiphanic totality. This is then related to some classic psychoanalytic and relational formulations and dimensions, and then to the literary evolution. I synoptise the book and its evolution. I explore with illustrations the improvisatory-creative implications for practice of this meta-theory. I show the theory has profound contextual implications in archaic historical anthropology. The approach is put to work in a long psychodrama/analytic group supervision process I was/am involved with in Ireland. I sketch the relation to the Professional Knowledge Seminars. I illustrate the impact of the model in psychotherapy publications, literary ones, and philosophy, and sketch next steps, in relation to psychotherapy, philosophy, and literary themes.
Introduction

The most plausible alternative to the scientific-programmatic model of psychotherapy, is the poetic. The poetic paradigm is most clearly defined by its most distinctive mode, which is enactment. The core generic concept which most differentially defines enactment, as I am using the notion, is unparaphrasability.

The recognition of unparaphrasability eliminates the primary appeal to the Western conception of representation, and of truth as correspondence to fact, as the central model for understanding what we are dealing with – in psychotherapy, in poetry, in philosophy. This does not eliminate representation altogether, but it operates secondarily, at the reflexive level. When Piero Sraffa confronted Wittgenstein with the question, referring to a rude Neapolitan gesture, ‘what is the logical form of that?’ (Sraffa, no date) it was the classic confrontation of the representational model with a nameless alternative, which then had a powerful, yet still incomplete, impact on the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967), with its eventual appeal to Lebensformen, forms of life.

To be sure, it goes with this that life itself is unparaphrasable. If Heidegger’s hermeneutic (Heidegger, 1927/1967) is valid, the original Greek understanding of truth, formative in Greek thought up to Aristotle, as aletheia, unconcealment, or as, perhaps, ‘expression’ in modern terms, is one understood as an enactive totality which could only be communicated disclosively, not primarily as representation. Then the Greeks themselves, Aristotle above all (c.f., Politis, 2004), invented the categories, of entitites, which made it possible to define representation as the dominant mode, and even eventually to become aware of the enactive
by contrast.

From then on in, the alternative modes have had to be rediscovered, have had to fight the dominant mode, every inch of the way, have been in constant danger of marginalisation, and in constant danger of reverting once more to the dominant mode, and of bracketing the new insight back within the dominant mode. Wittgenstein’s social-behavioural definition of truth in the *Philosophical Investigations* vividly illustrates this, for one instance, harnessing even the breakthrough ‘form of life’ concept, to the dominant model of empirical factuality:

“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” --

It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (Wittgenstein,1953/1967, §241)

This appeal to observable agreement still presupposes the representative model of observation from *outside* of language, (otherwise it cannot solve, but merely reduplicates, the epistemic problem).

If all this is so, then this paradigm applies across the board to all three domains, and my problem of exposition is to bring it into sufficient specific detail to illuminate psychotherapy in particular. Even this is an artificial restriction. It will actually in reality apply even more widely - as Austin found with the performative dimension (Austin, 1962/2009). Something like Suzanne Langer’s (1953) *Feeling and Form*, where her closely analogous theory, which originally started off from music, is widened to be applied to all the arts, - but also *including ‘the art of psychotherapy’* - would be required.
My primary goal, therefore, is to show that the more generic conception of enactment is needed for psychotherapy also, and, secondly, that it potentially opens up a huge field of insight in our work.

At this very moment a flyer from The Relational School arrives, which includes a workshop on ‘Working Creatively with Enactment and Impasse’. Well then, my task is to show that even that formulation is not enough, and that, if we go beyond it to the wider generic and ontological formulation, then psychotherapy assumes its place as an art in its own right, and moves away from the tacitly medical and programmatic formulations so all-pervasive today, to identifying its own truth in action.
Some Epitomes of the Puzzling Relation to Poetry

“We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)

In the one case the thought in the sentence is something common to different sentences; in the other, something that is expressed only by these words in these positions. (Understanding a poem.)” (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967, *Philosophical Investigations*, §531)

“Beethoven’s great heart” – nobody could speak of “Shakespeare’s great heart”. ‘The supple hand that created new natural linguistic forms’ would seem to me nearer the mark.

A poet cannot really say of himself “I sing as the birds sing” – but perhaps Shakespeare could have said this of himself. (Wittgenstein, 1977/1980, *Culture and Value*, p. 84e)

“We need another language that does not exist (outside poetry) – a language that is steeped in temporal dynamics.” (Daniel Stern, 2004, *The Present Moment in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life*, p. 173)

When I was writing down these fantasies, I once asked myself, “What am I really doing? Certainly this has nothing to do with science. But then what is it?” Whereupon a voice within me said, “It is art.” I was astonished. It had never entered my head that what I was writing had any connection with art. Then I thought, “Perhaps my unconscious is forming a personality that is not me, but which is insisting on coming through to expression.” I knew for a certainty that the voice had come from a woman. I recognised it as the voice of a
patient, a talented psychopath who had a strong transference to me. She had become a living figure within my mind.

Obviously what I was doing wasn’t science. What then could it be but art? It was as though these were the only alternatives in the world. That is the way a woman’s mind works. (Jung, 1963/1995, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, p 210)

In fact, the plausible effect of the primal scene is partially due to Freud’s rhetorical contrast between the overt unreality of supportive fairy tales, and the historical fixing of the nightmare to historical times, places, and events. It has never been pointed out that of all of Freud’s five great case histories, the present one is exceptional in having no prominently indicated citation or mention of poetry. And when we ask ourselves why, we quickly realise that Freud was now too much on the tenterhooks of rhetoric to resort to a poetic quotation as proof when he was in logical trouble. Significantly, the case has a somewhat covert poetic citation (p. 12), and that comes from those revealing lines in Hamlet “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,/Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Turning this round, one might declare that the Wolf Man dreamt the wolf dream, but who on earth dreamt its outlandish interpretation? (Mahoney, 1984, Cries of the Wolfman, p. 108)
Enactment Theory: Methodology for a New Paradigm

The poetic paradigm, grounded in enactment theory as I am proposing it, is a new methodology in psychotherapy research and enquiry. It has areas of affinity and overlap with some familiar existing methodologies, particularly phenomenological, hermeneutic, and heuristic. But this does not tell us much. And its closest cousin is speech act theory (c.f., e.g., Austin, 1962/2009, Searle, 1969, Derrida, 1988, Goffman, 1983). Enactment theory encompasses speech act theory, having the performative dimension, in a certain sense, in common with it, but its scope is wider. But it is better to start by describing its unique features.

Enactment theory is a multidisciplinary theory, which encompasses psychotherapy, literature, philosophy, and potentially other disciplines. Its most explicit, and I believe earliest, formulation is in literary studies (e.g., Leavis, 1952/1962). And there is a growing and widening appreciation of a similar and genuinely related concept, going by the same name, which has emerged perhaps in the last thirty years in psychoanalysis. This version began on a narrower basis and has increasingly widened out. Its merit is that it clearly evidences the linguistic viability of this usage in psychotherapy, but, because of its initial origins in notions of defence, its full potential scope is only gradually becoming apparent in psychoanalytic contexts. With its opening out to something wider, it may more readily become clear that the convergence with the literary usage is a genuine one, as well as a creative one.

The fullest live meaning of enactment, like a concept as basic as that of transference, for
instance, is communicated through examples. That will be done, within the limits of space, later in this paper, apart from a technical example below. At this point I can only attempt a general definition, for methodological purposes. This definition relates to a multi-aspectival whole, which is also reflexive, and is therefore grasped as a concept within personal process. This means that, although in a sense it is a vivid and well-defined concept, grasping it involves a somewhat technical and abstract process of some philosophical complexity. For anyone who prefers examples, they will come shortly.

The central concept of enactment theory is that of a unified total communication, commonly, but not only or always, verbal, which is psychically multipolar and, secondly, unparaphrasable, and, thirdly, also iterable. In virtue of its iterability, its copy-ability, it is potentially independent of any specific human subject or that subject’s intentionality (for instance, we might not know, without further information, whether a given ‘case history’ is a record of actual events and processes, or a work of fiction).

Enactment, in its most developed modes, encompasses sacred and transformational human experience, but it also occupies all points on the communicative spectrum, from these peak instances right down to quite banal variants, in the form, for instance, of jokes. A classic instance I have often invoked is the graffito paradox: DO NOT READ THIS, seemingly a trivial example, but illuminating the central point, that there is a dimension of human communication which is essentially unparaphrasable, not representational, and multipolar.

The enactive contradiction of DO NOT READ THIS calls our attention to our human
capacity to hold multipolar contradictory elements together simultaneously in our psychic being, in such a way that the communication is irreducibly dependent, in its existence, on being potentially held, as a totality, in our psychic or personal being, though it is not dependent on any in particular, in virtue of its iterable, replicable aspects. It is essentially not referred outwards to an independent state of affairs. It is inherently self-referential.

The reality of the communication, though it will indeed contain other-referential elements, and require their being understood for it to be appreciated, is a self-reflexive totality; its communication as such is what it is, not defined by something other, something outside of the immediate whole, either causally or by external reference. In a soundbite, it is the being that it is about.

The methodology of elucidation, therefore, involves not merely pointing out its extraneous referential conditions, which is the common basis of most psychotherapy theory, but more primarily the nature of the multipolar internal cross-referencing that is involved in its being a self-reflexive totality. The primary mode of elucidation is therefore at the self-reflexive level, on its own level, not relating to other theoretical entities outside of the communication itself. The ‘at its own level’ here may, however, of course involve multiple centres of subjective selfhood (that is, more than one person). And secondary elucidation may of course invoke other dimensions and spheres of reference. Such secondary elucidation, nevertheless, needs to be justified by relevance, in terms of the autonomous cross-referential process.

Once the material of an enactment is of sufficient complexity and depth as to involve
a communication totality of real fusional connectedness and richness, with an explicit ‘dramatic’ dimension, as in psychotherapeutic process, or in poetry, then the potency of the enactive process as a transformational and dramatic process can be revealed.

The elucidation of this level of enactments, then, is where the primary operative or effective locus of this methodology exists.

The importance of referring to literature, and not simply confining ourselves to psychotherapy, here, is severalfold:

1. The possibility of the parallel existence at all, for instance in respect of the convergence, unnoticed on either side, of the psychoanalytic and the literary concepts of enactment, suggests a structural relationship: an expectation which is realised.

2. Literature offers a concentrated, and, in virtue of its linguistic form, a fully iterable sampling process, which enables us to elucidate the nature of enactment much more clearly than is possible with the often very indeterminate and ‘sloppy’ (Stern, 2004) process of psychotherapy.

3. The self-reflexive character of literary wholes, is easier to make clear in literature, than in the case of those of psychotherapy process, which are commonly construed in terms of theoretical factors which are other than the process itself.

It is because of that element of reference to elements other than the process itself, that enactment in psychoanalysis has tended initially to carry a connotation of an acting out of a past causal traumatic process in the present, whose real meaning is to be found in the
dimension of the past, and the causal, and the consequent defensive strategy, themselves, not in the process as such. As the discussion of this in psychoanalysis has evolved, the conception has become more open-ended and, significantly, has been converging with the literary concept.

Getting fully clear about this can become confusing, because what is going on in the process, as the examples to be given later indicate, essentially do involve the presence of the past in the present, and in its repetitiveness as such, (as well as the iterable aspect), and this was indeed one point of my partial disagreement with Daniel Stern (Wilkinson, 2003c). But what has to be emphasised is that this still does not mean that the meaning of the present process is ‘really’ in the past; rather the living past, as well as the iterable aspect, is part of the cross-referencing elucidation which is involved in clarifying this present (but reflexively iterable) process. Once we reach this point, we realise there is not an either/or, either of past and present, or of literature versus psychotherapy, not to mention philosophy.

4. In the parallel to the appeal to literature, it is easy next to see that the psychotherapy session, also, is a creative whole – when it is allowed to be by theoretical preconceptions, as gradually all schools more and more are recognising. It is, in one sense, an open-ended whole, though of course it is temporally finite. The same applies to the longer-term narrative of a medium or longer term psychotherapy. The more we think about a psychotherapy process, the more an inherent frame process becomes apparent, which has some affinity with the formal frame aspect of poetry.

Then it is possible to begin to see the ‘ec-static’ [‘standing out from’] whole which is
involved in the creative process of enactment, whether in poetry or in psychotherapy, and
the convergence of the two traditions becomes apparent. Hence I wrote in 2003, what I still
uphold:

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the defining
features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the unconscious. In
such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum, transference oscillates with
dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and unconscious or non-conscious are part
of a total spectrum, to which total access even in principle is contradictory, but which
exerts its awesome pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study
the sacred ‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’, - but in the company of angels,
of the whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history
brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’ (Kierkegaard, 1859/1962), or the
‘Moment’ of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, On
the Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883/2006); and all of these are in continuity
with what has been known as psychoanalysis; and constant and endless dynamic
effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic discovery,
not repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the light of this,
also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies becomes minor,
by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments and explorations, and
pattern transcendings, in the work. (Wilkinson, 2003c, pp. 251-2)

Once this point is reached, it becomes possible to bring into view the very rich wider scope
of enactment theory, and to grasp that the whole of art, religion, and psychotherapy praxis
is illuminated by it, and that, like performative/speech act theory (c.f., Austin, 1962/2009), it extends into all realms, even that of the indicative and representational. The core of this methodology will be given extensive illustration in what follows.

This approach to the methodology of using and elucidating enactment, in the context of a convergence and analogy between psychotherapy and poetry, may be objected to in the grounds, firstly, that the psychoanalytic concept of enactment is indeed more limited, and does not admit of expansion beyond an ‘acting out’ model. I hope sufficient doubt will be shed upon that argument by the instances I adduce from the psychoanalytic community later, particularly the work of Stern (2004), Aron (1996), and Ringstrom (2001).

Secondly, the general analogy may be challenged. The structural affinity of a present reflexive process, influenced by the past, and iterable, which is shared between psychotherapy process, and poetic process, may not be considered sufficient to show anything more than a trivial affinity between the processes, and certainly not sufficient to constitute a paradigm.

Well, by the very nature of the case itself, we are dealing here with non-demonstrative considerations, and someone might prioritise other conceptions. But I would like to point out that all the approaches in psychotherapy that countenance transference, and secondly all the approaches which place an intensive emphasis on transformation in the present, one and all recognise that live reworking in the present is the heart of psychotherapy process. To highlight this was indeed the central point of Stern’s book (2004). That is, they all recognise
enactivity, as defined, as being the core of the psychotherapy change process. I am adding certain things to the awareness of enactivity, but it is indeed recognised as a reflexive process in these traditions.

I am calling attention to the parallel unparaphrasable reflexivity of the process of enactment and cross-referencing, in the live realisation and recreation of poetry, to say nothing of the writing it. The reason the concept of enactment is applied here by Leavis (1952/1962) is because the liveness of art evokes that kind of description, in its lived character in performance, in creation, and in critical-creative recreation. This, then, is a structurally parallel concept to that we find in the psychotherapy examples. It has the same unparaphrasability, and reflexivity to the moment of realisation. It has the same unique particularity, unmanualisability, and, - in positivistic terms, - unanalysability, as narrative-relational psychotherapy. This coincidence seems to me sufficient to make this a parallel worth pursuing.

And, if pursued in deeper and more far reaching ways, many more analogies emerge which ‘bring home the bacon’ of the power of the analogy. But here I have concentrated upon basic justification.
General Synopsis of the Enactment Thesis and the Poetic Paradigm

The Enactment paradigm is one which is both close to, yet far apart from, the psychoanalytic concept of enactment, as expounded, for instance, by Lewis Aron (Aron, 1996). The psychoanalytic paradigm, in a simplistic version, says that what is internalised from experience, but not fully assimilated to cognition, is enacted in someone’s process as a defensive measure. Enactment may here be anything from a fully fledged action, with motivational drivers out of awareness, to the most subtle nuances of feeling picked up in a relational transaction, in what is commonly called projective identification.

This large range of possible content is also shared with enactment, as I understand and use the term, but as I am using it the scope and richness of the concept is not confined to defensive measures. Further, it is understood as the primary ontological mode of human existence, and is therefore not merely confined, as a technical term, to psychotherapy.

This whole commentary will be an attempt to bring out what this difference is, why the difference is crucial to Psychoanalysis itself, and why this difference places ontological, trans-empirical recognitions at the heart of psychotherapy.

There are many approaches which approximate to what I am saying, since what I am saying relates to things which are ‘in the air’ in psychotherapy; Stern, Knoblauch, Ehrenberg, Gendlin, and Ringstrom are five who come very close, as do significant elements in the Jungian traditions, and I shall be dealing with the remaining differences, in some of these cases, in due course.
What follows is a fuller elaboration drawn from the attempt at epitomising enactment in the chapter, *Primary Process of Deconstruction: Towards a Derridean Psychotherapy* (Wilkinson, 2009b, in Frie and Orange, p. 99). This chapter, signifying the impact of my thinking on the psychotherapy field, was a chapter I wrote by request of the Co-Editor, Roger Frie, to address the absence of a positive presentation on Derrida’s work in the book. It was articulated on the basis of the clarifications of the significance of enactment theory I had developed, particularly in Chapter Five of *The Muse as Therapist* (Wilkinson, 2009a). This chapter, *Primary Process of Deconstruction*, which illustrates how far in clarification the book had brought me, is included as an Appendix to this essay.

1. Enactment involves *dramatic* pattern and narrative. It is dramatic pattern and narrative which has an intrinsic dynamic three-aspect/three tense temporal structure and intentionality, and which, as drama, has a polarity-based intersubjective unfolding, denouement, or *peripeteia* (c.f., Aristotle/Butcher, no date/1895/1997).

2. Enactment involves an *inherent recognitional, iterable*, element, in which meaning at all levels is in principle repeatable, and re-enactable, though never in its totality or as a perfect repetition. This is the Platonic element in enactment, as I understand it, whose significance, in the poetic paradigm, which lifts it out of the purely presence-based concept which dominates Stern’s (2004) conception, is that it highlights the creatively repeatable element in psychotherapy. This cross-connects it to the psychodynamic concept of *transference*.

3. Enactment involves a dimension of *cross-referentiality, which is a totality and is potentially infinite*, and encompasses, and presupposes, but does not exhaust, the infinite background. This, in conjunction with the dramatic element, is the *non-paraphrasable*
4. It also involves an inherent element or aspect which is non-reducible to the representational in any form, cannot be paraphrased, and is intrinsically action, absolute becoming and creation. It is, in that way, primarily ontological. This is the clarification of the process element in psychotherapy as enactment. But we are not just experiencers of process but its enactors, and this is the heart of what is creatively possible in psychotherapy. In another language (Bollas, 1989, *Forces of Destiny: Psychoanalysis and the Human Idiom*) this is the transformation of fate into destiny.

[Given that, in the end, as Austin (1962/2009) found, representational communication will also prove to be an enactment, or a performative, this has to be qualified, and this would be done by showing that representational communication, too, rests always upon a background which is never representable.]

5. It involves a potentially epiphanic aspect, which consists in the mystery of the livingness of enactment, but which can encompass the very greatest and profoundest forms of encounter. This accords with the sense that we often have that enactments, even in psychoanalysis, often overlap with rites. The basic tendency of poetry to move towards the bardic and towards music and dance (c.f., Knoblauch, 2000, and Langer, 1953) is connected with this element. This intrinsic tendency towards a widening of the concept of enactment, then, I shall consider later on.

Not all of these elements are there in very basic enactments, like ‘DO NOT READ THIS’, but they constitute the full potential of the concept.
Mapping Enactivity Theory: Linguistic Usage

So we begin with the theory of enactment. The concept of enactment as, following FR Leavis (Leavis, 1952/1962), I am using it, is an extension of its character as a contrast word in a global way.

All the uses of enactment we are concerned with imply either a sense of an act completed - according to rule, instead of just partially or abstractly, - or else something lived and acted as opposed to merely, or (alternatively) more appropriately, experienced in pure cognition or consciousness. The idea of an enactment which they have in common is, in some sense, a more totally overt realisation or manifestation.

Enactment is normally used as a straightforward contrast word:

‘The ritual was duly enacted [as opposed to ‘merely recited’ or ‘merely referred to’]’

‘The law was enacted [as opposed to ‘voted through in parliament’]’

‘The play was first enacted in 1956 [as opposed to, e.g., given its final rehearsal]’

The Psychoanalytic Concept of Enactment

Most relevantly to us, I believe there are two usages of the concept of enactment, which are confusingly close to one another: the psychoanalytic; and the literary, (first formulated by FR Leavis, 1952/62, as far as I know).
METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST

In the usage of psychoanalysis, a usage which is first cousin to Leavis’s usage, - a relationship to which we shall come shortly, - enactment is at first opposed to being conscious of or merely or verbally remembering; here, initially is a vivid ‘layperson’s’ description:

‘The way I look at enactments (this is my lay interpretation of the process and any mistatements are mine and not McWilliams!) is in the context of the analytic or therapy space between the T and the patient/client which contains the relational elements and dynamics between them. The patient is expected to bring key elements of his/her inner life into this space for the T to interpret and the dyad studies it together. They are not supposed to “do” anything about the material, just examine and discuss. As Twinleaf expressed it so beautifully, when a dyad is highly attuned, there is more pressure for the T to not only observe but to enter into the “as if” space as a participant by introducing his/her own material. This pressure can become irresistible if the T’s inner dynamics mesh compellingly in some way with those of the patient. Since this is unconscious for the T, he/she is unaware of his/her participation in the enactment. In some cases, the two then act out these dynamics in real life, collapsing the analytic space. Since such enactments may be outside the T’s awareness, his/her control of the therapy is lost, hopefully temporarily, and ruptures or other consequences can follow. Enactments, like ruptures, can be extremely subtle. An alert T can recognize the enactment quickly and can often pick up useful information for the therapy this way. The important thing is for the T to recognize the enactment and take immediate steps to contain or repair it or whatever the situation warrants. Nancy McWilliams points out in her book that common roles that get
played out in enactments include not only the “seducer and the seduced” but also the “uninvolved nonabusing parent and the neglected child,” “the sadistic abuser and the helpless, impotently enraged victim” (p. 18) and others. McWilliams explains it all so beautifully. I love her books.’ (Lu, 2008)

Lewis Aron writes about enactment from a relational-psychoanalytic point of view, in which movement he is a key figure, involved in central relational-psychoanalytic publications; he prefers interaction to enactment, enactment carrying, for him, connotations of a restriction of the scope of relationship, and having somewhat negative connotations, because of the limits I have pointed to in the psychoanalytic concept:

‘To speak of enactments suggests that these ‘events’ happen from time to time, maybe even with some frequency, but it denies that patient and analyst are always enacting, that analysis is interactional from beginning to end.’ (Aron, op. cit., p. 212)

Here he is within a hair’s breadth of grasping that enactment is indeed ubiquitous, something which becomes even clearer a little later (see below). The contrastive element in the meaning drives him to downgrade its use, as he believes it is perjorative, in the context of anti-relational theory:

I have serious reservations about the terms enactment and projective identification. Precisely because they isolate a certain aspect of the analytic process that is marked off as interactional, they may inadvertently cover up the interactional dimension of other aspects of the analytic process. In other words, one may acknowledge facets of the analytic process to be enactments or projective identifications and therefore recognize that those phenomena are interactional; but by labelling those isolated
processes as enactments, one is then permitted to view other aspects as not being enactments and therefore not to be viewed interacionally. (Aron, op. cit., p. 212)

Leavis’s meaning also starts off as contrastive: - in his case, as with Austin’s (1962/2009) performatives, a contrast with statements. But, eventually, further consideration reveals that this is a contrast of dimensions of communication, not of types of communication. What I want gradually to show is that if we recognise, as Austin did, that there is a performative, or, rather (more comprehensively), enactive, element to all communication, only then can we grasp the full scope of this insight. Otherwise the most powerful illustrations of it, whether psychoanalytic enactments on the one hand, or epiphanic poetic situational enactments on the other, are left stranded, without their grounding in the ontology of ordinary experience.

In this wider context, the content of what we mean by enactment is very variable, and this is what causes difficulty in definition. But without it we cannot properly ground our understanding of the more emphatic instances. This is to do with the ontological abstractness of the generic understanding of enactment.

**The Poetic (Leavisian) Concept of Enactment**

I have said that the psychoanalytic sense of the term is a first cousin of the Leavisian. I now need to explain this.

First explanation: contrast with statement.

If we take Aron’s statement at face value:

‘To speak of enactments suggests that these ‘events’ happen from time to time, maybe even
with some frequency, but it denies that patient and analyst are always enacting, that analysis is interactional from beginning to end.’ (Aron, op. cit., p. 212)

and accept that patient and analyst are ‘always enacting’, where does it take us? Here I introduce the terms ‘enactivity’, to mark the sense in which enactment is ubiquitous, ‘basic enactments’, and the evaluative sense in which we have more vivid and epiphanic and epitomising enactments.

First we note that we do not normally say of a piece of music or a painting that it was enacted. The first performance is just that in the case of music. It can also be termed a performance in the case of a play, but it can additionally be said to be enacted. If music is to be brought within the scope of enactment, it will need to be with a wider sense than any yet discussed. Something like an Escher paradoxical drawing is, arguably, analogically describable as an enactment, but we will come back to this sense, which connects with the core Leavisian sense I am going to introduce.

So an enactment, as a dramatic enactment, will have the connotation of being in some peculiar way bound up with words. Words used to ‘perform dramatically’. Whereas, in the psychoanalytic sense, it goes ‘beyond’ words. How shall we make sense of this contrast? It is because, in the psychoanalytic sense, the words which are surpassed are nevertheless of cardinal importance; they are needed precisely for the contrast, as is brought out in the Lewis Aron passage I quote in a moment.

Enactments are something fuller or more complete. They ‘go the whole hog’. Something is consummated, or ‘comes right out’. In the psychoanalytic context, this tends initially
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Enactments are when something ‘got out of hand’ in some way. As Aron argues (Aron, op. cit., pp. 212-3), it is only gradually that it is realised that enactment applies across the board, and Aron thinks that then its meaning is near to dissolving. He oscillates in his sense of the boundaries of the concepts here:

We began by describing enactments as a fairly infrequent event that occurs only with very disturbed patients who need to use primitive forms of communication. Before long we realised that healthier patients too use this mechanism, and later we realized that analysts do too. And now we may begin to wonder whether speech is ever used only to communicate and not also as a form of action [my italics]. Then we realize that if the patient’s associations are actions then so too are our interpretations. Before long the very distinction between words and acts breaks down [my italics]. Which is not to say that there is no meaningful difference between words and acts; after all, just because they are not sharply distinguishable does not mean that there is no difference between them. Some words may be more like actions than others and some actions may be more communicative than others. Analysts must recognise, however, that both dimensions occur continually in the psychoanalytic process. No one uses words only to communicate; nor does anyone communicate only through words. (Aron, op. cit., pp. 212-3)

Here is where the astute and sophisticated Aron converges with the process Austin went through in considering performatives. To repeat, what I want gradually to show, is that, if we recognise, as Austin (op. cit.) did, that there is a performative, or (more comprehensively) enactive element to all communication, only then can we grasp the full scope of this insight.
Doing things in words, as Austin realised, is special. And then, indeed, stating is also a doing, as Austin eventually gleefully recognises (op. cit., pp. 91 ff).

We can see that the linkage is that, even where there is a deep connection with words, as when a play or a law is enacted, what matters is the consummation into deed, but one which rests upon the conventional or human character, mostly, of words, but if not of words, of other communicative means used symbolically, such as expressive gesture. Aron brings this out clearly in the above passage. The dimension just touched upon also relates to the body of writing about the khora, the primal background or container, in Plato’s sense (e.g., Kristeva, 1974, in Kristeva, 1986, Derrida, 1993/1995).

And this now illuminates Leavis’s sense, because, in his sense, an enactment is something that cannot be completed in any other way, or paraphrased, or stated in a way that is less than the enactment, in his sense. In his sense a paradox like:

**DO NOT READ THIS**

is an enactment, because it cannot be paraphrased, or broken up in linear mode, in a very vivid and obvious sense. But it is also true that it starts from the words, that the initial meaning of enactment only transpires because it starts from the contrast with words, and all the extension of meaning builds upon that. This brings into view the implicit background enactivity involved even in the ordinary enactment of non-contradictory referential communication:

**PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT.**

Goffman too wrote in depth about this, subtly interfused, background element, with its
iterable and Derridean dimension, in his wonderful posthumous paper *Felicity's Condition* (Goffman, 1983).

And, therefore, when we grasp that the Leavisian sense widens out, in the way I am going to describe, illustration becomes very difficult to offer with precision, because what is in question is now structural, a meta-analytic extension of the first meaning of enactment, and it is now that which we must characterise. It is indeed the ubiquitous *dramatic interactivity* which constitutes enactment in the Leavisian sense, and this is what we must move towards characterising.

Now, in the central definitional chapter, chapter five, of *The Muse as Therapist* (Wilkinson, 2009a), I used Blake and Escher as illustrations, and characterised this in the following way:

A poem like William Blake’s *Ah Sunflower* (Blake, 1977) can be held to enact a grammatical movement like an Escher painting (it does not matter too much if this interpretation is incorrect, it only needs to be a possible interpretation):

That is, we find by the end of the poem that the ‘goal’ (the ‘sweet golden clime’) turns out after all, once again, *da capo*, to be the starting point (the youth and the virgin, after their resurrection, still ‘aspire’, though there is a, possibly deliberately
ambiguous, hint of a secondary meaning of ‘breathing again’), so that we recognise that all that desire enacts – is still just endless desire:

Ah, Sunflower! weary of time,
Who countest the steps of the sun,
Seeking after that sweet golden clime
Where the traveller’s journey is done;

Where the youth pined away with desire
And the pale virgin shrouded in snow
Arise from their graves, and aspire
Where my Sunflower wishes to go.

But this is not just stated by the poem, it is enacted by it. It is also, when we think about it, a profound enactment of what desire is, so that the enactment also expresses (we participate in) a deep truth of life, like, but in another key from, Oscar Wilde’s impish paradox (Wilde, 1891/2004):

A cigarette is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaves one unsatisfied. What more can one want?

It is an enactment because, as with the Escher painting, we hold in our mind the visual or the grammatical rules, which then lead us on to a ‘repositioning’, based on a second, unexpected, but still congruent, use of the same visual or grammatical rules. And this, then, flips us back and leads us round in the endless circle, realising
the quasi-permanence, of re-enactment as we return to the beginning again! Every
time we read the poem!

This, in either case, takes the presentation in the direction of an enactment which
exploits the rules unexpectedly, as opposed to a straightforward propositional or
visual ‘representation’ of a possible actual state of affairs – whether that is of a
staircase, or a consistent description of a straightforward realisation of desire.

What, then, Escher does visually, and what Blake does textually, on this
interpretation, is take us though a (textual) enactment, unrealisable in physical
actuality but only through the quasi-permanence of imagination, the full description,
or evocation, of which cannot abstain from, or fall short of, the very process and
imaginative means of the enactment.

That is, in grasping this, we ourselves participate in the enactment, nothing short
of that will achieve understanding here. (And the literary method itself, of course,
consists of brief epitomising selected and selective enactments, i.e., quotations, but
enactive quotations, a process which therefore which raises the issue, always, how
far criticism is itself creative!) (Wilkinson, 2009a, pp. 165-167)

As with the graffito paradox of DO NOT READ THIS, we then have something which is not
paraphrasable, or reducible to statement, (or, by analogy, to the rules of perceptual space,
with the Escher), and so is enacted, meaning that this becomes the only mode in which the
significance in question is, and can be, conveyed.

I adduce now also a passage of Leavis’s on the Shakespearean use of language, one which I used when I spoke on Leavis’s concept of enactment as a multidisciplinary paradigm, to the *Revaluing Leavis* Conference, another of the multidisciplinary offshoots of this work (‘Leavis FR’, 2009). It is epitomised in the comment on the exquisite ‘swan’s down-feather’ passage from *Antony and Cleopatra* (Shakespeare, 2005).

Leavis quotes and comments as follows:

*Antony*

Her tongue will not obey her heart, nor can
Her heart inform her tongue – the swan’s down-feather
That stands upon the swell at full of tide,
And neither way inclines.

The Arden [Shakespeare] footnote…… runs:

It is not clear whether Octavia’s heart is the swan’s down-feather, swayed neither way on the full tide of emotion at parting with her brother to accompany her husband, or whether it is the inaction of heart and tongue, on the same occasion, which is elliptically compared to that of the feather.

‘It is not clear’ – it ought to be clear; that is the implication. The implied criterion, ‘clarity’, entails an ‘either/or’; does the image mean *this* or *that*?

The reductive absurdity of the conception of language behind the criterion thus
What Leavis, in his peremptory way, is saying is that there is a complex total communication here, which is intrinsically unparaphrasable, but not opaque to elucidation and evaluation, - indefinite and unlimited elucidation and evaluation, I would wish to add.

We can now bring into view the characteristic cousinship between the psychoanalytic concept and the Leavisian concept. It seems *prima facie* clear, especially from the Aron passage quoted above, that there is no essential *structural difference* between an enactment, in what I am calling the psychoanalytic sense, and in the Leavisian sense, other than that the Leavisian is a poem (or ‘dramatic poem’, etc).

But even that incidental difference, of actuality versus fiction, dissolves in the face of the Boswellian imaginative dramatic reportage of Dr Johnson’s ‘real time’ laughter at Bennett Langton’s making his will, which I evoked in my REPL (Wilkinson, 2005a), where I wrote (before I had fully realised the significance of the enactment concept):

> Boswell’s account of Johnson’s conversational satire on Bennett Langton’s will, in 1773, illustrates supremely the kind of dramatic-mimetic genius, and existential encompassing, in question. In the Keatsian fashion, he is both inside, and outside, the Johnsonian tragic burlesque he presents as dramatic poem here. In the space I have I can only allude to the part his art plays here.

> Johnson, on the other hand, is here the ‘superior being’ of Keats’s passage (Keats,
1819a/1947), relating it all, scanning novelistically, as possessor of totality-vision, his gaze upon the vanity of human existence, with a preternatural, pitiless, and panoramic clarity, and comic satire and mimetic mockery (implicitly, of his two hearers included, but also his own illness and mortality), whose mighty mimetic-symbolic sweep, - together with the huge Homeric upsurge of his sheer animal laughter! - reminds us of the great Dickens, as it is caught, in turn, in *Boswell.s* dramatic eye!

I have known him at times exceedingly diverted at what seemed to others a very small sport. He now laughed immoderately, without any reason that we could perceive, at our friend’s making his will; called him the TESTATOR, and added, ’I dare say, he thinks he has done a mighty thing. He won’t stay till he gets home to his seat in the country, to produce this wonderful deed: he’ll call up the landlord of the first inn on the road; and, after a suitable preface upon mortality and the uncertainty of life, will tell him that he should not delay making his will; and here, Sir, will he say, is my will, which I have just made, with the assistance of one of the ablest lawyers in the kingdom; and he will read it to him [laughing all the time]. He believes he has made this will; but he did not make it: *you*, Chambers, made it for him. I trust you have had more conscience than to make him say, “being of sound understanding;” ha, ha, ha! I hope he has left me a legacy. I’d have his will turned into verse, like a ballad.’ (Boswell, 1791/1998)
This enacts, at several inexhaustible levels, in its unification of multiplicity, the principle of ‘symbolic totality’, inextricably entangled with the mimetic elements.

As we engage with such a passage, the poetically opposed intersecting frames and frameworks are interwoven in our flesh and gut; one instance, the chasm of mimetic contrast between the imagining of Langton’s sense of his own ‘amour propre’, and dignity, and lofty ‘spiritual seriousness’; and Johnson’s exploding perception of the banal and fear-engendered egoism of Langton’s actual motivation. (Wilkinson, 2005a)

In both the psychoanalytic and the Leavisian senses, the communication or interaction process transcends paraphrasable words or interpretation. So what is the difference, other than that one is more perjorative and the other approbative?

It is that, in the Leavisian sense, the structural basis of enactment is being elucidated at the meta-level. The unparaphrasability and other related markers are implicitly apprehended (though Leavis only pursues this ambivalently) as ontologically irreducible, and hence as ontological characterisations. And where psychoanalysis increasingly does this, it does converge with the Leavisian sense.

It is because there is a sustained and systematic attempt to do this, in Daniel Stern’s The Present Moment, despite Stern’s one-sided emphasis on the present qua present, that I have given it such a measure of attention (four times in seven years, Wilkinson, 2003c, 2005b,
Consequently, what I sought to show, in my review article of 2003 (Wilkinson, 2003c), but even more in Chapter 5 of *The Muse as Therapist*, and again in Chapter 4 of *Beyond Postmodernism* (Wilkinson, 2009b, see Appendix), is that Stern can only structurally characterise ‘temporal dynamics’ by evoking an enactment, which happens in the most vivid and graphic way, even alluded to in his aphoristic remark, which I used as an epigraph:

‘We need another language that does not exist (outside poetry) – a language that is steeped in temporal dynamics.’ (Stern, 2004, p. 173)

Stern instinctively resorts, - in a culminating example, which I analysed at length in its context (Stern, 2004, pp. 174-5, Wilkinson, 2009a, pp. 176-182) - to the poetry, which he has implicitly recognised as the only language through which ‘temporal dynamics’ can be evoked. Yet he does not explicitly follow through the implications - even though his implicit insight is so profound, that he serendipitously and brilliantly affords very strong supporting evidence for the thesis I am defending.

Now, ‘enactment’ is a reflexive concept which is bound up with words for its characterisation. Because Stern remains thus gripped by the paradigm of ‘present experience’, he does not adequately follow through the implication of its reflexivity or its being bound up with words. Despite his debt to phenomenological philosophy (Husserl, 1893-1917/1991), he is drawn towards neuroscientific and dualistic, objectivising, models.
Consequently he fails to grasp the implications of the fact that one can only characterise enactment \textit{reflexively, with yet another enactment}. Early in the book (Stern, op. cit., pp. 8-9) he writes, in one of many passages with this kind of implication:

> The present moment, while lived, can not be seized by language, which [re?]constitutes it after the fact. How different is the linguistic version from the originally lived one? At this point, even the neurosciences can make only limited suggestions. In spite of this, the book is largely about the unreachable present moment. Such a lived experience must exist. It is the ungraspable happening of our reality.

This is both true and false, both equally profoundly. Experience as such is, in a sense, indeed opaque to language – but because it is \textit{experience}, not because it is not linguistic.

I addressed this whole issue at great length in Chapter Five of Wilkinson, 2009a (e.g., pp. 196-202). The paradox of enactment is that it is \textit{not} reducible to language, in the sense of paraphrasability, but yet it is wholly dependent upon language (or at least symbolism).

\textit{Enactment is communicated through the (linguistically informed) apprehension of an enactment, in its being enacted.} Language is enactment which is not simply convertible into linguistic content. In this, enactment is like Austin’s performatives, being verbally grounded, and yet not linguistically representational, except in a secondary sense. (The \textit{difference} is, Austin’s performatives remain propositional \textit{in form}, whereas enactment is not tied to the form or proposition.)

Experience is a process as an act. Enactment is a reflexive act which is also a process.
If all this were not the case, nothing of the fascinating dramatic apparatus of Stern’s breakfast interviews, and all that goes with them, in his book, would be possible at all. We would indeed be non-reflexively, unrememberingly, immersed in the present, like either an animal or a mystic in ecstasy. The passage from Hamlet I quoted in the introduction of my book evokes this (Wilkinson, 2009a, p. xxvii)

What is a man,

If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more.
Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us unused. (Shakespeare, Hamlet, IV, 4)

So the verbal-dramatic element is indeed irreducible in enactments; it the ubiquitous and all-embracing dramatic interactivity which constitutes enactment in the Leavisian sense. This is what we must move towards characterising (no one, at another level, is more acutely aware of this than Stern, as we shall shortly see). It is the micro- and macro-dramatic process which is at the heart of the enactment paradigm. This is the link between the literary sense of enactment and the psychotherapeutic. I shall now approach this convergence from the literary end.

Leavis’s starting point in his exposition of enactment is Shakespearean drama, in opposition to Dr Johnson:

Johnson cannot understand that works of art enact their moral valuations. It is not
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enough that Shakespeare, on the evidence of his works, ‘thinks’ (and feels) morally; for Johnson a moral judgement that isn’t stated isn’t there. Further he demands that the whole play shall be conceived and composed as statement. The dramatist must start with a conscious and abstractly formulated moral and proceed to manipulate his puppets so as to demonstrate and enforce it. (Leavis, 1952/1962, p. 110/11)

But, as I developed in relation to Eliot in my book (pp. 184ff.), Leavis’s whole stance on this goes back to his use of Eliot’s ‘dissociation of sensibility’, which Eliot introduces as follows:

The difference is not a simple difference of degree between poets. It is something which had happened to the mind of England between the time of Donne or Lord Herbert of Cherbury and the time of Tennyson and Browning; it is the difference between the intellectual poet and the reflective poet. Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they do not feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose. A thought to Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility. When a poet’s mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man’s experience is chaotic, irregular, fragmentary. The latter falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two experiences have nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always forming new wholes.

We may express the difference by the following theory: The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth [my italic], possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could devour any kind of experience. They are simple, artificial, difficult, or fantastic, as their predecessors were; no less nor more
than Dante, Guido Cavalcanti, Guinicelli, or Cino. In the seventeenth century a
dissociation of sensibility set in, from which we have never recovered; and this
dissociation, as is natural, was aggravated by the influence of the two most powerful
poets of the century, Milton and Dryden. Each of these men performed certain
poetic functions so magnificently well that the magnitude of the effect concealed the
absence of others. The language went on and in some respects improved; the best
verse of Collins, Gray, Johnson, and even Goldsmith satisfies some of our fastidious
demands better than that of Donne or Marvell or King. But while the language
became more refined, the feeling became more crude. The feeling, the sensibility,
expressed in the Country Churchyard (to say nothing of Tennyson and Browning) is
cruder than that in the Coy Mistress. (Eliot, 1921/1932)

The key passage here points back to Shakespeare and the drama:

The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the dramatists of the
sixteenth, possessed a mechanism of sensibility which could devour any kind of
experience. [my italic]

‘The successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth’: what Eliot is saying, implicitly putting
aside his earlier denigration of ‘the ordinary man’, is that experience, in an integrated
sensibility, is dramatic, has the inner diversity of the dramatic, and, therefore, that the
psychological inner world is a differentiated drama. Eliot’s own poetry of the time illustrates
this compellingly. Here, for instance, is his poetic evocation of Bertrand Russell, (who
probably cuckolded him, and whose priapism, and pagan Hellenic mystery of being, is
deliciously caught in the poem):

[Eliot’s epigraphs always add to the dimensions, this one by Lucian]:

\[\Omega \; \tau\iota\varsigma \; \kappa\alpha\iota\nu\sigma\tau\eta\tau\omicron\sigma\varsigma\; \acute{\iota} \; \mathrm{H}r\acute{a}k\lambda\epsilon\varsigma\; \tau\iota\varsigma\; \pi\alpha\rho\alpha\delta\sigma\xi\zeta\omicron\lambda\omicron\varsigma\iota\nu\varsigma\upsilon\varsigma\alpha\omicron\nu\varsigma\; \epsilon\upsilon\mu\iota\mu\iota\chi\kappa\nu\alpha\omicron\nu\varsigma\; \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\omicron\upsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma\;\]

[Roughly, very roughly, translated]:

O what novelty, by Hercules, what paradoxical machinations belong to man!

WHEN Mr. Apollinax visited the United States

His laughter tinkled among the teacups.

I thought of Fragilion, that shy figure among the birch-trees,

And of Priapus in the shrubbery

Gaping at the lady in the swing.

In the palace of Mrs. Phlaccus, at Professor Channing-Cheetah’s

He laughed like an irresponsible foetus.

His laughter was submarine and profound

Like the old man of the sea’s

Hidden under coral islands

Where worried bodies of drowned men drift down in the green silence,

Dropping from fingers of surf.

I looked for the head of Mr. Apollinax rolling under a chair

Or grinning over a screen

With seaweed in its hair.
I heard the beat of centaur’s hoofs over the hard turf

As his dry and passionate talk devoured the afternoon.

“He is a charming man”— “But after all what did he mean?”—

“His pointed ears…. He must be unbalanced,”—

“There was something he said that I might have challenged.”

Of dowager Mrs. Phlaccus, and Professor and Mrs. Cheetah

I remember a slice of lemon, and a bitten macaroon.

Now, it was as just such an inner dramatic process that Freud portrayed the psyche. First, we find this true of the psyche of the Interpretation of Dreams (1900/2008), where, occurring in the dream in Fechner’s ‘other Scene’ (c.f., my comments on this in Episodes and Scenes, Wilkinson, 2005a), forbidden thoughts and impulses and feelings have to disguise themselves and mutate into unexpected affiliations, mergers, fusions, and displacements, to break through the dictatorship of the censorship.

Secondly, in the psyche of the later metapsychology, the entire psyche is constructed on a socio-dramatic model, emerging from the mystery of the child’s fort/da, as Derrida evoked, in a passage to which we shall come, which then became the prototype of the varieties of object relations theory, ego-psychology, and relational-intersubjective theory, as well illustrated by Lewis Aron, and all their humanistic-integrative offshoots, such as psychodrama, Gestalt, and Transactional Analysis. And this relates to everything Daniel Stern is saying about ‘choreography’ and ‘protonarrative envelopes of temporal experience’.
In poetry, what Eliot is saying about the 17th century is also graphically, and staggeringly vividly, realised in such a familiar and classic metaphysical poem as Donne’s *The Sun Rising*:

BUSIE old foole, unruly Sunne,

Why dost thou thus,

Through windowes, and through curtaines call on us?

Must to thy motions lovers seasons run?

Sawcy pedantique wretch, goe chide

Late schoole boyes, and sowre prentices,

Goe tell Court-huntsmen, that the King will ride,

Call countrey ants to harvest offices;

Love, all alike, no season knowes, nor clyme,

Nor houres, dayes, moneths, which are the rags of time.

Thy beames, so reverend, and strong

Why shouldst thou thinke?

I could eclipse and cloud them with a winke,

But that I would not lose her sight so long:

If her eyes have not blinded thine

Looke, and to morrow late, tell mee,

Whether both the’India’s of spice and Myne

Be where thou leftst them, or lie here with mee.

Aske for those Kings whom thou saw’st yesterday,
And thou shalt heare, All here in one bed lay. 20

She’s all States, and all Princes, I,
Nothing else is.
Princes doe but play us; compar’d to this,
All honor’s mimique; All wealth alchimie.
Thou sunne art halfe as happy’as wee, 25
In that the world’s contracted thus;
Thine age askes ease, and since thy duties bee
To warme the world, that’s done in warming us.
Shine here to us, and thou art every where;
This bed thy center is, these walls, thy spheare. (Donne, 1941, Poems)

Here the differentiations of the inner/outer drama are traversed with awesome boldness.
The range of registers brought into play here, and inextricably cross-connected in the
characteristic way of poetry, is quite stunning. So, this is the unparaphrasable totality
which is poetic enactment, and to which, on my argument, corresponds the less well-articulated opaquenesses of the therapeutic interactivity in psychotherapy work. It is
equally unparaphrasable, if not always of equal aesthetic quality, although it always has that
epiphanic capability which astonishes us again and again.
§1. **NOTE:** I am also interspersing this commentary with paragraphs of more personal and freer, less expository, sometimes note form, reflections in italics, soliloquy, as it were: of which the first now follows.]

§1. Need to get across, how I think the formulation I am pursuing crystallises out a strand of thinking in the field, which releases us from the spell of scientific or rather positivistic models, and enables us to have a more proactive conception of our profession. A strand of which many psychotherapy traditions, and thinkers, contain large elements, but of which we may try the experiment of exploring whether they culminate or crystallise in this formulation.

The difficulty persists, Hydra-headed, of showing that it, - enactivity, - as I understand it, actually adds something to existing formulations. This hinges in the end upon its being an ontological formulation, which places enactivity at the core of an trans-representational articulation. Difficulty in showing, in this way, that it is a sufficiently complex or paradoxical conception, in one sense, that even deep anticipatory intuitions of it often remain intractably caught within a representational framework which is actually at odds with it – Wittgenstein is a striking case in point, so near and yet so far: as his puzzlement with Shakespeare, and the Shakespearian use of language, suggests.

This is also bound up with the multidisciplinary dimension, in a world which still tenaciously patrols disciplinary boundaries, - and indeed in a world which also still patrols
What this amounts to, is that I am saying that it is essentially the same point, whether it is literature, or psychotherapy, or philosophy. Which is why it is too obvious, - in one sense. But not reductionist to any one of the three. Each as itself. Different ways of coming at the same. Identified by the function and frame. If I talk literature in a session it is still psychotherapy, just the centre of gravity is a bit different. And if I call attention to the ‘psychotherapeutic dimension’ of a poem, or write a novel about psychotherapy, it is still literature (however there is no ‘pure literature’ or ‘pure poetry’). But the ‘psychotherapy dimension’ is psychotherapy. And all psychotherapy is ‘applied psychotherapy’, the frame is not so narrowly definable as to admit of a ‘pure’ model, just as is the case with literature.

For me it is startlingly simple, whether in my work in practice, or in theory – but how do I convey this simplicity? By showing that it is ontological? Especially when, on the other side, it seems to many as if, content-wise, I may be saying something which is so obvious that it is almost cliché. This is part of the mercurial shape-shifting protean character of it all. It keeps jumping around like a jumping bean! There is a chronic tension between contexting it in a wider perspective, and making it so wide that the original point gets lost. However, the wider context is essential to it.
Background: the ‘history of thought’ context

Never has there been a time which has access simultaneously to more thought, and more traditions of thought, than our own.

As the explosive expansion of this situation has accelerated since the 17th century, philosophy has increasingly been driven to reflect upon itself, and upon its own foundations. It has become, implicitly and explicitly, more and more psychotherapeutic in the process. In reflecting on its own foundations, it has been increasingly compelled to address the foundations of subjectivity as such, after Descartes’ intuition had leapt ahead.

In turn, this has increasingly resulted in philosophy’s turning its mind to the ontological basis of subjectivity in *inter*-subjectivity. The huge shifts in awareness, after Kant, indexed in the Romantic Era, by the names of Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx, and Nietzsche, are central initial illustrations of this. Psychotherapy emerged from this process, and has followed suit; and latterly, and increasingly, led this process.

Alongside of this philosophical-psychotherapeutic explosion of subjectivity, and intersubjectivity, English literature, from the Renaissance onwards, increasingly incorporated *drama and the dramatic* within its aegis. Supremely in Shakespeare, then in seventeenth century poetry, and eventually in the emergence of the 19th century novel, ‘the novel as dramatic poem’ (Leavis, 1948/1974), as an increasingly poetic medium: these media, again, rapidly developed powerful forms of inwardness, and powerful techniques for the exploration of intersubjectivity.
They rendered it almost inevitable, that one major aspect, of the eventually emerging discipline of psychotherapy, would take the form of advanced dramatic and interpretative methodologies for the exploration of subjectivity and of intersubjectivity. Diagnostic enquiry became conversation and story-telling; then conversation and story-telling became processes of dramatic enactment. With severe reservations nowadays on the part of the flamboyantly scientifically minded, such as Kächele (2001), the case history or narrative became, and remains, the uneliminable paradigm of psychotherapeutic investigation. Variations on the theme of transference took centre stage – and this dramatic metaphor is something more than a metaphor.

Apparently paradoxically, but on reflection perhaps inevitably, these developments ran alongside the rise of the greatest expansion of physical science which seemingly the world has ever known. They ran, therefore, likewise alongside the ever increasing radicalisation of a positivistic materialist mentality and methodology, as a major – though not the total – dimension of the scientific vision.

Against the background of religion’s on-going divisions, and its struggle with the secular, not surprisingly, therefore, the world became divided into two domains or dimensions, consciousness and extension, and with two, increasingly diverging, methodologies to match (c.f., Mill on Bentham and Coleridge, Mill/Leavis, 1950). Descartes epitomised this in his Meditations on First Philosophy (Descartes, 1641/1996) Perhaps the most surprising thing about the rise and continuance of Cartesian dualism, has been the strength and tenacity of the on-going resistance to it. Something in us tenaciously resisted it, even when we could
neither refute it, nor think outside its categories, so that we by default remain implicit Cartesians, even when we most resisted it; but we do still resist it, even though we cannot agree on the basis on which to do so.

However it is very commonly assumed that Descartes has duly been refuted (c.f., e.g., Ryle, 1949/1970, Damasio, 1994, Totton, 1998, Wilkinson, 2000, presented as part of my RAL 5 submission), whereas these ‘refutations’ normally consist in embracing vigorously one horn or other of the dilemma. Certainly, the two dimensions Descartes addresses have neither of them suffered any diminution since he wrote; on the contrary! As the question how far, even in his appeal to res cogitans, Descartes is wedded to a representational understanding rather than an existential one, remains live (c.f., Henry, 1985/1993), this leads on to the question whether there is indeed a ‘third position’, and this question is at the heart of this enquiry.

This world situation, of course, in turn, has generated, or brought into mutual relation, a whole mass of core belief systems, and their associated praxes and rituals. With the advent of globalisation, and what McLuhan (1964) called ‘the global village’, we also have access to, and often live right next door to, the diverse beliefs of a huge plurality of peoples, and to their practices, which involve these core beliefs. There arises from this, simultaneously, an intensification of fundamentalisms of belief, and pluralistic understandings opposed to fundamentalisms.

Out of all this, then, comes the recognition with which I began this section, that never has there been a time which has access simultaneously to more thought, and more traditions of
thought, than our own. So, increasingly, because of the loss of a single unifying framework, thought as such, ‘grand narratives’ as such, beliefs as such, have apparently gone into the melting pot. Notoriously, at just before the time of the emergence of psychotherapy as a major force, Nietzsche proclaims *the death of God* (1882/2001), which some, including Nietzsche himself (1967/1968), have understood in terms of the elusive concept of *nihilism*, and others, such as some post-modern thinkers, have understood as the end of grand narratives (c.f., e.g., Lyotard, 1979), and the end of ontology (c.f., Derrida, 1967/1973).

The developing awareness of comparativity of beliefs and of disciplines, and the development of techniques for the examination of belief frameworks, and the development of foundational frameworks, such as phenomenology, and analytic philosophy, which are designed to hold belief frameworks simultaneously in suspense in the process, have burgeoned on many fronts, and in many disciplines. In my RAL 5 material, one dimension which I explored several times, as I moved towards the formulation of *enactivity*, is that of the meaning of *pluralism* (c.f., e.g., Wilkinson, 1999, 2002a), and whether it is actually a relativism.

The disciplines for the exploration of subjectivity, then, have been pervaded, to an increasing degree, by relativism, or pluralism, allied with a kind of secular agnostic empiricism and continence in interpretation, and by an acceptance of indeterminacy in the way in which we hold beliefs and frameworks of enquiry. It is as if, not merely psychoanalysis in the wake of Bion (1970), but all human science and humanities disciplines, have embraced Keats’s formulation of ‘Negative Capability’, which had played such an important part in my own development (Wilkinson, 2010a):
I had not a dispute but a disquisition, with Dilke on various subjects; several things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously - I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason - Coleridge, for instance, would let go by a fine isolated verisimilitude caught from the Penetrailium of mystery, from being incapable of remaining content with half-knowledge. This pursued through volumes would perhaps take us no further than this, that with a great poet the sense of Beauty overcomes every other consideration, or rather obliterates all consideration. (John Keats Letter to George and Tom Keats, 21 Dec. 1817, Keats, Ed. MB Forman, 1947a, my italics)

In this situation of lack of agreed beliefs or agreed methodologies, disciplines have responded in various ways. It is often assumed, or argued, for instance, of the deconstructivist and post-modernist development, as expounded in, e.g., Derrida, Of Grammatology, 1967/1976, that its implication is a throughgoing relativism and constructivism (c.f., Dews, 1987). Whether or not this be a fair account, it is certainly and clearly true that it reflects a situation in thought where firm foundations have ceased to be able to be taken for granted, and when we must somehow delight in dancing on the surf, the fluid surfaces, or the vortices, of thinking.

This situation, naturally, is more and more being reflected, and reflected upon, in philosophically aware modern psychotherapy. In exploring the grounding insights, in the
narrative and relational traditions, in modern psychotherapy, we are dealing with matters whose nature is both exceedingly elusive, and exceedingly open to dispute. (These, encompassing, at least, psychoanalytic, psychodynamic, analytical psychology, humanistic, integrative, existential, and transpersonal approaches, I broadly oppose to the programmatic traditions, such as CBT.) We are dealing with elusive matters and concepts, whose definition is constantly in flux.

And yet it is evident that there is a significant degree of consensus, around the issues I shall be discussing, as it were in the ‘twilight zone’, or the faultlines, of psychotherapeutic process, among philosophically minded, relationally inclined, psychoanalysts, analytical psychologists, psychodynamic, and humanistic, para-analytic, integrative, existential, and transpersonal psychotherapists. Even where there is disagreement, it is to a considerable extent around agreed issues.

But, by the same token, it is hard to characterise this clustering, because any signifier one chooses will turn out to show exceptions.

Initially psychoanalysis sought the kind of certainty commonly attributed, first to dogmatic religion, and then to Enlightenment science, the kind of sense of certainty we find in Kant and Hegel and Marx. This is reflected, for instance, in what Freud famously wrote to Fliess:

One strenuous night last week, when I was in the stage of painful discomfort in which my brain works best, the barriers suddenly lifted, the veils dropped, and it was possible to see from the details of neurosis all the way to the very conditioning
of consciousness. Everything fell into place, the cogs meshed, the thing really seemed to be a machine which in a moment would run of itself. The three systems of neurones, the ‘free’ and ‘bound’ states of quantity, the primary and secondary processes, the main trend and the compromise trend of the nervous system, the two biological rules of attention and defence, the sexual determination of repression, and finally the factors determining consciousness as a perceptual function - the whole thing held together, and still does. I can hardly contain myself with delight. If I had only waited a fortnight before setting it all down for you. (Freud/Kris, *Freud letter to Fliess of October 20th, 1895*, in *The Origins of Psychoanalysis*, 1954, p. 129, c.f., Wilkinson, 2000a)

Derrida comments tersely (referring to *A note on the mystic writing pad* of 1925, Freud, 1925/1984):  


This sort of feeling of certainty soon collapsed, though constantly resurrected, in one form or another, in the history of psychotherapy, which thereby mimics philosophy. It is perhaps better, therefore, to adopt instead the sort of strategy Lewis Aron (*A Meeting of Minds: Mutuality in Psychoanalysis*, 1996, pp. 32-33) attributes to Stephen Mitchell, of a generic, broad church, relational understanding, which would head off at the pass attempts by the orthodox to pick off rebels by *isolating* their distinctive positions:

Mitchell’s point is that none of these schools individually could stand as a viable theoretical alternative to the comprehensiveness of Freudian thought,
but, if their insights were brought together, a composite relational theory
might be comprehensive enough to offer a viable alternative to the classical
framework. Mitchell does not claim to have completed a finished theoretical
system; rather he has attempted to formulate an approach that enables the analytic
community to begin to work out such a system. (Aron, *A Meeting of Minds:*
*Mutuality in Psychoanalysis*, 1996, p. 33)

I am, then, casting my net rather wider than Mitchell and Aron do, for reasons to do with the
fundamental ontological role, that concepts related to that of enactment, have had in all three
disciplines. But I am working in terms of the same type of logical principle. In considerable
measure, as already touched upon above, I have been doing since at least 2000, in the
material which is gathered into my RAL 5 submission

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/ATerribleBeautyisBornRal4and5.pdf


http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/TottonReview.pdf

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/3WayReviewPDF.pdf

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/AutonomyofPsychotherapy.pdf

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/SternReview.pdf

As time has gone on, the multidisciplinary breadth and basis of the implications of this
approach has become more emphatic. In the RAL 4 and 5 submissions I addressed the issue
of Phenomenological Causality (Intentional Causality) and its offshoot issues, which is very
much in the background of this issue of enactment.
In the process of creating this background, as already indicated, I am setting out the concept of *enactment*, as I am using it, as, while closely related to the concept of enactment, as used particularly in psychoanalysis, and used increasingly in a creative non-perjorative way (e.g., Aron, 1996), mine is not the same as that one.

In particular, it is more clearly ontological than that is, though ontological elements are constantly threatening or promising to emerge, or implicit, in the psychoanalytic concept. Once the spectrum difference is grasped, it furthermore enables us to give a unifying characterisation of the cluster of themes, in the mode of background, I am about to describe.

In a sense, I started from the other end, the literary and philosophical end, as I described in my previous commentary (Wilkinson, 2010a) and this means that I started from the broader understanding, which, on my concept, psychoanalysis is in the process of reaching. This makes it possible to reach wider connections which do not automatically arise, or only slowly, from the psychoanalytic trajectory. Jungian approaches do indeed start from a wider perspective, and, apart from a residual empirical aspiration, which can make the logic of Jungian approaches somewhat indeterminate, they are naturally the closest to my concept.
Reflections §2

§2. Reflections: there are a whole cluster of writings which are teasing away at a particular closely related problem, which is variously formulated.

It might be alternately described as the problem of: how do we make the transition from preconceptual awareness and experience to conceptual awareness? or, how do we make the transition from pre-oedipal conceptual modes to oedipal modes? Or, how do we differentiate between those, what functional criteria do we have?

Or, how do we describe what we mean in the transition from one person to two-person and then to three-person modes of conceptualisation or conceptual awareness? Or how do we understand the transition from sensori-motor to concrete operations, or from concrete to metaphorical thinking? How do we understand the development from Paranoid-Schizoid to Depressive Positions, whether or not we take the further step Grotstein (2000) attributes to Bion, of the Transcendent Position?

How do we move from engulfment by, or fusion with, the archetype, to the differentiation which leads to individuation?

There are so many accounts of this general area, and what they are all concerned with, in their own way, is a certain transition - towards what Rogers calls ‘becoming a person’. I myself tried to address this whole skein of issues in the book (Wilkinson, 2009a), to give it space, without forcing it into a one-causal-model mode or metaphor, by differentiating three
major dimensions of the narrative-relational conception: the precommunicable (the ‘It’, embodiment); the relational field; and text and context. With the clarification of enactment, however, a more unified approach to all this emerged.

Its going to be my contention that this means the the several dimensions of the dramatic totality which is, unparaphrasably, expressed in enactments, will indeed be realised in an emergence of integrated subjective/intersubjective volition, as mapped in the psychodynamic traditions, in some form. The recognition of the archetype in Jungian approaches, or the complex (which Freud borrowed from Jung in any case) in Freudian approaches, or ‘object relations’ in Klein and Fairbairn, is the recognition that dramatic process within a frame is intrinsic to these processes.

In this process of emergence, there is also a unitive conception of the containing background, shared by many perspectives: Freud’s ‘primary process’; Winnicott’s ‘transitional experience’; Derrida’s and Kristeva’s appropriation of Plato’s untranslateable ‘concept’ of the khora; Klein’s and Isaacs’ ‘unconscious phantasies as the primary content of all mental processes (Isaacs, 1943/1991, p. 276); Grotstein’s (1982)‘background object of primary identification’; Jung’s collective unconscious or the Self in one of its senses; Margaret Little’s ‘basic unity’; Daniel Stern’s ‘emergent self’ and ‘core self’; and Groddeck’s (not Freud’s) all-embracing concept of the ‘It’.

It is very tempting to see this descriptively as a representation of developmental sequence, and to forget that primarily it is lived. When it is seen as a representation of a causal-
developmental sequence, it is then easy to construe present dramatic totalities and enactments simply as replications of events in the past, and thus, in effect, as memories of objectively occurring events, of which they are representations. This is to succumb once more to linear-causal paradigms, which are only secondarily relevant to our work.

Thereby the true enactive, non-linear-causal, dramatic totality, character of process is downgraded, at best, instead of being recognised as the primary ontological reality, to which representations of causal sequences are secondary. But this time we are going to come at this equally from the psychotherapeutic end. It will still appear, eventually, I argue, that enactment assimilates representation, rather than the other way around.
Comparative Illustrations: Stern, G Eliot, Derrida and Freud

So, now, for some comparative illustration, to bring the issues vividly into view. I begin with an illustrations from psychotherapy (Daniel Stern, 2004). Then, because this is such an exceptionally vivid and clearly articulated example of the kind of phenomenon we are going to be considering, and, to suggest that it is hardly at all a step from psychotherapy to literature, I turn to a necessarily long literary quotation, from George Eliot’s novel Daniel Deronda (Eliot, G, 1876/1988, Chapter 26), where the developments leading to Gwendolen Harleth’s engagement to Henleigh Grandcourt show very pronounced psychotherapeutic features, in the modern sense, with FR Leavis’s pertinent comment upon it. Finally, in a passage which graphically expresses enactivity in a way which is almost excessively supersaturated, I turn to an illustration from philosophy, Jacques Derrida writing on Freud. All three illustrations start from the psychoanalytic end, as I am dubbing it, in that they show a strong emphasis on repetition and repetitional process and pattern.

Illustration of Enactive Repetition in Daniel Stern

In the passage touched on above, quoted in The Muse as Therapist (Wilkinson, 2009a, pp. 172-182) where I discuss at length a long passage from Stern’s book, the one from which I obtained my epigraph

We need another language that does not exist (outside poetry) – a language that is steeped in temporal dynamics. (Stern, 2004, p. 173),

Stern moves onwards, from a whole series of evocations of ‘present moments’, to one which evokes the crystallisation of a ‘moment of meeting’. I have already written, in this Commentary, on the significance of that crucial passage and referred to the significance of
my own climactic formulation in my own earlier review article on Stern’s book, from 2003 (Wilkinson, 2003c). As I have said, I have found Stern’s book the closest to my vision, and have engaged with it several times from 2003 to 2009 (Wilkinson, 2003c, 2005b, 2009a, 2009b).

For the moment, I simply wish to show that Stern has an absolutely graphic grasp of the ‘present moment’ dimension of the repetitional (and past-referring) phenomenon with which we are currently concerned. His brilliant, and very Freudian, general statement of this, which I quoted in 2003, is:

I was prepared to see present behaviour as an instantiation of larger behavioural and psychological patterns. That is the essence of the psychodynamic hypothesis. However, I was surprised to see larger psychodynamic patterns reflected in units as small as present moments. This realisation opened up the way to consider the present moment, like a dream [my italics], as a phenomenon worthy of exploration for therapeutic purposes. (Stern, 2003, p. 18, as quoted in Wilkinson, 2003c)

I compared this with the following from Freud, in the Interpretation of Dreams:

And even when it happened that the text of the dream as we had it was meaningless and inadequate - as though the effort to give a correct account of it had been unsuccessful - we have taken this defect into account as well. In short, we have regarded as Holy Writ what previous writers have regarded as an arbitrary improvisation [my italics], hurriedly patched together in the embarrassment of the moment. (Freud, 1900/2008, as quoted in Wilkinson, 2003c)
So, then, here is the first, and classic, illustration of this in Stern’s book, where he is introducing the ideas of ‘present moments’, and ‘a world in a grain of sand’. He writes (op. cit. p. xi) of how the idea of present moments came to him when he began to study film and video of mother-infant interactions and observations and realised how much happens, and how richly it happens, in mere seconds:

I began to think of these moments as the basic building blocks of experience. Once I got the hang of these techniques (e.g., freeze frame, slow motion, segment repeats) I could even use them, unsystematically, in real time, for very short stretches, to see my psychotherapy patients differently. I was just beginning as a therapist.

Certain moments in therapy began to reveal aspects of the therapeutic process different from those I was trained to see. My notes from a meeting with a patient in 1969 illustrate this:

‘She enters my office and sits in the chair. She drops into it from high up, The chair cushion deflates rapidly, then takes another five seconds to stop accommodating itself. She clearly waits for that, but just before the cushion lets out its last sigh, she crosses her legs and shifts to the other haunch. The cushion deflates again and reequilibrates. We wait for it to get done, Rather, she does, she is listening to it, feeling it. I’ve been ready since she came in, but now I’m waiting, too. Its hard to know when the cushion has given up all its air. But everything waits. Does she sense she is waiting, or holding time? Everything waits for her readiness. I feel restrained from moving until it’s done. Almost as if I should hold my breath to hasten it along, to better judge when the still point is reached and the session can ‘start’. When I finally think that her body and the cushion have reached their readiness, that the
sound and the feel of settling has stopped, I begin to shift my chair, in anticipation breathing more freely. But she is still hearing the sound recede and is not quite ready. My shift is arrested in midflow by her still waiting. I feel like I have been caught in a game of ‘statue’. It is ridiculous. And I can sense my annoyance building in me to have my rhythms so disrupted and controlled. Should I let it go on? Should I bring it up? She wouldn’t dream that we had already played out the main themes of the session, and an important theme in her life. [my italics]

Before my experience with the micro-momentary world of implicit happenings, all this would never have jumped to the foreground. I would have passed it over, waiting for her to speak.

Such experiences eventually led me to construct the *micro-analytic interview* as a way of getting closer to lived subjective experience at the micro-momentary level.

Granted, one can not get to the lived subjective experience and stay there while talking about it. But that does not stop me from thinking about it and approaching as close as I can.’ (Stern, 2004, p xii-xiii)

Stern, here, and in many more examples, shows the keen eye and mind for enacted repetitions which his book develops into his theory of the therapeutic efficacy of working in the moment, and particularly moments of meeting. This was how it caught my attention in 2003, when it arrived for review, just before I ceased to be Editor of the *International Journal of Psychotherapy*, and just after discovering Darlene Bregman-Ehrenberg’s *The Intimate Edge* (1992), which I had reviewed in the March 2003 issue (Wilkinson, 2003a), beginning there to articulate a theory of performativity (Austin, op. cit.), if not as yet fully, or fully clearly, enactment. Ehrenberg’s is a book which Stern mentions (Stern, 2004, p.
186), along with Knoblauch’s *The Musical Edge of Therapeutic Dialogue* (2000), as the only psychoanalytic writing entirely congruent with his vision, and that of the Boston Change Study Group, of ‘present moments’. I would now want to add to this list of approaches congruent with Stern’s, Philip Ringstrom’s work, (c.f., e.g., Ringstrom, 2001) to the significance of which I shall be returning.

In practice, in line with such realisations, Freud quite early grasped that, for instance, a communication in a dream can continue to be enacted in the process of the session, in forgetting and repression for instance, enactively brought into the process of a session, as the woman quoted in chapter 7 of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1900/2008) represses her sceptical mockery of Freud’s theory which is hidden in her witty allusion (which replicates the dream’s own reference to his book on *Witz*, *Wit*) to ‘channel’:

> ‘*Du sublime au ridicule il n’y a qu’un pas.* The writer retorted: *Oui, le pas de Calais*, whereby he wished to imply that he thought France sublime and England ridiculous.

> But the *Pas de Calais* is a channel….’

But his overt conceptualisations, as *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, (Freud, 1916-17/1991) for instance, illustrate, remain dominated by drive theory until quite late on, and never fully release themselves from it (resulting, for instance, in Freud’s distortion of Groddeck’s ‘the It’ in the later metapsychology, c.f., Groddeck, 1923/1961), despite the ‘object relations’ dimension of the later metapsychology, and despite the extremely vivid grasp of *embodiment* manifest in, for instance, the *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria* (Freud, 1905/1990).
We shall shortly return to Freud, repetition, and enactment, seen through the eyes of Derrida.

First I want to show how vividly and graphically the same phenomena appear in a 19th Century novelist, George Eliot.

**Illustration from a 19th Century poetic-dramatic novel: George Eliot**

Here, then, are the George Eliot passages:

But Mrs. Davilow had withdrawn her arms, and Gwendolen perceived a letter in her hand.

“What is that letter?--worse news still?” she asked, with a touch of bitterness.

“I don’t know what you will think it, dear,” said Mrs. Davilow, keeping the letter in her hand. “You will hardly guess where it comes from.”

“Don’t ask me to guess anything,” said Gwendolen, rather impatiently, as if a bruise were being pressed.

“It is addressed to you, dear.”

Gwendolen gave the slightest perceptible toss of the head.

“It comes from Diplow,” said Mrs. Davilow, giving her the letter.

She knew Grandcourt’s indistinct handwriting, and her mother was not surprised to see her blush deeply; but watching her as she read, and wondering much what was the purport of the letter, she saw the color die out. Gwendolen’s lips even were pale as she turned the open note toward her mother. The words were few and formal:
Mr. Grandcourt presents his compliments to Miss Harleth, and begs to know whether he may be permitted to call at Offendene tomorrow after two and to see her alone.

Mr. Grandcourt has just returned from Leubronn, where he had hoped to find Miss Harleth.

Mrs. Davilow read, and then looked at her daughter inquiringly, leaving the note in her hand. Gwendolen let it fall to the floor, and turned away.

“It must be answered, darling,” said Mrs. Davilow, timidly. “The man waits.”

Gwendolen sank on the settee, clasped her hands, and looked straight before her, not at her mother. She had the expression of one who had been startled by a sound and was listening to know what would come of it. The sudden change of the situation was bewildering. A few minutes before she was looking along an inescapable path of repulsive monotony, with hopeless inward rebellion against the imperious lot which left her no choice: and lo, now, a moment of choice was come. Yet -- was it triumph she felt most or terror? Impossible for Gwendolen not to feel some triumph in a tribute to her power at a time when she was first tasting the bitterness of insignificance: again she seemed to be getting a sort of empire over her own life. But how to use it? Here came the terror. Quick, quick, like pictures in a book beaten open with a sense of hurry, came back vividly, yet in fragments, all that she had gone through in relation to Grandcourt --the allurements, the vacillations, the resolve to accede, the final repulsion; the incisive face of that dark-eyed lady with the lovely boy: her own pledge (was it a pledge not to marry him?) -- the new disbelief in the worth of men and things for which that scene of disclosure had become a symbol.
That unalterable experience made a vision at which in the first agitated moment, before tempering reflections could suggest themselves, her native terror shrank.

Where was the good of choice coming again? What did she wish? Anything different? No! And yet in the dark seed-growths of consciousness a new wish was forming itself--"I wish I had never known it!" Something, anything she wished for that would have saved her from the dread to let Grandcourt come.

It was no long while -- yet it seemed long to Mrs. Davilow, before she thought it well to say, gently --

"It will be necessary for you to write, dear. Or shall I write an answer for you - which you will dictate?"

"No, mamma," said Gwendolen, drawing a deep breath. "But please lay me out the pen and paper."

That was gaining time. Was she to decline Grandcourt’s visit -- close the shutters -- not even look out on what would happen? -- though with the assurance that she should remain just where she was? The young activity within her made a warm current through her terror and stirred toward something that would be an event -- toward an opportunity in which she could look and speak with the former effectiveness. The interest of the morrow was no longer at a deadlock.

“There is really no reason on earth why you should be so alarmed at the man’s waiting a few minutes, mamma,” said Gwendolen, remonstrantly, as Mrs. Davilow, having prepared the writing materials, looked toward her expectantly. “Servants
expect nothing else than to wait. It is not to be supposed that I must write on the instant."

“No, dear,” said Mrs. Davilow, in the tone of one corrected, turning to sit down and take up a bit of work that lay at hand; “he can wait another quarter of an hour, if you like.”

If was very simple speech and action on her part, but it was what might have been subtly calculated. Gwendolen felt a contradictory desire to be hastened: hurry would save her from deliberate choice.

“I did not mean him to wait long enough for that needlework to be finished,” she said, lifting her hands to stroke the backward curves of her hair, while she rose from her seat and stood still.

“But if you don’t feel able to decide?” said Mrs. Davilow, sympathizingly.

“I _must_ decide,” said Gwendolen, walking to the writing-table and seating herself. All the while there was a busy undercurrent in her, like the thought of a man who keeps up a dialogue while he is considering how he can slip away. Why should she not let him come? It bound her to nothing. He had been to Leubronn after her: of course he meant a direct unmistakable renewal of the suit which before had been only implied. What then? She could reject him. Why was she to deny herself the freedom of doing this -- which she would like to do?

“If Mr. Grandcourt has only just returned from Leubronn,” said Mrs. Davilow, observing that Gwendolen leaned back in her chair after taking the pen in her hand--
"I wonder whether he has heard of our misfortunes?"

“That could make no difference to a man in his position,” said Gwendolen, rather contemptuously,

“It would to some men,” said Mrs. Davilow. “They would not like to take a wife from a family in a state of beggary almost, as we are. Here we are at Offendene with a great shell over us, as usual. But just imagine his finding us at Sawyer’s Cottage. Most men are afraid of being bored or taxed by a wife’s family. If Mr. Grandcourt did know, I think it a strong proof of his attachment to you.”

Mrs. Davilow spoke with unusual emphasis: it was the first time she had ventured to say anything about Grandcourt which would necessarily seem intended as an argument in favor of him, her habitual impression being that such arguments would certainly be useless and might be worse. The effect of her words now was stronger than she could imagine. They raised a new set of possibilities in Gwendolen’s mind -- a vision of what Grandcourt might do for her mother if she, Gwendolen, did -- what she was not going to do. She was so moved by a new rush of ideas that, like one conscious of being urgently called away, she felt that the immediate task must be hastened: the letter must be written, else it might be endlessly deferred. After all, she acted in a hurry, as she had wished to do. To act in a hurry was to have a reason for keeping away from an absolute decision, and to leave open as many issues as possible.

She wrote: “Miss Harleth presents her compliments to Mr. Grandcourt. She will be at
home after two o’clock to-morrow.” (Daniel Deronda, 1876, from Chapter 26)

Leavis’s comment, in The Great Tradition, is:

Reading this, it is hard to remember that George Eliot was contemporary with Trollope. What later novelist has rendered the inner movement of impulse, the play of motives that issues in speech and act and underlies formed thought and conscious will, with more penetrating subtlety than she? It is partly done *through* speech and action. But there is also, co-operating with these, a kind of psychological notation that is well represented in the passage quoted above, and is exemplified in ‘Quick, quick, like pictures in a book beaten open with a sense of hurry….’, and ‘yet in the dark seed-growths of consciousness a new wish was forming itself….’ And ‘The young activity within her made a warm current through her terror….’, and ‘All the while there was a busy under-current in her, like the thought of a man who keeps up a dialogue while he is considering how he can slip away’ – and so much else. (Leavis, 1948/1962)

Leavis brings out well the essential affinity to psychological-psychotherapeutic understanding here, but without making explicit the clear *repetitional* element with which we psychotherapists are so familiar, and which begins to make the cross-connection with psychotherapy process.

The next chapter, which describes the peculiar process of Gwendolen’s reaching the point of acceptance of Grandcourt’s proposal, is of comparable calibre, equally as sophisticated,
to our eyes, in the portrayal of fundamental encounter to which this long passage has led up.

Here, to suggest its power, is a short sample:

In eluding a direct appeal Gwendolen recovered some of her self-possession.
She spoke with dignity and looked straight at Grandcourt, whose long, narrow, impenetrable eyes met hers, and mysteriously arrested them: mysteriously; for the subtly-varied drama between man and woman is often such as can hardly be rendered in words put together like dominoes, according to obvious fixed marks. The word of all work, Love, will no more express the myriad modes of mutual attraction, than the word Thought can inform you what is passing through your neighbor’s mind. It would be hard to tell on which side—Gwendolen’s or Grandcourt’s—the influence was more mixed. At that moment his strongest wish was to be completely master of this creature—this piquant combination of maidenliness and mischief: that she knew things which had made her start away from him, spurred him to triumph over that repugnance; and he was believing that he should triumph. And she—ah, piteous equality in the need to dominate!—she was overcome like the thirsty one who is drawn toward the seeming water in the desert, overcome by the suffused sense that here in this man’s homage to her lay the rescue from helpless subjection to an oppressive lot.

Clearly, brilliant as all this is, it is highly recognisable, as a type of process, to any psychotherapist. It is familiar. It is profoundly interactive. It is drama, dramatic process, driven by highly intelligible, and powerful and limiting, repetitional impulsions which operate reciprocally upon both parties. We see, repeatedly, how, as she struggles with
her radical inauthenticity and lack of grounded selfhood, Gwendolen reacts, in a reflex repetitional pattern, oppositionally, but without genuine inner decisiveness, to any suggestion of decision (and in the ensuing encounter with Grandcourt, which leads to her betrothal, he skilfully and cold-bloodedly manipulates her in this respect). A key moment illustrating all this, in the already quoted passage, is:

“No, dear,” said Mrs. Davilow, in the tone of one corrected, turning to sit down and take up a bit of work that lay at hand; “he can wait another quarter of an hour, if you like.”

If was very simple speech and action on her part, but it was what might have been subtly calculated. Gwendolen felt a contradictory desire to be hastened: hurry would save her from deliberate choice.

“I did not mean him to wait long enough for that needlework to be finished,” she said, lifting her hands to stroke the backward curves of her hair, while she rose from her seat and stood still.

The strange interactive dances of a thousand psychotherapy sessions, which include our own contrarian, conciliatory, or would-be-neutral, tendencies, as part of a total pattern, yet always caught in an uncanny counter-transferential ballet, - which can, sometimes, be transformed and turned upside down, if we have only the wit to catch ourselves in the act quickly enough, - emerge as broadly and subtly comparable to the George Eliot portrayal, for us psychotherapists, - even though, of course, there are significant deep differences of frame.
Daniel Deronda is written at the historical moment when transference, in the full-blooded reflexive psychoanalytic sense, (which, in the wider psychoanalytic sense of repetitional pattern enacted in the present, is clearly at work even in this example), is beginning to emerge explicitly, and be discovered. Of explicit transference, this novel, itself, indeed, gives a powerful illustration, in the relationship between Gwendolen Harleth, and Daniel Deronda. Transference, in a multiplicity of ramifications, likewise is to be found vividly portrayed, also, in novels by Dickens, Little Dorrit (1857/2003), Tolstoy, Anna Karenina (1875/1965), Henry James (The Bostonians, 1886/2000, and The Portrait of a Lady, 1882/2007), and Dostoievsky (The Idiot, 1868/2004, Brothers Karamazov, 1880/2003), at around this time, just prior to the emergence of psychoanalysis, and his discovery of transference, in the evolution of Freud’s own creative development.

All these novelistic accounts of transferential process manifest the kind of relational-dramatic understanding of that process, which has gradually and somewhat belatedly succeeded the initially rather positivistic vision with which psychoanalysis began, and which is illustrated by the type of vision Freud is driven by, in the passage from the letter to Fliess already quoted (loc. cit., Kris/Freud, 1954).

Now, there are, of course, many, many approaches which have suggested ways to characterise what is going on in such situations. If, then, my (Leavis-derived) conceptualisation is to add something, it must map the familiar and diverse approaches which tackle something like such interactions as these, and then suggest how the conceptualisation of enactment welds it all together in a new, or more embracing, way. My
mapping of the conception of enactment develops a way which links a narrower and a wider exposition of this concept, and grounds it in an articulation, which takes it as the basis of an ontological account.

First I must give the two mentioned further illustrations, from philosophy (Derrida), which bring out the essential affinities in an informal way. This example graphically concerns repetition, in a way which will then enable us to consider in an initial way the relationship between repetition and enactment.

In The Present Moment: in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life (Stern, 2004) Stern develops and expounds an acute and precise methodology for identifying patterns of the sort which we have noted in the passages from George Eliot. He identifies two dimensions, which partially correspond to my own focus upon a narrower and a wider exposition of the concept of enactment, namely ‘present moments’ and ‘moments of meeting’.

‘Present moments’ are any present experience in which something comes to the attention of consciousness as potentially requiring response, however minimal, and which has a narrative choreography and architecture, again, however minimal, which enables conscious recognitional identification of its intentional structure to be achieved. ‘Moments of meeting’ are epiphanic present moments in a relational context, which bring about a major shift and realisation in someone’s experience and action.

Roughly speaking, in the George Eliot passage, Gwendolen’s realisation that she does not
want to spin out the decision, triggered by her mother’s placid remark that the man could wait another quarter of an hour, is a ‘present moment’. The crystallisation that she must reply, and her replying:

She wrote: “Miss Harleth presents her compliments to Mr. Grandcourt. She will be at home after two o’clock to-morrow.”

following on her mother’s comment on Grandcourt’s knowledge of their financial predicament, would be, - if ironically almost the reverse of epiphanic, - a ‘moment of meeting’, that is, it is an large event which crosses a threshold, and which is profoundly relational, even if, here, at the one remove of a written note.

**Freud and Derrida: Beyond the Pleasure Principle and The Postcard**

Returning now to Freud, and to Derrida, what Freud’s theory says, and what he does, are two different things, and, in particular in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1920/1991), he, in the language of this contribution, *enacts* what he is writing *about* in an astonishing and remarkable fashion. This is the theme, carried further than anyone else has carried it, as far as I know, of Derrida’s commentary, in *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond* (Derrida, 1980/1987, though c.f., also Mahoney, 1981, who also ‘gets’ the enactive element of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*).

So, here, from the, apparently, but only apparently, very different starting perspective of a post-modern philosopher, the philosopher of deconstruction, from left field as it were, Derrida (1980/1987) in *The Postcard: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond*, gives a commentary on Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1920/1991). This
carries George Eliot’s and Stern’s type of insight onwards, into a characterisation of what the present contribution would call the *enactive* character of the entire Psychoanalytic movement.

This characterisation brings out that the repetition has an *ontological* character, in that the *movement itself* is shown as circularly, and foundationally, defined by repetition, enactively, as realised in this work.

It also touches deeply on the nature of the *temporality* of the repetitional processes, as Stern likewise does very intently and philosophically in *The Present Moment: in Psychotherapy and Everyday Life* (Stern, 2004). And it connectedly touches on the (in the ontological sense) ‘power’-driven *binding/bonding*, character of such repetitional processes, in which Freud implicitly evokes Nietzsche, and, of course, anticipates Bowlby (e.g., Bowlby, 1979).

To begin with, writing about the first chapter of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Derrida says, of Freud, almost exactly what Stern says of his client’s entry to the session:

‘In sum, Freud could have stopped there (and in a certain way he does, I think that everything is played out in these first pages, in other words that everything will only repeat his arrest, his *pas de marche*, but it is repetition, precisely, that is in question here); the speculative possibility of the totally-other (*than* the pleasure principle) is in advance inscribed within it, in the letter of engagement it believes it sends to itself circularly, speculatively, inscribed in that which is not inscribed within it, the opener of a scription of the other, that *overlaps* [a meme] the principle. The very surface of the
‘overlap’ no longer belongs to itself, is no longer what it is as such. Writing affects the very surface of its support. And this non-belonging unleashed speculation.’ (op. cit., p. 283)

After playing with this metaphor of ‘speculation’, and related metaphors, Derrida goes on:

‘In what he writes something must derive from the speculation of which he speaks. But I will not content myself with this corruption by reapplication. I am alleging that speculation is not only a mode of research named by Freud, not only the oblique object of his discourse, but also the operation of his writing, the scene (of that) which he makes by writing what he writes here, that which makes him do it, and that which he makes to do, that which makes him write, and that which he makes – or lets – write. To make to do, to make write, to let do, to let write: the syntax of these operations is not given.’ (op. cit., p. 284, my italics: - and Derrida himself, and the translation, stretches syntax to its very extremes here)

Characteristically, Derrida brings so much cross-connecting interpretative material to bear, and so completely inundates us with multiple considerations, that it is beyond finite assessment, let alone quotation (though, equally characteristically, he manages, by creative sleight of hand, to quote the entirety of John R Searle’s response to Signature Event Context in his extended commentary in Limited Inc, Derrida, 1988, an act which is entirely relevant to what he is doing in that commentary, as Erving Goffman, op. cit., 1983, affirms in his delicious posthumous paper, Felicity’s Condition:

A wonderfully hilarious (and sound) example is provided by Jacques Derrida’s 92-
page analysis of the presuppositions employed by John Searle in the latter’s 10-page reply to Derrida’s 25-page critique of speech act theory (Derrida 1977.).

But, that too, as a dimension of enactment, is a characteristic of the inexhaustibility of the greatest enactive works, like Shakespeare’s *Tragedies*, Wagner’s *Der Ring Des Nibelungen*, *Ulysses*, and *Mysterium Conjunctionis* (Jung, 1955/1963).

With that proviso, then, in the context of his leading up to his enquiry into Freud’s discussion of the child’s (his grandchild’s) game of *fort/da* with the spool, Derrida writes as follows (the convoluted syntax, dictated by exigencies of translation in part, enacts what he is saying triplefold):

‘Fold back: he (the grandson of his grandfather, the grandfather of his grandson) compulsively repeats repetition without it ever advancing anywhere, not one step. He repeats an operation which consists in distancing, in pretending (*for a time*, for time: thereby writing and doing something that is not being talked about, and which must give good returns) to distance pleasure, the object or the principle of pleasure, the object and/or the PP, here represented by the spool which is supposed to represent the mother (and/or, as we will see, supposed to represent the father, in the place of the son-in-law, the father as son-in-law, the other family name), in order to bring it (him) back indefatigably. It (he) pretends to distance the PP in order to bring it (him) back ceaselessly, in order to observe that itself it (himself he) brings itself (himself) back (for it (he) has in it(him)self the principle force of its (his) own economic return, to the house, his home, near it(him)self, despite all the difference), and then to conclude: it (he) is still there, I am always there, *Da*. The PP retains all
its (his) authority, it (he) has never absented it(him)self.

One can see that the description to follow of the fort/da (on the side of the grandson of the house) and the description of the speculative game, so painstaking and so repetitive also, of the grandfather writing Beyond.... overlap down to their details. They are applied to the same thing. I have just said: one can see that they overlap. Rigorously speaking, it is not an overlapping which is in question, nor a parallelism, nor an analogy, nor a coincidence. The necessity which binds the two descriptions is of another kind: we would have difficulty naming it; but of course this is the principle stake for me in the selective and motivated reading that I am repeating here. Who causes (himself) to come back [revenir], who makes who come back [revenir] according to this double fort/da which conjugates into the same genealogical (and conjugal) writing the narrated and the narrating of this narrative (the same of the ‘serious’ grandson with the spool, and the ‘serious’ grandfather with the PP)?’ [final italics mine] (Derrida, op. cit., pp 302-303)

All this, then, leads us on, via the implication of Freud’s enacted auto-bio-graphy, or auto-thanato-graphy, to exploring what I would designate the enactive character of the whole psychoanalytic movement, in terms of what is going on in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, in the following passage:

‘It is not only a question of this tautological mirror. The autobiography of the writing posits and deposits simultaneously, in the same movement, the psychoanalytic movement. It performs, and bets, on that which gives it its occasional chance. Which amounts [revenant] to saying, in sum (but who is speaking here?) I bet that this fort/
da cooperates, that this cooperation cooperates with initiating the psychoanalytic cause, with setting in motion the psychoanalytic “movement”, even being it, even being it, in its being itself, in other words, in the singular structure of its tradition, I will say in the proper name of this “science”, this “movement”, of this “theoretical practice”, which maintains a relation to its history like none other. A relation to the history of its writing and the writing of its history also. ‘[final italics mine] (op. cit., pp. 303-304)

This is an enactive history, then, which is highly relevant to understanding what Lacan does with Freud as primal discoverer (Lacan, 1973/2004). And we shall later consider what it would be like to make central the possibility that enactivity is indeed the primary human mode, before all cosmology, theo-ontology, and logocentricity, something which would place psychotherapy alongside of bardic poetry and the bardic-poetic foundations of philosophy.

Yet Derrida remains enough in the thrall of the defensive conception of enactment and its equivalent terms to still see an element of diagnosis in all of this, an element of a blinding which perseverates, in the apostolic succession of the succeeding movement, and consequently irretrievably and incurably affects all subsequent development. For he goes on (and this is far from an isolated note):

‘If, in the unheard of event of this cooperation, the unanalysed remainder of an unconscious remains, if this remainder works, and from its alterity constructs the autobiography of this testamentary writing, then I wager that it will be transmitted
blindly by the entire movement of the return to Freud.’ (Derrida, op. cit., p. 304)

One might add that, if so, then also it will be by the entire movement of the relational psychoanalytic opposition to Freud, starting with Adler and Jung, and continuing with Lewis Aron’s (1996) pioneer heroes, Ferenzci and Rank. Opposition, or submission and identification, would equally be caught in it.

But, if we do not view enactivity and performance in a primarily defensive conception, but as a totality which is creative, then developments within the tradition will be possible, and we can also – non-reductively – understand the compensatory movements within the tradition, the strongest and most graphic of which is associated with the name of Jung, though Jung himself calls attention to the significance of Adler and, through him, of Nietzsche (Jung, 1928/43/1992).
Stocktaking, going beyond these illustrations

All these three articulations, each in their own way, in effect largely define enactment as *re-enactment*, and as outcome and consequence of something like trauma, resulting in an enactive stance which is based upon a defensive mimesis and self-identification. But all three also implicitly go very far towards a more far-reaching conception of enactment, also.

We shall shortly explore the very wide field, which nevertheless broadly operates within this framework, though without being overly reductive, and, indeed, in recent work, including Stern himself, having a sense of the creative breakthrough, the *moment of meeting*, as included in *enactment*.

All three of these approaches, at the same time, convey the most acute sense of the self-willing and initiating active force of *process*, in these modes and these vignettes. The latter is what Stern designates as the *presentness* of the present moment, the secret of the psychoanalytic *making present of the past*. As things stand in these three illustrations, even in the case of Derrida (the more ethically explicit later Derridean positions, e.g., *The Politics of Friendship*, (1994/1997), mark a shift in this respect, c.f., Wilkinson, 2009b), one might, as devil’s advocate, say that things are as if, *if* an enactment could be released *from the past*, from the repetitional, and enter the pure present of encounter, *then and only then* a *pure enactment* would be possible, which would be uncontaminated by the repetitional component, or, better perhaps, would be able to *creatively assimilate it and transform it*.

The repetitional element is, in this framework, seen as if it were, in some sense, merely a
deficiency or defence; there is variance in the degree to which it is seen as an inescapable, or ineluctable, defence. Derrida believes it is inescapable. In *Freud and the Scene of Writing* he says (1967/1978)

‘Life must be thought of as trace before being may be determined as Presence….. the *Traumdeutung* ….defines primariness as a ‘theoretical fiction’…. It is thus the delay which is in the beginning.’

But this is still set against the present as an heuristic ideal, albeit unrealisable. This gives rise, in compensatory but still reactive mode, to the notorious unconceptualisability Derrida postulates foundationally in his earlier writings, for instance in *Differance* (1967/1973, p. 159):

“Older” than Being itself, such a *différance* has no name in our language. But we “already know” that if it is unnameable, if is not provisionally so, not because our language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another language, outside the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of “differance,” which is not a name, which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and deferring substitutions.

I am arguing that a full understanding of enactment resolves the apparent antithesis, because it enables us to recognise that what is not sayable as *action qua action* IS sayable as the reflective revisiting of action, which may always be accessible as an enactment.
Likewise, Stern has the ideal model of a *living present*, the present of moments of meeting, which are achieved by a transcendence of the past in a *leap*:

An evolving pattern develops as the sequence of intensity, proximity, and fullness of display, of their intention movements progresses. These relational moves are enacted out of consciousness, leading up to the moment of meeting – their hands move to meet.

Here, too, a notion of readiness is needed, because suddenly the full act is executed in a leap. The present moment surfaces quickly like a whale breaching the water’s surface. There is not an incessant, agonizing progression up to the final act. (Stern, 2004, p 175-6)

What I argued about this in my review article is that Stern veers towards an absolute conception of the present, which is incompatible with the emphasis on the past which is implicit in his (in practice extremely powerful!) grasp of the *repetitional* (and transferential) character of present moments (which, if pursued fully, would take him in a Derridean direction respecting *deferral*).

I argued that the repetitional element is Platonic, it is the element of iterability, of intrinsic infinite repeatability, but that this dependence on, or relationship to, the past *neither* means that enactment is hostage to the past, *nor* that it seeks to supersede or eliminate its dependence on both the past, and on iterability of meaning, or, also, upon archetypal-platonic dimensions of meaning and energy-organisation. The *recognitionality* of music,
and drama, for instance, the balance of the known and the new, is intrinsic to the livingness of enactment. Present, past, and the universal or iterability, are all correlative.

This also means taking account of what Kristeva, Grotstein, Heidegger, and Goffman, in their different ways, all emphasise, the background, which is an infinite background (c.f., Wilkinson, 2003b), which Derrida (1993/1995) and Kristeva (1974) relate to the maternal Platonic khora of the Timaeus, and which opens up for us the way to the hugely many variations on a theme, in the psychoanalytic tradition, of the Freudian conception of primary process.

Primary process, as it incorporates within itself the living process of the work, becomes fully enactment, a dramatic totality which is not to be reduced, in a Kantian way, to a projective unknown behind the moment, or even hidden and implicit, as ‘O’, in the moment, in a Bionian fashion (Wilkinson, 2003b). Freud’s own famous formulation, so unusually Groddeckian, and so greatly admired by Lacan, who compared it to pre-Socratic sayings, Wo Es War, soll Ich Werden, where ‘It’ was, there shall ‘I’ come into being, which is not necessarily a statement of the supersession of (the) ‘It’, could be seen as an implicit apprehension of what reflexive enactivity does with the inchoate process we call primary process (Freud, 1932/1991). The affinity of Bion’s ‘O’ to Groddeck’s ‘It’ is fairly clear.

There are many formulations which move a long way towards evoking the element of totality. Ogden’s (1999) ‘analytic third’, for instance, is one of the clearest:

I view the intersubjective analytic third as an ever-changing unconscious third
subject (more verb than noun) which powerfully contributes to the structure of the analytic relationship……… [T]he analytic third is at first almost entirely an unconscious phenomenon. Since the unconscious, by definition, cannot be invaded on the wings of the brute force of will, the analyst and analysand must use indirect (associational) methods to “catch the drift” (Freud, 1923/1955, p.115) of the unconscious co-creation. (Ogden, in Mitchell and Aron, 1999)

Therefore, coming from the other end of enactment, as already touched upon, I offered a conception in my 2003 paper on Stern, - included in my RAL 5 submission, - to which I still subscribe:

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the defining features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the unconscious. In such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum, transference oscillates with dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and unconscious or non-conscious are part of a total spectrum, to which total access even in principle is contradictory, but which exerts its awesome pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study the sacred ‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’, - but in the company of angels, of the whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’ (Kierkegaard, 1859/1962), or the ‘Moment’ of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, On the Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883/2006); and all of these are in continuity with what has been known as psychoanalysis; and constant and endless dynamic effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic discovery,
not repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the light of this, also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies becomes minor, by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments and explorations, and pattern transcendings, in the work. (Wilkinson, 2003c, pp. 251-2)

But I did not yet realise that the concept of enactment as such was the unifying generic concept which could be the meta-analytic and ontological ‘organiser’ of all these interrelations. I sketch the process of crystallisation, in its recent development from around 2003, later on.

**Enactment from the Literary end**

And all this, then, I now connect with the Leavisian formulations of enactment and its analogues:

Johnson cannot understand that works of art enact their moral valuations. It is not enough that Shakespeare, on the evidence of his works, ‘thinks’ (and feels) morally; for Johnson a moral judgement that isn’t stated isn’t there. Further he demands that the whole play shall be conceived and composed as statement. The dramatist must start with a conscious and abstractly formulated moral and proceed to manipulate his puppets so as to demonstrate and enforce it. (Leavis, 1952/1962, p. 110/11)

This conception, once again, is epitomised in Leavis’s comment on the exquisite ‘swan’s down-feather’ passage from *Antony and Cleopatra*:

*Antony*

Her tongue will not obey her heart, nor can
Her heart inform her tongue – the swan’s down-feather
That stands upon the swell at full of tide,
And neither way inclines.

The Arden footnote… runs:

It is not clear whether Octavia’s heart is the swan’s down-feather, swayed neither way on the full tide of emotion at parting with her brother to accompany her husband, or whether it is the inaction of heart and tongue, on the same occasion, which is elliptically compared to that of the feather.

‘It is not clear’ – it ought to be clear; that is the implication. The implied criterion, ‘clarity’, entails an ‘either/or’; does the image mean this or that?

The reductive absurdity of the conception of language behind the criterion thus brought up is surely plain. (Leavis, The Living Principle, 1975, p. 102)

Here Leavis is opposing a conception of language defined primarily in terms of statement and proposition, the representational conception, as I am calling it, in favour of unparaphrasability. It is not an accident, then, that he defines the realm of its operation as the ‘third realm’ (Leavis, 1962), a realm transcending the antithesis of subjective/objective, in alignment with Winnicott, Ogden, Jung, Pirsig, Gendlin, and even Sir Karl Popper.

What I have done since 2003 is progressively to articulate the conception of enactment implicit in this, and to seek to define it in such a way as to bring out the full conception of a totality which is involved. This has not, of course, proved easy. In so doing, as I shall make
plain, there is much convergence with understandings starting, as it were, from the other end, many of which are discussed in Lewis Aron’s book, as already partly touched upon.

If, in the terms I am trying to define, a conception of enactment, or analogue term, embodies unequivocally (i.e., not reluctantly, by default, in the terms of another, more representational, conceptualisation) the features I sketched before, of *dramatic, iterable, cross-referential, non-paraphrasable, inherently action-mode, non-representational, ontological, potentially epiphanic, and past-transformational* (not just repetitional), then it is indeed equivalent to the concept I am trying to articulate, and I defer to it. But I have not found anything quite this unequivocal as yet.
Critical Synopsis of the book, *The Muse as Therapist: a New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy*

Before moving on to consider the practice implications of this approach, this is perhaps the best and most pivotal point to connect all this with the arguments and material of my book (Wilkinson, 2009a), *The Muse as Therapist: a New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy*. I have already (Wilkinson, 2010a) recognised that the book has faults, both of style and of content. When I wrote it, I was not as fully aware as I needed to be of the counter-concept of enactment in the psychoanalytic tradition. And it was only as I wrote it that the concept of enactment came clearly and unequivocally to take centre stage, which it does in Chapter Five. Achieving the conceptualisations, which I mapped in Chapter Five, paved the way for the rather difficult task of summarising Derrida, and his relevance to Psychotherapy, in terms of the concept of ‘enactment’, in less than 20 pages, in Chapter Four of *Beyond Postmodernism: Primary Process of Deconstruction: Towards a Derridean Psychotherapy*, (Wilkinson, 2009b, attached as Appendix here).

On the other side of the coin, I believe it is very valuable if a work bears *some* of the signs of the creative struggle which has been involved in its genesis. If we are genuine connoisseurs of philosophy, we would not wish to be without the immense testimony of the monumental creative struggle for understanding which marks the First Edition version of Kant’s *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories* in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1781/1964), even though this makes it one of the most difficult and challenging reads in philosophy there is. The significance of that struggle, in terms of opening up a conception of imaginative unity in experience, which is impossible to conceptualise in objectivist
categories, is indeed one of the core themes of my book. It is doubly appropriate, if the book is about the process of creative crystallisation which is involved in enactments in the peak moments sense of the term. Well, I believe it certainly does that, if perhaps a little too much…….

Much of the Introduction was written after the rest of the book, and quietly celebrates the adventure of the book, albeit with recognition of its peculiar demands on the reader. It ends with the reminder that the Greek god of healing, Asclepios, is indeed son of the god of poetry, Apollo.

Chapter One outlines the poetic analogy. In this chapter ‘enactment’ has not yet taken centre stage, and I lean on the Heideggerian-Greek conception of truth as *aletheia*, unconcealment. I now think that, conceptually, *aletheia* has to move forward to *enactment*, or backwards to representation, and will not itself serve as an ultimate explanatory concept. This chapter has a very full illustrative analysis of a GM Hopkins poem, an exploration of the ethical-transformational dimension of an Asimov novel, in the light of the paradigm, and, as the psychotherapeutic dimension, an extension of a dream analysis which I previously had begun in Wilkinson (2003b). Because we here have not yet fully and unequivocally grasped the ‘dramatic’ dimension of enactment, even though all the dimensions are there in the ‘three psychoanalytic infinites’, the main concentration in this dream analysis, as well as in the Hopkins poem one, is ‘infinite cross-referentiality’. A version of this chapter is in press, by request, for the inaugural issue of the new Canadian Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling.
The fictional psychotherapy Chapter Two, whether or not it is very good dialogue, illustrates both cross-referentiality and the dramatic reduplicative aspect of enactment quite clearly, and, I hope, the improvisatory freedom this conception brings to the work.

The Heidegger Chapter, Chapter Three, is there in order to undercut the idea that there is an ontological framework which stands further back than the particular, as an ontological a priori. Heidegger is the great master of this, and I set out to show that his achievement is actually on all fours with the poetry and psychotherapy dimensions, in virtue of its own peculiar cross-referentiality, and that Heidegger does not go the full way to a relational ontological account, which means he is still caught in residues of the objectivist representational paradigm. So in the end this chapter vindicates an account of an irreducibly particularistic yet non-empirical, ontological a priori.

The Shakespeare Chapter Four, which includes addressing the Shakespeare Authorship Question from within a psychotherapeutic slant, is the strongest ‘applied’ putting into action of the thesis. It works on the assumption, parallel to that between psychotherapy session and life, present and past, of a dialectical relationship between life and work, which enables us to make significant cross-connections between them, without assuming a merely biographical model of the relationship. Thinking that the author will project into her/his work in broadly transferential enactive terms, enables us to make sense, in the context of King Lear, of the authorial hiddenness, in the character of Edgar, in a way which strengthens the pseudonymous conception, and which I have not seen paralleled in other texts on
Shakespeare. This has been recognised in the publication of a version of this Chapter (Wilkinson, 2010b) in the second issue of an online Oxfordian journal, *Brief Chronicles*,<http://www.briefchronicles.com/ojs/index.php/bc/index.php> which also reviewed my book (Waugaman, 2009).

As I have already indicated, and substantially discussed, Chapter Five sets out to define the poetic paradigm analogy in terms of the concept of enactment, and in terms, particularly, of unparaphrasability. The first part of this is mainly organised around Daniel Stern’s (2004) Chapter 10, and the second part around the conception of Kant’s (1781/1964) concept of ‘imaginative synthesis’ as an implicitly social-dramatic concept, taken in relation to Eliot’s (1921/1932) exploration of the ‘dissociation of sensibility’ concept. The final part of the chapter applies this in a phenomenological-temporal reworking of the quasi-scientific anatomical fiction of the later Freudian metapsychology, and connects that with my tri-aspect concept from Chapter One, and with Karl Barth’s (1932/1936) exploration of the Christian concept of the Trinity in *Prolegomena to Church Dogmatics I*, 1, and finally with the three parts of Andrew Marvell’s (1681/1984) *To His Coy Mistress*. I draw on Proust’s conception of immediate memory in exploring this (Proust, 1913/1941). All this is very condensed, and more by way of a promissory note for later work than anything else, but it suggests that such a phenomenological reworking of a quasi-scientific model, in the light of my concept, may well be worth exploring.

Chapter Six is a brief epilogue in the light of current psychotherapy politics and quasi-scientific aspiration, ending with Macbeth’s conversation with his doctor on how to ‘minister
to a mind diseased’. So I believe this book, despite its faults, does enough to make a prima facie case for the relevance of the paradigm. Whatever it is, the book continues to sell, and to attract readers, on a steady basis.
METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST

General Practice Consequences of using the Enactment Meta-paradigm

I am not claiming of this paradigm that it is a revolutionary new methodology which systematically alters praxis. Rather it is a meta-level paradigm, which alters our way of thinking, and has some indirect impact on praxis. Of course, it would indeed be an irony’ and contrary to its nature’ to claim for it a direct programmatic implication! I suggest a number of quiet implications which lead to a certain creative openness in practice.

1. Firstly, it makes sense of reflexive re-enactment in process – whether in deliberate experimental ‘enactments’, in the (related but different) dramatic sense, in psychodrama, gestalt, etc, or in spontaneous enactments which are released by reflexive interpretation of, or reactions to, what is going on. If what is going on in session is all, implicitly, enactment, and if as therapists we can ‘tune in’ to that process, unexpected flashes, and enactments of realisations can emerge. These may be both incremental or, as Stern says, ‘in a leap’ (Stern, p. 175). It is not applying theory to process, but allowing process itself, as potential enactivity, to become reflexive, in a myriad of ways.

Thus, in his paper on Cultivating the Improvisational in Psychoanalytic Treatment (2001) Ringstrom repeatedly reverts to the case of a particular client who has a hugely powerful and monumental quest to be ‘free of evil thoughts’. By way of spontaneously expressed judicious swift identifications with Jonathon’s subversive element, his client and Ringstrom have made steady progress. Jonathon has even been able to kill some squirrel pests at his home but Ringstrom is fond of squirrels. At the end of a session, the remark ‘at the doorknob’:
'Through telling me more and more about my “evil,” Jonathan became emboldened to tell me about his. One day, he told me with considerable glee about his poisonous “genocidal” attack on the ground squirrels that were decimating his backyard. He became quite animated while describing a playful exchange he had had with his next-door neighbor, who had taunted Jonathan, by sending him a Polaroid photograph of a baby squirrel that had survived Jonathan’s holocaust. In the photo, the neighbor was resuscitating the squirrel with an eyedropper full of milk.

After no further discussion of the squirrels for several months, Jonathan, rising to leave a session, commented in a seemingly innocent and kindly tone, “Oh, what a cute squirrel in your backyard!” As it turned out, I was fond of the squirrel he pointed out, as it had often come visiting on the brick patio next to the French doors, which were just to the right of my seat behind the analytic couch. On many occasions, the squirrel and I had caught each other’s attention and taken a moment to speculate on each other’s occupation. That squirrel had seemed to be saying to me, “So, you work with nuts? I work with nuts too.”

For an instant, I started to acknowledge Jonathan’s comment about my cute little furry friend, but then I did a double-take and exploded aggressively but playfully, “You keep your fucking hands off my squirrel!” Jonathan burst into laughter and smiled broadly. This “doorknob-exit enactment” became one of those little tests, unbeknownst to either of us, that boiled down to whether I really knew him or not. Could he trust that his aggression could be more than known—could be embraced by me and sanctioned by an engagement of my own? Could I survive his aggressive
thoughts and feelings as they pertained not only to me but also to all that was potentially of importance to me? Could this relationship, for the first time in his life, be one in which the split-off part of his personality was as welcome as all the rest?

What happened that was so improvisationally rich? Our session, our “scene” if you will, was coming to an end, and, in a moment of unconsciously playful experimentation—the classic doorknob-exit enactment—Jonathan “turned into” his preachy “Church Lady” persona to see how it would play with me. I started to respond to this version of Jonathan when I suddenly recognized that a part of him was missing—the aggressive, potentially sadistic version of Jonathan that was heretofore always being crushed by his Church Lady persona. In fact, the liberation of that version of Jonathan was soon followed by the cessation of his immobilizing migraines—headaches that were so intense that they had even intermittently required hospitalization. On this day, however, both “Church Lady Jonathan” and “sadisticgenocidal Jonathan” were able to coexist on the same improvisational stage.

What is so crucial in such an example is the sense of recognition the patient acquires. I believe that this recognition has a “performative” quality—that improvisation leads to this performative recognition, which in certain moments can be more penetrating than other forms of recognition such as affect attunement or empathy. How different would our engagement have been, for example, had I said to Jonathan during his “staged exit,” “Perhaps there is another feeling you have about my squirrel. As squirrels have been a particular menace in your life, maybe you’d like to ‘kill’ my
squirrel.” I think that such a carefully manicured engagement leads some patients to say, “Would you please stop sounding like a therapist!”

Not knowing about Ringstrom then, I was pursuing parallel pathways in my review article on Ehrenberg’s work (Wilkinson, 2003a), and I too came up with a backhanded type of clinical example. I likewise, at this point (2003a) am using Austin on ‘Performatives’ as a stalking horse, even though ‘enactment’ is already present as a general concept:

‘An abused and agoraphobic client, who had progressed well, had made the decision to move to another part of the country and see me more infrequently on trips to where I work. She then came to a session, when she seemed very stuck and ‘back to square one’. I was curious about this and decided not to get drawn in, but just waited and listened and tracked my response. I became aware of feeling subtly hypnotized and seduced. It was rather pleasant, cosy, much belying the ostensible communication content, which was despondent and had returned to old preoccupations and patterns. I remarked to her -(perhaps, to her mind, right out of the blue) - ‘she’d make a great seducer’! Then I explained the route by which I had got to the point of saying that, and what emerged, in the dialogue, was that she was feeling abandoned by me, and felt she needed to convey that she was ‘no better’, thereby to hold me in to continue to see her in the new situation. (She had a tendency to believe she could only see me if she had ‘real problems’, so any progress was felt by her as a loss!) But - as with Ehrenberg’s many examples - the element of enactment, timing, and subtle
enmeshment went way beyond a simple verbal interpretation of a verbal fantasy, for instance: ‘you are feeling abandoned by me’. Had I confined myself to that, it would have been lifeless and stereotyped. The element of seduction, and then of amusement when we both ‘got’ what was going on, and so forth, as with Ehrenberg’s instances, were all there, and essential to it.

The element of timing, connected to the periodicity to which Freud attached such importance, e.g. Beyond the pleasure principle (Freud 1920/1991), and A note on the mystic writing pad (Freud, 1925/1991), is one element of ‘good interpretation’ which is irreducibly present even on the classical model, and cannot be accounted for by it. Indeed, interpretations themselves are in fact a particular, perhaps a unique, type of performative utterance, (c.f., J. L. Austin, op. cit.), and the classical model, in its ideal form, collapses at the outset therefore.

The verbal response was both an epitomisation (condensed! homeopathic!)
As all such interventions are both ‘homeopathic’ by their nature), and was an enactment which participated in the interaction, and, of course, is a combined total communication which partakes as such of the nature of implicit or phenomenological ‘knowing’ in the Stern/Merleau-Ponty sense. If one were to try to account for all the dimensions of this interaction - the body dimension, the erotic dimension, the attachment dimension, the eye-contact or absence of it, the mutual delight in the countertransferential turnaround, the element of logical paradox which comes into such situations, the element of withdrawing to a meta-level perspective which makes
such an intervention possible, the element of ‘prescribing the symptom’ in it, etc, etc, - the analysis

would be endless (one gets a little sense of what it would or might be from Being and Time, Heidegger, 1927/1967). In other words, any attempt to account for this, in terms merely of a verbally articulable content, is a non-starter.

Of course, once one opens all this up, then the objections to enactments fall by the wayside, because all of this, in some essential measure, is enactment!’ (pp. 71-72)

Here, clearly, there is a good deal of convergence of position, at approximately the same time, even. Ringstrom contrasts a model derived from ‘classical theatre’ with one drawing from ‘improvisatory theatre’. My Editorial (Wilkinson, 2000b) on Science Beliefs and Values in Psychotherapy, in July 2000 uses the ‘experimental theatre’ analogy at some length. I do not want to claim there is any fundamental disagreement. I just want to note that, as far as I can see, besides the residues of the ‘defence’ concept of enactment, Ringstrom confines himself to method, and theory underpinning method, whereas I have, as it were, turned method into ontological theory, in that this appeal to a global conception of enactment, which I am making, is then taken as an ontological paradigm encompassing all three disciplines. My thesis of enactivity is a metaphysic.

As I already wrote in the first Commentary:

“There is not a noumenal referential entity apart from it all upon which it is to be projected. Being and meaning is simply as actualised or lived, in all its infinity,
interconnectedness, and in the context of the infinite background, both actuality and potentiality. Being is, and is its becoming, - the existentialists’ insight, which I believe the enactment concept carries to its full conceptual realisation (absorbing the insights of post-modernism and deconstruction in the process, c.f., Wilkinson, 2009b). As Derrida grasps, yet not quite fully articulating its implications, in his early writings, but does substantially later (Derrida, 1967/1978, Wilkinson, 2009b), there is still a cognitivist centring in the Heideggerian conception of the existential-ontological, which moves towards an enactive conceptualisation in the later Heidegger.” (Wilkinson, 2010a)

2. The two major dimensions: cross-reference, and the dramatic ‘knot’ aspect, of enactment, both lead to a kind of listening in the work which is open to recognise what is going on on the surface, non-reductively, because both are aspects of the inherent unparaphrasability of process. And at the same time, unexpected links and signifiers can emerge. Free association is the aspect of the former, of cross-referencing, and the dramatic dimention may lead to a kind of enactive object relations, as an ontological, action-based, stance, as the latter. Stern’s ‘moments of meeting’, like Mitchell’s tormenting client who demanded to know, ‘if you weren’t my analyst and I weren’t your patient and we met in the street and I said that to you, what would you say? Mitchell’s answer: I would say, fuck you! But I AM your analyst, and you ARE my patient!’ (Mitchell, 2000)

My own appeal to experience draws in the client I quoted in Primary Process of
Deconstruction:

‘I have a client who, like me, regards Dostoeivsky as the ne pus ultra of novelists, and as perhaps the single human being who has most endured the sight and feeling of the terribleness and sheer brutal horror of human existence. My client does idealise him, and me, and his tendency to idealisation is linked to his predicament. This is the background to what transpired. In the course of conversation which had touched upon creativity and dramatic art and experience, including Shakespeare, we reached Dostoeivsky, and he remarked, very earnestly and shyly, with a pause in the middle, as if whispering a secret: “But I have realised that in Dostoievsky – there are some cracks…” I chuckled and paused, and then said, “But, - you know, - no one’s perfect.”

We both fell about laughing. What was the joke? Very hard to explain! Something about the extreme contrast between Dostoievsky’s supreme greatness and the hyperbolic perfectionism that would find fault even with him – and, in a sense, thus, even with life itself! Such a moment is impossible to capture (even for myself in retrospect), virtually impossible to explain, because it depends on the ramifications and idiosyncrasy of persons, and context, depends on enactivity. In its accessing universal themes, and in its participation in language, in iterability, the enactment transcends the moment, as a poem transcends the moment. But this embraces also ‘real life enactivity’, as, for instance, Boswell’s dramatic evocations of Johnson’s

Here would also come in Stern’s billionaire, who found Stern’s fees derisory and paid him pro rata what he earned per hour for a few sessions, till he had worked through that issue, and then settled again to Stern’s normal fee (Stern, 2003, in Spaniolo-Lobb and Amendt-Lyon, Eds., 2003). Clearly, the element of acceptance of his position is held in a way which at the same time is open to creative change.
§3. Reflections: the foothold of intelligibility of the psychoanalytic concept of enactment provided by the element of repetition, and the objectification of the past, tends to seem to be the guarantor of this element not getting right out of hand. Lewis Aron, in the passages I adduced, wavers on this, between rejecting a concept of enactment, which is circumscribed by an element of ‘acting out’, and moving in the direction of recognising that everything that happens in session, is enactment, is a totality:

‘To speak of enactments suggests that these ‘events’ happen from time to time, maybe even with some frequency, but it denies that patient and analyst are always enacting, that analysis is interactional from beginning to end.’ (Aron, 1996, p. 212)

Here he is within a hair’s breadth of grasping that enactment is indeed ubiquitous, something which becomes even clearer a little later. But, on the other hand, the contrastive element, meaning defined by opposition, in the meaning drives him to downgrade its use, as he believes it is perjorative, in the context of anti-relational theory:

I have serious reservations about the terms enactment and projective identification. Precisely because they isolate a certain aspect of the analytic process that is marked off as interactional, they may inadvertently cover up the interactional dimension of other aspects of the analytic process. In other words, one may acknowledge facets of the analytic process to be enactments or projective identifications and therefore recognize that those phenomena are interactional; but by labelling those isolated processes as enactments, one is then permitted to view other aspects as not being enactments and therefore not to be viewed interactionally. (Aron, 1996, p. 212)
Once one seeks to bring into view the full epiphanic-dramatic totality one seems to open the way to such an all-embracing whole, that it is impossible to circumscribe or define it.

Thus, the dramatic-poetic conception implicit in TS Eliot’s notion of the ‘dissociation of sensibility’ is argued (e.g., Kermode, 1957, or Leishman, 1951) to have broadened a recognition of a specific mode of poetry, to something so wide that it can no longer be pinned down. The counterargument, used for instance by Heidegger in his evocations in Being and Time (1927/1967), is that one uses epitomising illustrations to find a specific way to evoke a structure which is generic – and it is this which I am trying to do.

Therefore there is a two-step process, rather analogous to that Stern (2004) adopts with his terminology of present moments and moments of meeting. I speak about basic enactments, and peak or high level enactments, or epiphanal enactments. Obviously there is a spectrum here. Regarding basic enactments, such as DO NOT READ THIS, they can just be analysed structurally, and their importance is that they reveal the enactive element in all communication. Thus, PLEASE READ THIS NOTICE, which might be taken to be defined, paraphrased, or given its meaning, by its ‘reference’ to the content of the notice, when it is compared with DO NOT READ THIS, turns out to rest just as clearly upon the background as that does.
Some primordial process of enactivity/active genesis the common theme

The conception of enactment is closely related to that of the performative (c.f., especially Austin, 1962/2009). Enactivity is a wider concept but there is much overlap of the concerns. Austin, as Derrida implicitly recognises (Derrida, 1988), was driven by a profound intuition of an utterly generic insight, which, nevertheless, for reasons connected with the ontological repression embedded in the philosophical tradition, he held back from fully pursuing. I shall often use the words enactment and performative, and variants, in conjunction with one another.

There are many, many strands which emphasise the enactive element or the performative, some of them very ancient. It is fairly clear from the opening pages of *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967) that Wittgenstein would probably have assumed that the imperative preceded the indicative, or that they were originally indistinguishable. Jaynes takes a similar view of the origin of language, and of internalised injunctions, in *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Jaynes, 1975/1990, Wilkinson, 1999). Susanne K Langer (1953) in *Feeling and Form*, in many ways the most systematic and brilliant exposition of an enactive account of art and proto-art, makes similar assumptions, for instance in her account of the origin of dance.

Robert Pirsig also takes speculation in a similar direction. At the end of *Lila: an Inquiry into Morals*, 1991 (and his conjectures are confirmed by many studies and in particular very graphically by the ever increasing harvest of data steadily being derived from the 5000 year old Iceman mummy found in the Italian Tyrol in 1991, ‘Otzi’[reference ‘Otzi’]), he is
exploring the origin of static, and dynamic values in the Sanskrit word *rta*, a word reflected ‘in a thousand’ etymologies in many languages:

He could only guess how far this ritual-cosmos relationship went, maybe fifty or one hundred thousand years. Cavemen are usually depicted as hairy, stupid creatures who don’t do much, but anthropological studies of contemporary primitive tribes suggest that that stone-age people were probably bound by ritual all day long. There’s a ritual for washing, for putting up a house, for hunting, for eating, and so on – so much so that the division between ‘ritual’ and ‘knowledge’ becomes indistinct. In cultures without books ritual seems to be a public library for teaching the young, and preserving common values and information.

These rituals may be the connecting link between the social and intellectual levels of evolution. One can imagine primitive song-rituals and dance-rituals associated with certain cosmology stories, myths, which generated the first primitive religions. From these the first intellectual truths could have been derived. If ritual always comes first and intellectual principles always come later, then ritual cannot always be a decadent corruption of intellect. *Their sequences in history suggest that principles emerge from ritual, not the other way round. That is, we don’t perform religious rituals because we believe in God. We believe in God because we perform religious rituals.*

If so that’s an important principle in itself. (Pirsig, 1991, p. 395, my italics)

Our cognitivist-representational bias makes us look askance at such a conception. Yet it is indirectly, and almost inadvertently, confirmed by Ninian Smart, for instance, in his otherwise masterly *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy* (Smart, 1964), when he is
discussing what he calls the *Exegesis *Viewpoint [the asterisks indicate that he is defining these translations in use, in an Indian context, not in their Western sense]. Without quite realising the significance of what he has said, he calls this:

‘the most curious and (in some ways) the most archaic of the *orthodox *Viewpoints’ (Smart, op. cit., p. 72, my italics).

The *Exegetes took the view that ritual and injunction are the primordial phenomena and praxes, and are sui generis. Smart explores this in a puzzled and intrigued way for a page or two, including their version of an understanding of the primordiality of language, a version which makes the work of Plato, St John’s Gospel, JG Hamann, Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida come across as degenerate empiricisms! And he ends, clearly in a way which implies this is a very strange position for them to take, and which starts from the cognitivist-ontological-representational end, by default, as it were:

Briefly, one could characterise *Exegesis as the result of a split in religious thinking – a split between the references of religious activities (e.g., the gods or God) and those activities themselves. *Exegesis belongs essentially to those forms of religion which centre upon the numinous and sacramental activities: it has no interest in contemplation and mysticism. And yet by a strange paradox, it loses all concern for the ‘objects’ of worship and sacrifice. It abandons the gods, virtually, and yet not by way of substituting one God or the Absolute of Brahmanism. Instead, it substitutes for the gods only ritual power – it is solely through the right performance of religious duties that salvation accrues. It is as though a Christian were to become an atheist, and yet believe in the independent efficacy of the sacraments.
Yet, tempting as this cognitivist-ontological-representational stance is - in the light of 2500 years of its dominance! - in the re-emergence of something like the *Exegesis position in demythologised forms of religion and secular versions of the sacred, it may well occur to us that this is indeed the oldest form of the sacred, as well as the newest, and that the trend in Nietzsche and Heidegger, in sociologists and anthropologists like Durkheim and Levi-Strauss, in novelists like DH Lawrence, and in psychologists like Jung, and the Freud of *Totem and Taboo*, and Julian Jaynes, to create bridges between the oldest pre-Christian forms and the ‘post-Christian’, may well be accurate, and encompass this matter of enactivity also.

Leavis captured this in vivid epitome – justifying the bracketing of him with Dr Johnson by George Steiner, in the famous remark: ‘The Muses have only conferred two Doctorates’. Here is how I approached the matter in relation to Leavis’s enactive secularism, in Cambridge in September 2009 at the already mentioned Downing College ‘Revaluing Leavis’ Conference:

Yet, in his intense secular and immanent sense of the sacred, there is something of the sparse incandescent concentration of a Spinoza, a Plotinus, even a Herakleitos, in Leavis. His view of Bunyan is relevant. In Leavis’s hands, Bunyan yields dramatically to an account, in which theistic belief and credo are simply stripped out and away from, the concentrated enactive life-affirmation which Leavis finds at his core. Ironically, as it were, this ‘redeems’ a work written within the belief-
framework of an intolerable, starkly terrible Calvinist creed. We thus gain a glimpse of a quasi-post-modern centrality of pure enactment in Leavis’s Weltanschauung. Tom Brangwen’s oft cited ‘He knew that he did not belong to himself’ is denuded of its Pauline belief background. It becomes an affirmation of the pure flame of life itself. Sought in this phoenix flame is a purity, a magnificent concentration of spirit, an ascetic yet alchemically scintillating affirmation of sacred glory, cleansed of dross, and of nihilistic or trivialising chaos. As with Spinoza, Freud, Heidegger, it is a stoicism of a transfigured, yet immanent, ‘Nature’, physis. Heidegger culminates by affirming the poetic flame of spirit (‘Geistige’) in Trakl’s poetry; Leavis by affirming the enactive pure flame of the Lawrentian phoenix-wings (the Eliotic Pentecost being more suspect). (Wilkinson, 2009c)

In respect of flame, one may also compare Derrida on Heidegger (Derrida, 1987/1991). And Lacan writes of Freud in analogous terms. And arguably this is more true of Jung than any transcendent interpretation. This post-Hegelian recognition of a sui generis creative-enactive fire, which is not transcendent in the sense of metaphysics or theology of the beyond, is a reasonably common enough motif today.

I go on in my reflections to apply, in extended mode, a somewhat Jungian line of understanding to my re-reading of Robert Pirsig’s Lila.
§4. Recently I reread some of my ‘old stagers’, favourite books which strike a deep personal resonance within me, for reasons of which I am partly aware, including Robert Pirsig’s (1992) second book, *Lila An Inquiry into Morals*, Isaac Asimov’s (1996) *The Robots of Dawn*, and Joseph Conrad’s (1902/17/1956) *Typhoon and The Shadow Line*. I also shared, culminating in a joint presentation on 14th September at Dublin Castle, in a synoptic survey of supervision work I have been doing since 2003 in Cork, with the National Counselling Service under the auspices of HSE.

http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/newscentre/archive/nationalcounsellingservice10yrs.html

The title of the book which was produced, including our paper, was taken from feedback by one of the clients in the groupwork I had supervised: “Out of the darkness …to a life that shines”. Sir Richard Bowlby gave the keynote address at Dublin, striking some fundamental ‘attachment theory’ notes with stark simplicity.

And I found myself simultaneously connecting with ‘attachment theory’ trajectories, and with Jungian ones, as I read those books, and as I meditated the course of our work, which had gone through a quite extraordinary process of death and rebirth, which we enacted in the presentation at Dublin. We had only realised its significance quite belatedly, as illustrated in the personal account, coinciding substantially with those of my colleagues, which I wrote in September 2009, as we embarked on the writing of the chapter, and the preparing of the presentation.
As I read those familiar books, things ‘hit’ me which had not hit me before. If I can weave together commentary upon Lila (holding The Robots of Dawn, Asimov, 1996, in the background), to begin with. Firstly, in Lila, cardboard as the characterisation is, I nevertheless became aware this time that I now realised how hugely important Lila is symbolically to him. This bypasses (perhaps even paradoxically exploits) the enormous parallel misogynistic element which comes through in relation to Lila herself, not merely from the partially autobiographical figure of Phaedrus, but also in and through the representative of social morality, Richard Rigel, whose key role in validating some more traditional morality in Phaedrus (and Pirsig) than he had been able to allow himself in Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, in a compensatory way, also hit me this time as never before. Rigel and Lila have a down market, poor man’s, flavour of a Dante-esque Virgil and Beatrice. They are, in Jung’s language, psychopomps. And then it is hinted that they will end up married, fusing Pirsig’s ‘biological’ and ‘social’ quality. So they are the alchemical couple of the conjunctio. Lila has been pursuing Rigel from the start of the novel. Rigel appears, at Lila’s mantic prediction, time and again through the novel. Pirsig draws it all together, both the personal and the philosophical strands, starting with a passage about the doll which Lila has first adopted, then abandoned, in her temporary insanity, with which he conducts a projective dialogue:

‘All this is a happy ending.’

Happy ending? Phaedrus thought about it for a while.

‘I wouldn’t call it a happy ending,’ he said. ‘I’d call it an inconclusive ending.’

‘No, this is a happy ending for everyone.’ the other voice said.
‘Why?’

‘Because everyone gets what he wants,’ the voice said.

‘Lila gets her precious Richard Rigel, Rigel gets his precious self-righteousness, you get your precious Dynamic freedom, and I get to go swimming again.’

‘Oh, you know what’s going to happen?’

‘Yes of course,’ the idol said.

‘Then how can you say it’s a happy ending when you know what’s going to happen to Lila?’

‘It’s not a problem,’ the idol’s voice said.

‘It’s not a problem? He’s going to try to lock her up for life and that’s not a problem?’

‘Not for you.’

‘Then why do I feel so bad about it?’ Phaedrus asked.

‘You’re just waiting for your medal,’ the idol answered.

‘You think maybe they’re going to turn around and come back and hand you a citation for merit.’

‘But he’s going to destroy her.’

‘No,’ the idol said. ‘She isn’t going to let him get anything on her.’

‘I don’t believe that.’

‘She owns Rigel now,’ the idol continued. ‘He’s had it. From here on he’s putty in her hands.’

‘No,’ Phaedrus said. ‘He’s a lawyer. He isn’t going to lose his head over her.’

‘He doesn’t have to. His head’s already lost,’ the idol said. ‘She’s going to use all those morals of his against him.’
'How?'

'She’s going to become a repentant sinner. She may even join a church. She’s just going to keep telling him what a wonderful person he is and how he saved her from your degenerate clutches, and what can he do? How can he deny it? There's no way he can fight that. That just keeps his moral ego blown tight as a balloon and as soon as it starts to sag he will have to come back to her for more.'

Whew, this was some idol, Phaedrus thought. Sarcastic, cynical. Almost vicious. Was that what he himself was really like underneath? Maybe it was. A theatrical ham idol. A matinee idol. No wonder someone threw it in the river.

'You're the winner you know,' the idol said. '.....by default.'

'How so?'

'You did one moral thing on this whole trip, which saved you.'

'What was that?'

'You told Rigel that Lila had quality.'

'You mean in Kingston?'

'Yes, and the only reason why you did that was because he caught you by surprise and you couldn't think of your usual intellectual answer, but you turned him around. He wouldn't have come here if it hadn't been for that. Before then he had no respect for her and a lot for you. After that he had no respect for you, but some for her. So you gave something to her, and that's what saved you. If it hadn't been for that one moral act you'd be headed down the coast tomorrow with a lifetime of Lila ahead of you.'

Phaedrus didn't like it. Judgements of this sort from a branch of his own personality
were very confusing – and somewhat ominous. He didn’t want to hear any more of them.

‘Well, idol,’ he said. ‘you may be right and you may be wrong but we are coming to the end of the road here.’ (Pirsig, 1992, pp. 412-413)

Phaedrus enacts a ritual of farewell with the idol. And then he has a recollection, a low grade Proustian memory, evoked by the concatenation of events he has been through.

‘... Then he remembered when he had been walking down a dirt road...on the Northern Cheyenne reservation ... with Dussenbery, John Wooden Leg, the tribe’s chief and a woman named LaVerne Madigan from the Association of American Indians... they were all walking down the ’road ... when one of those raggedy nondescript dogs that call Indian reservations home came onto the road and walked pleasantly in front of them ... Then LaVerne asked John ‘What kind of dog is that?’. John thought about it and said, ‘That’s a good dog.’

... if he were looking for proof that ‘substance’ is a cultural heritage from an ancient Greece rather then an absolute reality, he should simply look at non-Greek-derived cultures. If the ‘reality’ of substance was missing ... that would prove he was right ...

Now the image of the raggedy Indian dog was back, and he realised what it meant. LaVerne ... wanted to know what genetic, substantive pigeonhole of canine classification this object walking before them could be placed in. But John Wooden Leg never understood the question. He wasn’t joking when he said ‘That’s a good dog’. He probably thought she was worried the dog might bite her ... John
had distinguished the dog according to its Quality, rather than according to its substance. That indicated he considered Quality more important.

... American Indian mysticism is not something alien from American culture. It’s a deep submerged hidden root of it.

Americans don’t have to go to the orient to learn what this mysticism stuff is about. It’s been right here in America all along. In the Orient they dress it up with rituals & incense & pagodas & chants ... and huge organizational enterprises that bring in ... millions of dollars ... American Indians haven’t done this. Their way is not to be organized at all. They don’t charge anything, they don’t make a big fuss, and that’s what makes people underrate them.

Boas said, ‘The Dakota Indian considers goodness to be a noun rather then an adjective.’ He will tell someone, ‘Take care of your goodness, rather than ‘Be Good’.

Good is a noun. That was it. That was what Phaedrus had been looking for. That was the homer, over the fence, that ends the ball game. Good as a noun rather than as an adjective is all the Metaphysics of Quality is about .... Of course, the ultimate quality isn’t a noun or an adjective or anything else definable, but if you had to reduce the whole Metaphysics of Quality to a single sentence, that would be it.’ (Pirsig, 1992, from pp. 415-418)

Good, value, creation of value, is a noun, the verb is a noun, ‘gooding’ is a noun, and nouns are not confined to things defined in categories, according to the Aristotelian conception.

That makes a noun a verb. And I am, in a way, saying a verb, enactment, is a noun, is what defines being-in-action, creates it as a totality. And I am saying that, because our
representative conceptualisations operate according to the Aristotelian model, this cannot be represented, only realised in the totality which is action, enactment, as a piece of musical unfolding only IS in its unfolding, and we are it, as TS Eliot says in The Dry Salvages (Eliot, 2004):

For most of us, there is only the unattended

Moment, the moment in and out of time,

The distraction fit, lost in a shaft of sunlight,

The wild thyme unseen, or the winter lightning

Or the waterfall, or music heard so deeply

That it is not heard at all, but you are the music

While the music lasts.

In its enactment, because of what Eliot, in Burnt Norton (Eliot, 2004), calls the form, the pattern, there is iterability, repeatability, definiteness:

Only by the form, the pattern,

Can words or music reach

The stillness, as a Chinese jar still

Moves perpetually in its stillness.

Not the stillness of the violin, while the note lasts,

Not that only, but the co-existence,

Or say that the end precedes the beginning,

And the end and the beginning were always there

Before the beginning and after the end.

And all is always now.
So the opaque process of languaging, languaging that which resists language so tenaciously, in this philosophical novel, runs alongside the almost inadvertent symbolic convergence and enactment of the chymical wedding, on which we have touched. The cheque of the archetypal unfolding is cashed as the dramatic enactment. Phaedrus, as consciousness, as reflection, as the gauche ‘chemistry professor’ (a delicious inadvertent alchemical signifying touch), as such cannot marry, cannot participate, other than in a surrogate way, being used as a slingshot by Lila, who uses him, unbeknown to him and in part to her, to reach Rigel.

Lila is a judge. That’s who lay here beside him tonight: a judge of hundreds of millions of years standing, and in the eyes of this judge he was nobody very important. Almost anyone would do, and most would do better than he.

After a while he thought, maybe that’s why the famous ‘Gioconda Smile’ in the Louvre, like Lila’s smile in the streetcar, has troubled viewers for so many years. It’s the secret smile of a judge who has been overthrown and suppressed for the good of social progress, but who, silently and privately, still judges. (Pirsig, 1992, p. 206)

But Phaedrus, despite himself, becomes the boatman, the ferryman, over the Styx, for Lila, in her psychotic/archetypal fantasy. And she blesses him, repeatedly, throughout the novel. He sees the Dharmakaya light upon her, and it prevents him judging her, as normally he would have judged her. As the native Americans are for his friend Dusenberry, by default Lila becomes for him, a creative enactive study, and the author’s serious failure with her as a novelist becomes, in a paradoxical way, the index of his surrender to that in her which is beyond his conscious intellect.

‘I mean, I used to play I was this kind of person and that kind of person but I got so
tired of playing all those games. It’s such work and it doesn’t do any good. There’s just all these pictures of who I am and they don’t hold together. They’re all different people I am supposed to be but none of them are me. I’m not anybody. I’m not here. Like you now. I can see you’ve got a lot of bad impressions about me in your mind. And you think that what’s in your mind is here talking to you but nobody’s here. You know what I mean? Nobody’s home. That’s Lila. Nobody’s home. ........What you want to do is to make me into something I’m not.’ (Pirsig, 1992, p. 195)

What would a Buddhist make of this? What would David Hume make of it? Lila and Phaedrus pass through the inferno, and the Platonic Polyphemic Cave of the Giant, which is New York, and then return, in a narrow escape, to the river, where their fate is eventually resolved, in large part through the catalytic effect of Rigel’s interventions. The philosophy, the emerging theory of Dynamic and Static quality, the book being written which is suspended by Lila’s presence, is gradually dragged through the eye of the needle, the eye of the needle of the alchemical convergence, which the book enacts in its peculiar wooden, yet fascinating and haunting, way.

[Similar synoptic analyses could be made of i. the fictional cases of: Pirsig’s Lila (op. cit.); Asimov’s The Robots of Dawn (op. cit.); Conrad’s The Shadow Line (op. cit.) and Nostromo (1905/1957); and Wagner’s The Nibelung’s Ring; ii. the biographical illustration of the episode of Bennett Langton’s Will in Boswell’s The Life of Samuel Johnson Ll. D (1791/1998); and iii. the psychotherapeutic cases of my co-presentation of our work in Ireland with two colleagues whom I have supervised since 2003, work which underwent a
‘death and resurrection’ process which we all three evoked in a certain way [mine is inserted here, followed by the staged yet improvisatory psychodrama which was performed at Dublin]
‘As the Director of xxxxxxx Counselling Service knew me in another connection, he asked me to consider becoming supervisor for the groupwork at xxxxxxx. I was extremely pleased and excited by the invitation, and this sense of being valued and useful has remained, even though I have sometimes had the feeling, nevertheless, of being a stranger, even an intruder and an interloper, and of making presumptuous interventions.

And that seemed to be what I felt at the start (for me) also. I had a sense, rightly or wrongly, that earlier supervision of the groupwork had been on somewhat Rogerian non-directive lines, and that the group might be in trouble because of that. I found myself drawing on my long experience of group and institutional dynamics and and beginning to share with the facilitators my fantasy of a possible group in xxxxxxx which would develop a a life of its own and still be running, as it were, in 30 years time when we are all long gone. This seemed utopian. But I had a sense of a possible inception and creative leap. I was also aware of one of the facilitators being ambivalent about their longer term role and that this was affecting their sense of the vitality of the group. The management of the group seemed to be somewhat anxious, worrying about its possible demise and dwindling numbers. I remember a point where one of the facilitators expressed the feeling that the group’s life had run, and reached term, and that it could be let go. There was only one person left who attended regularly and who survived from the beginning of the group, to my recollection. I felt this ending was natural and should be endorsed, and expected that the next time I came it would be over.
Instead a shift had occurred, and both facilitators now felt the group had a life and should be fostered. We began to think about the institutional base of it, about advertising it, selling it, validating its function within the life of the organisation, and the group suddenly then began to recruit.

I am aware of a feeling that this is a kind of mythic dramatic story of death and rebirth and of a feeling that I am overdramatising my role in this. At the same time, I have a sense that something like this did happen.

Gradually the creative tension between one facilitator’s more cautious ‘Cognitive’ style and the other’s Psychodramatic approach, was free to emerge. Many scenarios of how to combine or alternate approaches were explored frequently in supervision. And eventually, in co-operation with the group’s own dialogue, a resolution emerged, of a ‘run’ of psychodrama followed by a ‘run’ of analytic process group activity, alternating. This ran parallel with the enlargement of the group by recruiting members. By this time the group had taken on a vital life which meant not only that its continued existence was secure, but so much so that it had been forgotten it was ever under threat.

This also had an effect on my role. I was now able to slip more into the background as a supervisor, and the facilitators’ discussions took on their own life. I could sit for quarter hour/half an hour without saying anything as they got on with solving the problems. Sometimes my immediate feeling was that I was no longer needed. But I had a sense of being part of something which had brought life into being as a witness and perhaps catalyst, and I continued to feel I had some new part to play in the evolution of this group and its
process. I am aware as I write of quite a strong feeling that my own role, all along, has been quite precarious, and of feeling at some level unwanted, and am sure these feelings reflect the sense of the difficult birth of this group, and of the fragility induced by the arena of work with sexual violation and abuse, and it now seems to me that the emergence of this group into life against the background of its near death, due to that precariousness and fragility, is expressive of a deep dynamic relating to abuse, and I feel suddenly now privileged at having been, as I feel, representing the male function of fertilisation and insemination, without this being abusive, which contributed to the rebirth – and I suspect in a sense the actual birth – of the group.

Postscript

This was written with deliberate surrender to intense countertransference feelings which I took as process, not literally, at the time, and allowed to well up as I went along – so that the emergence of the confident maleness of the end emerged unanticipated in the process, and its relation to the ‘death’ and ‘birth’ emerged in the process likewise. In the discussion, and the sharing of our respective writings, all three of us offered variations on this ‘death and rebirth’ theme, and we also considered whether there may not have also been an element of slaying and a sacrifice in my arrival as supervisor. There was also a profound shared sense of the death-rebirth element, which was felt by all three of us independently, with great excitement. It was recognised by all three of us that there was an element in the process of ‘laying claim’, ‘seizing something for ourselves’, and ‘seeing the possibility’, beyond in an ordinary process, in the laying hold of the potential for the group, and that my coming had been in accord with the vision and passion of the two group leaders, and had been catalytic for theirs.
Here is the script of the process which we enacted at Dublin Castle in the NCS/HSE 10th Anniversary Conference:

## The Proposal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th>Ah.....I can see it so clearly, a group, .....a psychodrama group of course, a weekly ongoing group for clients of the service. A place for life’s re-takes.....wax lyrical. Of course I need a partner in crime, now who will it be</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Well yes, I’d be interested. <em>Move to front centre stage Under breath It will be me of course, it’s non-negotiable and I’m the boss!</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Yes that could work, \textit{aside to audience clapping hands, and moving front centre stage as P moves back} \textit{yes yes yes, I was loking for a man, and he’s the boss as well, the bit of power can do not harm if you catch my drift. Turns to P, pauses} Have you done this before?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>Yes, I love groups, I was doing groups for year,...in england,...in Scotland, and up in Dublin too, how about yourself?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Sure I’ve been doing them since I was a nipper.....psychodrama, that is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td><em>Wistfully</em>...I always fancied the stage myself</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Energetically, engaging with one another...**

Let's get on with it so we need a room, a room, a supervisor, a supervisor, lights, lights, music, music, colour, colour, chairs, this one, no hat one, this'll be perfect, perfect, teddy, teddies, yes, yes, evaluate, research, Evidence based practice, Practice based evidence, core evaluate research core. Pause

**Afterthought mode**

C’ there’s something missing

‘P’ ah clients’

C referrals.

Then approach the audience, ‘we’re open for business and looking for referrals’

do you know someone who’d benefit from our group, male/ female, motivated, etc, capable of containing emotion without recourse to acting out.

They’d need to show commitment and be able to turn up.

Once they’re eligible for the service that’s fine.

---

**Mime carrying a huge pile of referrals**

Gosh P....look at all these referrals, it’s really going to happen now

---

**Still sculpt**

---

Let’s make appointments for joint assessments,

---

Yes let’s

---

The 4th at 10
METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST

No can do  
keeup volume up
More improvisd snapy repletion of this

Aside this baby aint going to happen if I don’t make it, I gotta take 
charge, lets keep this show on the road. I suppose I could see them for 
assessment by myself,
............Improvisation of taking on more and more responsibility

Ya ok....... Improvise being busy, turning back

..from burdened place, carrying load.....
You will be there for the birth, wont you?

Reflection how do you imagine this will unfold?, Tibetan Bowl

The Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrator</th>
<th>Images</th>
<th>Music</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We did it, Yahoo !! <strong>HIGH FIVE ACTION</strong>, .....</td>
<td>The Birth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn’t that go well....they were amazing... they were very open, and willing to share their stories... weren’t they?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...and such a strong need to express themselves?....with a need to connect and belong</td>
<td>Keep up the energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DRIFT</strong>...move back to back, shoulder to shoulder</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>we should leave some reflective time at the</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
beginning of session, slow the pace down a bit

Reflective, but don’t let energy drop

I’m so glad that we gave time to evolving the ground rules, ...interesting how they moved from wanting contact outside of the group to seeing how complicated that it might become

They got that, all right... turn towards each other again

they were able to be so open about anger issues, they actually managed to express anger towards each other.

And respectfully too

We could walk around in a circle here to denote passage of time

Heward one week later

A bit of gender split going on there, don’t you think

Yeah, what’s that about?

You know. all that stuff about sexuality and
differing sexual needs

C Oh that

P Yeah *(drawn out, its really dawning on us)*

C They managed to be so honest

P Pretty impressive all right!

C It was a good idea to include the Core

P Good idea......what’ll we do with it

C Not sure ...but just in case

P Just in case

Reflection; Gender, Sexuality and Sexual Abuse

Cracks Appearing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Images/slides</th>
<th>music</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sexuality issues/supervisor/</td>
<td>Slide 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

P We’ve just had a message from greg, he won’t be coming any more
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td><strong>Irritated</strong> but he made an agreement that he would come for 20 weeks,</td>
<td>Cracks Appearing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>and that he’d give us notice and notice to the group of his leaving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>And that he’d raise any difficulty he might experience in the group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>I’m concerned that this will undermine agreements made in the group already</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Exactly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>Ho well, lets just see how this one plays out</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some action here to denote passage of time, maybe some symbolic enactment of a crack in the group</td>
<td>Sad echoes music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>Look there’s another crack here, Group member roles, C this is all too difficult for me, it hurts too much I need more and more, you can’t give me what I need. P You’re just too hungry for this group, we give you everything we’ve got, bit it’s still not enough, and enough is enough, C I think I’ll just cut my wrists again, at least I</td>
<td>Fade music</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Theres another crack appearing</td>
<td>Sad echoes music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>It’s really had an impact on the men in the group</td>
<td>Time shift floor scene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time shift floor scene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It’s really tough to be a man in this group, I’m so outnumbered here, [clutching goolies] to audience,</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>how can I explore my sexual issues here, I’m ashamed to be a man.....when I hear Imelda’s story...OMG</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>that’s horrific...and Madeline too.....Of course it happened to me too, but that’s different, I should have been able to stand up for myself if only I wasn’t a wus</td>
<td>?Cork accent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Patronisingly reassuring, But we didn’t mean you at all, you don’t count as a man, you’re not a bastard like them, I don’t think of you as a man; more as a... plaster Saint</td>
<td>Sad echoes music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wick, look there’s a leak here, we’re loosing men</td>
<td>Fade music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>Never mind about that, just have a look at this one, we’re leaking practically everybody</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
**Reflection**: The place of the masculine in the context of CSA

### Near Death

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Slides</th>
<th>Music</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>We can’t go on much longer like this</td>
<td>Dark Clouds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Well...I’m willing to see this through to the end</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>But maybe we are at the end....we’re down to two members....for god’s sake a few times we’ve only had one attending....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>Yeah but...no one got back to me</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>Resource implications to think of....hard to justify the time element with such a long waiting list</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C</strong></td>
<td>But, but....I invited referrals at clinical meetings....I’m still waiting to hear from people.....no on got back to me.....there seems to be a real lack of interest and energy in the group........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>To tell the truth my own energy for it is</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Methological Commentary on the Muse as Therapist</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>gradually/rapidly reducing now as well.....</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| C | Not you as well.....[down but not out]... if only....if only....[siloquy] But Heward said he saw this group thriving in 30 years time, a legacy....long after we’ve left the place.  
 [To P......] Let’s raise it with Heward in supervision |
| P | That’s a good idea, we need to face up to the idea that it’s gone  
 *Play back, walking around a sickly patient on a respirator; both of us addressing Heward.* |
| C | The pulse is very weak |
| P | Lets turn the respirator off,...Why prolong the agony...I can’t stay up another night |
| C | Where there’s life there is hope, I’m not a quitter |
| P | I’m outa here; ....carry on without me  
 *P out the door; C appeals, partially follows* |
| C | Okay then, lets turn it off but before we do, lets take time to figure it out, ...... how we’re all going to be affected, ......try and work out the best possible way to do this......[to P]....Are you really going to leave it to die |

Siegfrieds funeral
P  Don’t see what else we can do

C  Can’t bear to see it fail, .....I’ve put so much into this, I’ve had such hopes for it .... Especially as it’s the only group of its kind in the region.

P  .....me to.....but c’est la vie

C  Where did we go wrong?....*drum beat* ....I can’t go on.....*drum beat* ......I give up  *covers teddies up*, I’m sorry,  I’ve failed you... *drops drum stick in depair; finally gives up control*

P  We tried, we did out best ....... we faught the good fight..... *More Sympathetic and together*

Reflection?

C

**Resurrection**

P  Why don’t we bring it to the team?....

*P picks drum sticks....develops a tentative rhythm.....offers on to C*

*Both develop a rhythm    Yellow resurrection cloth emerges*

**Stop Dead Create Space**
All three aspects, fiction, biography, clinical experience, perhaps selectively chosen but setting out to demonstrate a possibility, can be shown (I am being very schematic here) to fit a potentially Jungian model of descent into blackness and release and regeneration. Now, the classic tendency in Jungian analysis to map this in terms of a Platonic or biological archetype, which is often representationally understood as a manifestation of instinct and archetypal biology. There are honourable exceptions, such as Hillman, who head in the other, the Platonic, direction, following Schopenhauer.

“By soul I mean, first of all, a perspective rather than a substance, a viewpoint toward things rather than a thing itself. This perspective is reflective; it mediates events and makes differences between ourselves and everything that happens. Between us and events, between the doer and the deed, there is a reflective moment -- and soul-making means differentiating this middle ground.

It is as if consciousness rests upon a self-sustaining and imagining substrate -- an inner place
or deeper person or ongoing presence -- that is simply there even when all our subjectivity, ego, and consciousness go into eclipse. Soul appears as a factor independent of the events in which we are immersed. Though I cannot identify soul with anything else, I also can never grasp it apart from other things, perhaps because it is like a reflection in a flowing mirror, or like the moon which mediates only borrowed light. But just this peculiar and paradoxical intervening variable gives on the sense of having or being soul. However intangible and indefinable it is, soul carries highest importance in hierarchies of human values, frequently being identified with the principle of life and even of divinity.

In another attempt upon the idea of soul I suggest that the word refers to that unknown component which makes meaning possible, turns events into experiences, is communicated in love, and has a religious concern. These four qualifications I had already put forth some years ago. I had begun to use the term freely, usually interchangeably with psyche (from Greek) and anima (from Latin). Now I am adding three necessary modifications. First, soul refers to the deepening of events into experiences; second, the significance of soul makes possible, whether in love or in religious concern, derives from its special relation with death. And third, by soul I mean the imaginative possibility in our natures, the experiencing through reflective speculation, dream, image, fantasy -- that mode which recognizes all realities as primarily symbolic or metaphorical.” (Hillman, 1977)

The last phrase, always a strong presence in Jungian work, is near to the enactive conception, though as it stands it is subjectivist and volitionalist. But there is still a tendency in the above passage to invoke a representational Kantian conception of an unknown substrate. This remains the major framework in a very great deal of Jungian work.
But a fully dramatic-enactive understanding of this process is partially eluded in Hillman here. When we start from enactment, the drama simply unfolds, and then it is possible to see Jungian motifs and insights in its simple light. The recurrence of such themes, as the descent and annihilation of identity, and so on, is undeniable. They are patterns of the drama. For instance, the fluctuations of sun and night, and dawn, and similar things, in Wagner’s *Ring*, or in Joseph Conrad’s novels, if we abstract from the total situation, are very clear cut. The presence of death and resurrection in the Irish experience is undeniable for me. I have no difficulty in accepting there is a Platonic element in such patterns, both drawn from human experience, and from essential elements. But it seems to me those cross-connections are simply implicit in what is enacted, and nothing more is obviously demanded, since the significance of the work is implicit in its enactive process, and must be drawn out from it.
Putting the pieces together: Development and Application

Initially I had intended to organise my approach to the Doctorate around a novel based on a fictional seminar on Nietzsche’s *My Sister and I* (Nietzsche, 1951/1990, Wilkinson, 2008b). It soon became clear that this was over-ambitious for me, at least at this point.

The steps towards realisation, tracked in the various, both unsuccessful and successful submissions for earlier parts of the Doctorate, were:

1. First came the recognition of the pattern concept, the ‘core psychodynamic discovery’, to which I had alluded in Wilkinson, 2003c, and which I integrated as follows in Wilkinson, 2008, in connection with the poetic paradigm (the reference to *Unitive*, here, drew also from the collaboration with Tricia Scott as spearheading the Integrative-Humanistic formulations for the Skills for Health mapping project for Humanistic Psychological Therapy).

   The core idea is that we are all intrinsically engaged in a temporal process, which gets itself structured in ways which relate to patterns which are all-pervasive in our process. This happens in therapy and in ‘real life’ and also in other frame-based contexts (indeed there is no ‘absolute’ ‘real life’, *everything* is in some frame or another, which is why enactment is universal process). The acceptance of this is common ground amongst the psychotherapies, though there are many labels for it.

   Arguably this is the great psychodynamic discovery, more primary than the unconscious and less restricted in its scope (Stern, 2004, Wilkinson, 2003c). If this is accepted, then the whole of experience, - rather than a split off part, which
is seen as the ‘real’ meaning of an expressed part, as in much psychoanalysis, and some elements in integrative and humanistic approaches - becomes the vehicle of therapeutic process.

Then also therapeutic work can take a whole variety of forms, experimentally and creatively and according to individual style and skill, without the obsession with ‘the one right way’.

Taking a difference in emphasis to an extreme, one might say that in traditional psychoanalysis the patterned temporal psychodynamic process is channelled into the narrowest channel, so as to intensify the process of dissolution of illusion. By contrast, in an integrative-humanistic, poetic-integrative, framework, the aim, rather, of the use of the psychodynamic process is to increase connection with inner and outer reality by emphasising unitive congruences and relationship.

Even Person-Centred approaches are psychodynamic, in this broad sense, with their inner-outer dialectic, their movement from other-directedness to Self-directedness; and the overlaps with Kohut and Jung have been oft-noted (e.g., Rowan, 2001)!

So the difference between psychoanalytic approaches and integrative-humanistic ones is not in the general acceptance or rejection of the psychodynamic hypothesis, but in what they do with it, and the scope that they give it. Perhaps paradoxically, therefore, integrative-humanistic approaches do indeed normalise the psychodynamic hypothesis.
itself more comprehensively than psychoanalytic ones do. The latter stop half way and keep it at the pathological or reductive end of the spectrum (corresponding to Freud’s original hypothesis, splitting conscious and unconscious, primary process and secondary process, reality principle and pleasure principle, and so on).

Developing the recognition of the core psychodynamic hypothesis, Stern writes:

I was prepared to see present behaviour as an instantiation of larger behavioural and psychological patterns. That is the essence of the psychodynamic hypothesis. However, I was surprised to see larger psychodynamic patterns reflected in units as small as present moments. This realisation opened up the way to consider the present moment, like a dream [my italics], as a phenomenon worthy of exploration for therapeutic purposes. (Stern, 2004, p. 18, Wilkinson, 2003c, p. 240) (Wilkinson, 2008b)

Seen in this light, the connection seems straightforward, and my regarding the ‘in the company of angels’ passage, in my paper on Daniel Stern’s The Present Moment, as a key formulation of my position up to that point, seems reasonable:

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the defining features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the unconscious. In such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum, transference oscillates with dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and unconscious or non-conscious are part of a total spectrum, to which total access even in principle is contradictory, but which exerts its awesome pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study
the sacred ‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’, - but in the company of angels, of the whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’ (Kierkegaard, 1859/1962), or the ‘Moment’ of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, part III, On the Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883/2006); and all of these are in continuity with what has been known as psychoanalysis; and constant and endless dynamic effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic discovery, not repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the light of this, also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies becomes minor, by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments and explorations, and pattern transcendings, in the work. (Wilkinson, 2003c, pp. 251-2)

UKCP’s Conference *About a Body*, my equivalence material for the Professional Knowledge Seminars, where I dialogued with Carroll and Orbach, and wrestled with the paradoxes of embodiment, but before I had conceptualised enactment, came now.

2. Following that step, I attempted, but without sufficient clarity, to use ‘story and process’ as paradigms. Something was taking me beyond narrativity *per se*. Narrativity and process, alone, did not go far enough, to do the job I needed to do.

3. Next, in *Episodes and Scenes* (Wilkinson, 2005a) I took a major step forward, using the concept of the *dramatic* scene, which brought the living dynamic process centre stage. As I have indicated, I already had formulated for use the concept of enactment in this presentation, without realising that it was the solution to my problem. The development of the three aspect
model led me to the point where I was able to write the book. But the first chapter of the book as it stands only touches on, and lists, enactment, merely in a conglomerate fashion.

4. In *A terrible beauty is born*, the RAL 4&5 synopsis of my work (Wilkinson, 2005c) I tried to solve the problem with an existential formulation, but I also took a big step forward in locating the whole thing in the realm of *a literary-aesthetic conceptualisation*. In the RAL 4 section, I recognised and articulated my work on phenomenological causality as the foundation of these later developments, and, in the RAL 5 part of the submission, produced a map of all my major writings and papers relevant to the work of the Doctorate. This encompassed the three major themes of my work up to that point, the development of the phenomenological causality line of thought, as ‘Integrative Field Theory of Psychotherapy’, the development of a Pluralistic concept of integration, and the Integration of Existential and Psychoanalytic strands within the field of psychotherapy, culminating in my paper (Wilkinson, 2003c) on Daniel Stern’s *The Present Moment*, which, as already indicated, I saw as the fullest statement of my overall concept prior to the Doctorate. The concerns of this mapping overlapped with the material offered by Ken Evans, Jean Knox, and Anne Kearns, and with the *About a Body* Conference, discussed in my synopsis of the Professional Knowledge Seminars (Wilkinson, 2010c, d). It becomes clear, from this mapping, that the enactment concept of *The Muse as Therapist* is the culmination of my development, the making explicit of something which had been implicit, not something created *de novo*.

5. I also at that point became clear about the need to dissolve the fact/fiction antithesis (comparing Boswellian biography to the great novelists to illustrate the point in *Episodes and Scenes*). This quite post-modern recognition relates to what Miller Mair and Jane Speedy
6. As I strove to communicate my insight, repeated presentations at Metanoia, in Paul Barber’s seminars (Paul helped me reach for clarity in them at a crucial time), and elsewhere, led to the formulations, first, of the ‘Poetry is therapy: therapy is poetry’ slogan, and, secondly, to using the concept of enactment as a way of getting it across, as I explained in my revised Learning Agreement submission in January 2008 (Wilkinson, 2008a).

I stumbled into these just by the process of what was forced upon me by default in the process of explaining things. This was an emblem of the catalytic effect the entire Doctoral process had upon me, including the oppositional elements in it. I took for granted these insights, so that it was not until I was compelled to use them in explanations that I fully clearly realised they were the paradigms I had all along been seeking.

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something -- just because it is always before one’s eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him. And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (Wittgenstein, 1953/1967, §129)

Discovery is not a matter of absolute originality. Notoriously, Piero Sraffa broke the hold of Wittgenstein’s picture/logical form theory of meaning by making a Neapolitan gesture of contempt, and asking him ‘What is the logical form of that?’ (Sraffa, no date). In Archimedes and Newton we have two graphic discoveries founded in the ostensibly obvious.
In this note I explore what I found relevant to my project, already touched on in the previous material.

I have attended five professional knowledge seminars, and I also am claiming equivalence for my participation in the UKCP Professional Conference on *About a Body* of 2004, from which a book arose of which I was co-editor and for which I wrote the Introduction.

The five seminars were delivered by:

Miller Mair
Anne Kearns
Ken Evans
Jean Knox
Jane Speedy

Of these five the most immediately relevant to the poetic paradigm I have developed were Miller Mair’s and Jane Speedy’s. I touch on the other three first, then. Anne Kearns presented a seminar, drawing from her Metanoia Doctoral Project on the Seven Deadly Sins of Supervision. This was a helpful and mature opportunity to explore the tensions of supervision work, the severity of shadow elements, and the ethical dilemmas which are a part of the world of supervision in the context of regulation, and of increasing levels of litigation against practitioners. Ken Evans explored the dialogical paradigm – *We Are, Therefore I*
This relational paradigm for me forms one part of the three aspects of poetic disclosure and psychotherapy praxis which I explore in my book, the other two being Text and Context and the Pre-Communicable, the latter which has some relations to Groddeck’s concept of ‘It’, which is different to Buber’s, and more positive. I raised this issue with Ken but in the end it was held in suspense. Jean Knox explored the question, who owns the unconscious, from a Jungian point of view, and in effect offered a broadly ecumenical or integrative understanding, close to my own pluralism, connecting with archetypal understandings of the ground of praxis in our field. I found Jean Knox helpful enough to approach her as my academic adviser but she was unable to take this up.

I found all three useful and stimulating and always they give me opportunity in the process elements of the seminar to test out my own intuitions and how they relate to what is being presented. In all three my intuitions were welcome, in different ways, and appeared to make sense against the background of what was being presented.

Miller Mair’s interest in exploring writing as therapeutic is of course very close to my own concerns, and I found his Seminar exceptionally validating of my poetic starting point, and it was received as such by him. I also approached him as my academic adviser, on the basis of this seminar and he too was unable to take it up.

Jane Speedy’s Seminar on Collective Writing I found extremely clear and useful methodologically, drawing on approaches pioneered in Narrative Therapy, and it gave
opportunity to explore the relations between positivistic evidence-based approaches to research and arts/creative writing narrative based approaches, which are more aesthetically based. This is very close to my own position, although additionally I believe I have elaborated the poetic paradigm as an epistemology, implicating the alternative *a priori* ontological-philosophical dimension of the ‘a priori of the particular’ as enactivity, in my work, in a way I do not know anyone else has done. Jane Speedy takes for granted a post-modern concept *in which ‘the process’ is what is creative*, rather than the individual ego of authors and creators. This is very close to what I am evoking in the enactment concept, and it was exceptionally useful to be able to correlate what I have done with such a developed methodological concept.

The UKCP Conference on About a Body, for which I am claiming equivalence, took place in 2004, and the book of the same title, co-edited with Jenny Corrigall and Helen Payne, was produced in 2006. I wrote the introduction, which was praised by Cathy Kaplinsky (Kaplinsky, 2008) in her review of it for the Journal of Analytical Psychology in 2008 as a masterly survey of the philosophical intricacies evoked by the different approaches to the body and understanding the body developed at this conference, from neo-Darwinian to full-blooded spiritual-phenomenological understandings, such as those derived from Buddhism presented by Maura Sills. The dialogue between Roz Carroll and Susie Orbach, reproduced much as it took place in the book, evoked in particular an extremely vivid ‘embodied counter-transference’ in the resulting discussion, including my own question about the ‘Id/It’ as a mediating concept, which I would now characterise as an enactment in both the psychoanalytic, and the poetic, senses of the concept. My introduction, written in 2006, is completely comfortable with the neo-Darwinian/phenomenological spirituality spectrum –
and there is not yet a hint in it of the concept of enactment as I now formulate it, despite the fact that in my RPPL *Episodes and Scenes* of 2005 (Wilkinson, 2005a) I had already framed this concept. So hard is it to grasp one's own insights! In this piece, writing about Michael Soth’s presentation, I even wrote:

> Soth pursues a narrative as a kind of parable. The parable he is telling is that of convergence – convergence of the whole multiplicity of aspects of the self, in the context of the relational experience of re-enactment.

This is what, once clearly conceptualised as poetic process, the concept of enactment as such becomes in the poetic paradigm. But here I have not yet crossed into that awareness, although it is on the cusp of such awareness. As such I claimed it as a staging post on my way, to be accepted as equivalent to a 6th Professional Knowledge Seminar. I have included it here, but as an appendix, Appendix B.
Impact of the Book *The Muse as Therapist, and Future Developments*

The undertaking signalled by my book *The Muse as Therapist: a New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy* (Wilkinson, 2009a) has made an impact in several ways, directly and indirectly.

Directly, despite its well-known difficulty, the book has continued to sell steadily, and at the last time of reporting was the best seller at its price level in the UKCP/Karnac series. I am informed by interested people that it has been seen on the shelves of practitioners of various modalities, including psychoanalytic, existential, and systemic. Anecdotally, then, there are indications that it is doing a job, which for the most part has not been done for the narrative-relational psychotherapies as a whole, which is to mark out a model of the field which is not based on scientific or programmatic-manualisable paradigms, but on an arguably much more congruent aesthetic paradigm.

The most striking immediate impact it had, as I have already indicated, was in fitting me to respond coherently, broadly in the terms set out in the book, to a request for a chapter defending and explicating Derrida, in relation to modern relational psychotherapeutic thought, for the book *Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice* (Frie and Orange, 2009) edited by two of the most senior existential-relational theorists within the psychoanalytic community, Roger Frie and Donna Orange. I have included this chapter as Appendix A.

As I developed my thinking, it assisted me in indirect ways in being able clearly to impact the
process of developing the stance of the Humanistic and Integrative Psychotherapy community within UKCP towards negotiation with Skills for Health and the Health Professions Council. Notoriously, this led on to a very fraught and hard-fought election for Chair of UKCP, but, in the intensity of that process, it is easy to forget that, though the opposing parties took different political views, they largely took them on the same essential grounds, of how best to uphold and give a base for non-positivistic and open-ended understandings of the psychotherapies. Having myself, by that point, a very fully articulated position, even if a minority one, was invaluable in being able to defend the centrality of the unitive and enactive elements in Integrative-Humanistic psychotherapy in the context of the Skills for Health discussions. What we achieved in negotiation, not perfect but sufficient to protect the logic and range of our essential position, is now enshrined in the relevant Competencies and Occupational Standards (ours are 37-49):

<https://tools.skillsforhealth.org.uk/suite/show/id/81>

The book has also had a multidisciplinary impact. Two of its chapters have been the subject of solicitations from journals. I was invited to present a version of the first chapter by the prospective new Canadian Journal of Psychotherapy and Counselling, because it was perceived as resonating with the aspiration towards a non-positivistic basis for that journal. This publication is not yet realised, but I am confident that in due course it will be.

Matters advanced to completion in the context of the invitation by the Oxfordian [as in Shakespeare Authorship attribution: Earl of Oxford] journal Brief Chronicles to submit a version of my Shakespeare chapter, chapter IV, for publication.
Of course, the Oxfordian position on the Shakespeare authorship remains a minority position, but it is at least semi-respectable; it was the one held by Sigmund Freud, and by both conservative [Scalia] and liberal [Stevens] members of the US Supreme Court, as well as Orson Welles, and the radical Cambridge neo-Keynesian economist, Professor Joan Robinson, a significant number of Shakespearean actors, probably including Kenneth Branagh (Branagh, 2009). Two universities on each side of the Atlantic, Brunel and Concordia, now run Authorship Studies courses.

Brief Chronicles, in the person of the psychoanalyst, Richard Waugaman, reviewed my book favourably (Waugaman, 2009)

Wilkinson worries that the profession of psychotherapy suffers from excessive medicalization, as illustrated by the current infatuation with neuroscience on the part of many psychoanalysts. He therefore wants to demonstrate that the arts are equally fundamental to our understanding of the process of psychotherapy. I strongly agree with him on this score. He chooses poetry among the arts as “most accessible” to the argument he wishes to make.…

More recently, Howard Shevrin explained why he
chose to write his novel about psychoanalysis in verse —“How else but in verse to capture the paradox of these seeming antinomies, the simultaneous presence of the sound with its echo, the light in its shadow, the voice of the silence? Psychoanalytic discourse is to ordinary discourse as metaphor is to prosaic speech. It thickens ordinary meaning by its very form... Only verse can provide these resources”… (Waugaman, 2009)

Publication of the journal version of the chapter happened in November 2010 (Wilkinson, 2010c).

My work, which drew increasingly explicitly from FR Leavis, has also had an impact on the community to which Leavis’s work remains important, which includes such well known philosophical figures as Michael Tanner and Simon Blackburn. I have now been invited to speak at two presentations on Leavis (‘FR Leavis’, 2009, 2010), at Downing College Cambridge and the University of York, the former in 2009, when I spoke on Leavis’s Concept of Enactment as a Multidisciplinary Paradigm included as an appendix in the previous submission, and the next one, on 15th October 2010 at York

which developed my own stance, in terms of debating Leavis’s position on WB Yeats, and the implications of Leavis’s rejection, which I do not share, of the late poetry, especially The Circus Animals’ Desertion., questioning whether Leavis’s own use of the concept of enactment for moralistic purposes may not be closer to Samuel Johnson’s than he acknowledges.
My developed concept, with its relation to the existential and post-modern traditions in philosophy, is also in the background of the philosophy seminars I have been giving now and developing for four years, first in Ireland and then in the UK, and where the interface of all three disciplines is strongly present and explored in a very live fashion:

<http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/courses/>

Both courses explore implicitly the philosophical dimension of enactment, in that they view the evolution of philosophy as living history, in its full cultural context, as something constantly recreated, enactively, in the present of philosophy at any given time. This somewhat Hegelian stance, however, shares with Derrida’s response to Hegel, the assumption that enactivity is irreducible and hence more primary than the heuristic drive to complete conceptual-ontological synthesis, which is cardinal to Hegel’s own understanding. This view has also some affinities with Jung’s critique of Hegel, despite the very strong Hegelian elements in his own understanding of psychotherapy.

With these remarks I come up to the edge of where I would wish to head next with these concepts. Clearly the book, *The Muse as Therapist: A New Poetic Paradigm for Psychotherapy*, in terms of the large issues upon which it touched, was a first attempt, a sketch, more, perhaps, a promissory note than anything else. It opens the way to at least three books:

Firstly, one, a mapping of my understanding of the field of psychotherapy in terms of this concept, with a much more detailed exploration than has been possible so far of the implications for practice;

Secondly, an overview of the history of philosophy as the gradual emergence, or re-
emergence, of the primacy of enactment in an adequate ontology of human persons, in the background of psychotherapy, shaped in terms of the great historical synthesers in Philosophy (Wilkinson, *Philosophy as History*) and an exploration of the implications of that for human existence; the tentative title (as yet too cumbersome) for this one is: *Camping Out on Vesuvius: The Philosophical Understandings of Intentionality in the Foundations of Psychotherapy*.

Thirdly, a book on the Shakespearean tradition, and the post-Shakespearean tradition, placing an enactive understanding of ‘the successors of the dramatists of the sixteenth century’, in Eliot’s phrase, at its heart.

There would obviously, in the nature of my understanding, be considerable overlap and cross-reference between these three enterprises; for my understanding of enactment, in the end, is a human one, which embraces, unites, and transcends, all three disciplines together.
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Appendix A

Chapter Four of *Beyond Postmodernism: New Dimensions in Clinical Theory and Practice*

Eds Roger Frie and Donna Orange

*Primary Process of Deconstruction: Towards a Derridean Psychotherapy*

Heward Wilkinson

“We need another language that does not exist (outside poetry) – a language that is steeped in temporal dynamics.”

This evocative statement by Daniel Stern (2004: 173) suggests that poetry can provide a paradigm not only for understanding psychotherapy, but that psychotherapy itself is a kind of poetry. I believe that poetry provides a means to understand Derrida, and correlatively to make sense of Derrida’s relevance to psychotherapy. Although Derrida’s abstractness has led to much confusion and misunderstanding, I shall seek to show that Derrida’s insights are similar to and, indeed, expand on Stern’s. In this chapter, I shall focus above all on Derrida’s profound insight into the *particular existence* with which psychoanalysis or psychotherapy concerns itself.

Poetry provides a working paradigm for psychotherapy. The final sentence of P. B. Shelley’s *Defence of Poetry* (Shelley, 1840/2004) reads: “Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World.” Shelley’s expansive conception of poetry would undoubtedly include the reality
that the literature of religion and philosophy were originally one and the same with poetry. Despite the fact that in our technocratic, modern culture, poetry has become marginalised, it remains a fertile source.

The bridging of poetry, philosophy, and psychotherapy is vividly illustrated in William Wordsworth’s *The Prelude*, R. M. Rilke’s *Duino Elegies*, and T. S. Eliot’s *Four Quartets*. The philosophies of Friedrich Nietzsche and the later Martin Heidegger both draw extensively on poetry. In the history of psychoanalysis, Freud and Jung each make use of poetry. Freud’s insights are indebted to Greek and Shakespearean tragedy. As Lionel Trilling (1965/1967: 89) points out, Freud’s theory of primary process in dreams (Freud, 1900/1991) is implicitly a theory of poetic creation. Similarly, Jung’s key work, *Symbols of Transformation* (Jung, 1956) draws from such diverse sources as Lord Byron, *The Book of Job*, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Richard Wagner, Nietzsche, *The Epic of Gilgamesh*, the *Upanisads*, and Friedrich Hölderlin. More recently, Stern has extended this cross-pollination of psychoanalysis and poetry to develop his radical insights into the psychotherapeutic process (Stern, 2004).

Poetry likewise gives us a means of access to Derrida. I shall begin by exploring Derridean categories by way of a poem by William Blake entitled “The Sick Rose” (Blake, 1977). Blake’s poem has elements that resonate profoundly with a psychoanalytic perspective. Indeed, I view psychoanalysis as located between poetry and literary analysis. In order to use Blake’s poem to illuminate a Derridian framework, I delineate six major themes in Derrida’s work, which I then intertwine with evocation of elements in Blake’s poem. These
themes include: 1. *writing* (before the letter) and the primacy of *text* (in an extended sense); 2. *context*, cross-referentiality, and indeterminacy (*dissemination*); 3. *différance*, with an ‘a’; 4. *deferral*, novelty, and temporality; 5. *core deconstructive concepts*, which unfurl the significance of what Derrida means by *writing* -- these are concepts which entwine or straddle ideal and real, the *a priori* and the individual, such as *différance* itself, iterability, *parergon*, and *hymen*, supplementarity, and *metaphor* (c.f., Derrida, 1971/1982); and 6. *Enactment* and performativity [note i]. The last of these themes, *enactment* and performativity, take on increasing importance in Derrida’s development, particularly as the ethical preoccupation with persons and with the Other becomes more pronounced.[note ii] Indeed, given Derrida’s sustained encounter [note iii] with Levinas’ work, I would argue that his concern with ethics was never absent.

My use of the term “enactment” compares and contrasts with the common usage of enactment in psychoanalysis, especially relational psychoanalysis. In the broadest sense, enactment in psychoanalysis means something like the repetitional *re*-enactment of restrictive patterns derived commonly from childhood and childhood traumatisations. Enactment can be particularly manifest in transference-countertransference processes. Hoffman (2007), for example, writes that:

> The oscillation that took place during these times is best understood through a brief review of Heinrich Racker’s elaboration of the concept of counter-transference. Racker (1968) an Argentinian psychoanalyst, theorized that there are two kinds of countertransferences which emerge in treatment. The first is a complementary countertransference. Here, the analyst is nudged into the role of a significant other
in the person’s life, experiencing and potentially enacting that person’s feelings and behaviors. The second kind of countertransference is concordant. The patient assumes the role of a significant other, and the analyst is made to feel what the patient had to go through at some point in her life. Often, the most difficult and painful enactments are of this type. For healing to occur, the analyst must bear the experience of pain that the patient felt, that is, he/she must become a “faithful high priest”. (Hoffman, 2007, italics mine)

The relationship between enactment in Hoffman’s sense, and enactment in my sense, parallels the relationship between normal philosophical perjorative references to “writing,” and Derrida’s deconstruction/expansion of it into a much wider paradigm. The psychoanalytic use of enactment goes with concepts like “acting out” and “acting in,” and enactments are regarded, however benignly, as transcendable and exorcisable. By contrast with this more limited negative definition, I will suggest that enactment is a toto caelo reality, which is absolutely ubiquitous, quite uneliminable, and creatively at the heart of the work. In my concept, enactivity creates space for the realigning of enactments in the standard psychoanalytic sense.

From the perspective of the poetic paradigm, enactment and performativity give us a vantage point from which we can attain an appreciation of Derrida’s insights into psychotherapy. In addition, by adding poetry to the list of deconstructive concepts, we can better elucidate Derrida. Drawing on an example from Stern (2004), I will then suggest that such concepts as “empathic attunment” and “projective identification” be understood as core deconstructive concepts. Finally, I discuss two clinical vignettes, real and fictional, to convey the application
of my analysis to praxis.

**William Blake and Six Derridian Concepts**

Blake’s (1977) bardic poetry, with its precise, yet suggestive and musical resonances, and extraordinary rhythmic force, gives us innumerable wonderful and graphic examples of enactment. Its extraordinary density lends itself to elucidation of the Derridean framework, which is itself such a dense and saturated framework. In the space I have, I can only allude marginally to the range (not amounting to proof; but I am elucidating a concept here, not proving it) of such an analysis; a full analysis of this poem would certainly run to a book!

*The Sick Rose*

O Rose, thou art sick!

The invisible worm

That flies in the night,

In the howling storm,

Has found out thy bed

Of crimson joy:

And his dark secret love

Does thy life destroy.

I now examine the six elements I am attributing to Derrida in the light of structural elements and motifs we can identify in Blake’s poem:

1. *Writing* (before the letter) and the primacy of *text* (in an extended sense): What Derrida means by ‘writing’ is that there is an inherent aspect of language, which he later
dubs ‘iterability’ (Derrida, 1988), which transcends the conception of utterance and speech as simply events, as constituted in an immediate present. This aspect is inherently cross-referencing, and this notion of writing is contrasted with ‘writing’ conceived as a derivative, secondarily refential, affair, one dependent on the primacy of speech. Poetry embodies something like his concept in the permanence of the totality of form and forms, which give it an indefinitely re-repeatable character, and enable it to be read and connected even with worlds of awareness never contemplated by the author, as classically illustrated by Shelley’s Ozymandias, (Shelley, 1818/1999):

And on the pedestal, these words appear:

My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings,

Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay

Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare

The lone and level sands stretch far away.

Now, in the Blake there is very clear cross-referencing to Shakespeare’s King Lear.

For instance, in the lines

That flies in the night

In the howling storm
the combination of the allusion to ‘storm’ with the potent word ‘howling’, which evokes Lear’s repetition of the word ‘howl’ in his final entry with Cordelia dead in his arms, along
with other elements I cannot adduce in the space I have, makes the cross-reference virtually certain, making a major contribution to the potent undercurrents of the poem. It also makes it a powerful implicit comment upon the play! All this illustrates the characteristic of ‘writing’ as iterability.

Again, we may call upon the way in which the poem straddles the epochs, first of the courtly love idealisation of ‘the Rose’ (Lewis, 1977), and then that in which the ideal has collapsed (in Shakespeare already), in favour of a conception in which love has become inherently corrupted (‘his dark secret love’). This second epoch looks onward to Wagner, Baudelaire, Proust, Freud, and Klein. The abysmal faultline of tragedy is evoked, in the poem, in a way which will prevent us ever again looking on human love as innocent. Blake, in this regard, even reminds us of Melanie Klein’s pessimism, and her invocation of a primary splitting (Klein, 1946/1987). And thus, also, we who have a psychoanalytically informed consciousness, cannot retrospectively eliminate from our perspective the later dimension of psychoanalytic awareness, and go back to not seeing Blake partly through a psychoanalytic lens.

2. Context, cross-referentiality, and indeterminacy (dissemination): This aspect of cross-referencing, then, leads us on to vividly invoking Freud’s (1900/1991) concept of over-determination of meaning, as revealed in the analysis of the Blake. Given the lack of space, it is not possible to dwell on the question of the criteria of literary and hermeneutic attributions, but there is a gradient of criteria of relevance which is what makes such analysis non-relativistic. The infinite possibilities of cross-connection, in both the real and the ideal, the total field, are what Derrida (1976: 158) means by the slogan, there is nothing outside the text
That is, the relevance of the implicit range of meanings relates out to the totality of historic existence, in indissoluble interrelation with the indefinitely large cross-connections of meaning as such. It does not reduce world to text but, as it were, expands text to include world; text fades into context. Textual cross-referencing becomes contextual and ‘in-world’ (Heidegger, 1967) overdetermination.

3. Différance, with an ‘a’: Derrida’s (1968/1982) argument, in Différance, which critics such as Peter Dews (Dews, 1987: 32-3, 36-7) and Alisdair MacIntyre (2006) find back-handedly absolutistic, is that the intervals, or between-modes, of otherness, which differentiate positively different elements or things, are not themselves perceivable as such. Yet at the same time they are foundational for all which is perceivable, all that is perception and presence, enable all recognition of meaning, all identifiability of what is. This apparently means that Derrida privileges discontinuity over continuity and sameness, and it often reads, and is read, that way (c.f., Dews, op. cit.).

But the deeper implication can be put as follows: suppose, for instance, I spot a bird against the background of a bush. Now, a bird is both different from a bush, yet not absolutely unlike a bush (there is no absolute unlikeness); they are both alive, for instance, and part of a total ecology, which in turn is what enables me to recognise the bird in its context.

So there is a sense in which both sameness and difference are manifestations of something more primary, which we could crudely or awkwardly label, for instance, recognitionality. Now, this recognitionality is what Derrida is calling différance. And the elusive thing Derrida
is saying, is that we cannot derive this from any item, or collection of items, as such, in the field of awareness and being. Rather, it is the whole, the gestalt as a whole. Clumsily, again, it is the comparativity of the elements of the whole. It is intentional, it transcends or surpasses any of the items in awareness towards the sense of the whole.

To support this interpretation, referring to the differing/deferring ambiguity, Derrida (1967/1973: 129-130) writes:

In the one case “to differ” signifies non identity; in the other case it signifies the order of the same. Yet there must be a common though entirely differant (différante) root within the sphere that relates these two movements of differing to one another. We provisionally give the name of différance to this sameness which is not identical: by the silent writing of its a it has the desired advantage of referring to differing, both as spacing/temporalizing and as the movement that structures every dissociation.

Derrida concludes that this aspect or manifestation of existence is ineffable, in a sense, not nameable or objectively describable as such, but this does question-beggingly assume that being a res, an item, as such, is the paradigm of describable existence. Oddly, he simply inverts what he is opposing, rather than deconstructing it. In his defence, it is certainly true that there is an irreducibly metaphoric aspect to the understanding of this, for instance, in appeal to the metaphor of musical intervals or silences, and this metaphoricity is inherently
mind-discerned, - but, precisely by his previous argument, about text (section 2), it is also inherently ‘worldly’.

So this in the end leads on to the articulation of his case for the primacy of writing and text, and to the general argument that all forms of symbolism partake of iterability/re-iterability (Derrida, 1988; there is no difference marked by the ‘re-’, for Derrida; this is also what he means by ‘archi-trace’, 1968/1982). His argument for all this then is:

The différance which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself inaudible, in every sense of the word. (Derrida, 1968/1982, p. 5, my italics)

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval which constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject… (Derrida, 1968/1982, p.13)

On this basis of ‘primary writing’, ‘archi-trace’, etc., Derrida is sometimes accused of denying immediacy, presence, encounter, and so on, whereas it is rather that, at the deepest level, he seeks to ground them in this totality which is beyond sameness and difference. At this point, I simply recall how far psychotherapeutic work, like that of poets and musicians, essentially depends upon the inchoate, the silent, the intervallic, intersections of sensory modalities, intersections between verbal and non-verbal, etc. Stern (2004) labels this the realm of the ‘sloppy’. In connection with this, how frequent metaphors of ballet and
choreography are in Stern! Hence, the issues we are struggling with in Derrida and the philosophic tradition are profoundly relevant to psychotherapy.

In the Blake poem, I will just instance, as expressions of différance, the quasi-musical effects and intervals, those which give the line (again): “In the howling storm,” its resonance of cataclysm, to our inner ear, evoking the storm in King Lear, and in that resonance carrying a charge akin to the climax of the opening movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony.

4. Deferral, novelty, and temporality: This element is one aspect of différance for Derrida. Temporality, whether in Augustine, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, Freud (c.f., Derrida, 1978b), and Stern (2004), is trans-momentary; in the poem this is, for instance, evoked in the shift, where there is a marked musical pause and ‘breath’, between the line about the storm, and the beginning of the second stanza: “Has found out thy bed….” Innumerable such poetic instances of the transtemporal could be adduced; indeed it is inherent in poetry. Once we grasp this we go on to realise our whole experience is trans-momentary, deferred, poetic, of its essence. In my concept, this implies that experience itself is inherently enactment.

5. Core deconstructive concepts, which unfurl the significance of what Derrida means by writing (c.f., Derrida, 1971/1982): Poesis or poetic movement, in the light of Blake’s poem, now itself appears as a deconstructive concept, because it inherently overrides the distinction between objectivity and subjectivity. For instance,

Has found out thy bed

is inextricably both metaphor (‘subjective’), and concrete factual description (‘objective’).
As in the greatest moments in Shakespeare and Keats, without the concrete factuality of the description, the metaphoricity would hang in the air. Poesis both is there, public, analysable, yet not apprehensible except existentially. Later we shall find such concepts as “empathic attunement”, - which appeals irreducibly to experience, yet can still be both described and researched, - also occupy this space.

6. Enactment and performativity: While enactment is not Derrida’s term, but mine (c.f., Leavis, 1952-1962, pp. 110-111, c.f., note i.), Derrida does adopt performativity from Austin (1962). The following threefold concept of enactment -embracing both ethics and poetics/aesthetics - seeks to capture that towards which the concept of action and will, implicit in the poem as poem, tends:

A. the intentionality or meaning of action, and of words as action, is irreducible, that is, the intentionality of any of my actions cannot be eliminated reductively, which is not to say no causal analysis is possible at all;

B. qua action, in so far as it is an action, any action or enactment or performative is beyond knowledge, or, rather, more accurately, it is other, it is neither knowing nor not knowing;

C. but in so far as, by A, it is irreducible meaning, it can be epitomised, it is iterable, it has a teleology, it can be known (it is not ineffable), and it can be appraised.

Enactment is inclusive, and truly mimetic (c.f., Aristotle, trans. 1997), in that, at the level of primary experience, we can only evoke it, and to evoke it is indispensable in that, in part, it is how we characterise it.

Interpretations, though indefinitely extendable, are nevertheless governed by implicit criteria,
only to be challenged in terms of deeper or better implicit criteria. The great Shakespeare producer, Peter Brook, states this poignantly:

... Now if one takes [Shakespeare’s] thirty-seven plays with all the radar lines of the different viewpoints of the different characters, one comes out with a field of incredible density and complexity; and eventually one goes a step further, and one finds that what happened ... is something quite different from any other author’s work. It’s not Shakespeare’s view of the world, it’s something which actually resembles reality. A sign of this is that any single word, line, character or event has not only a large number of interpretations, but an unlimited number. Which is the characteristic of reality. (Brook, 1977)

Brook’s statement aptly describes the mode of deconstruction as enactment, which is not, however, relativistic. I shall now put these concepts to work in considering a pertinent passage from Stern (2004).

**Present Moments**

Stern’s work is crucial to the development of the concept of psychotherapy as enactment. His “implicit knowledge,” “moments of meeting,” “present moments,” “sloppy process,” and “temporal dynamics” are all enactments in my sense of the term (c.f., Wilkinson, 2003a). Stern touches the heart of this in making his implicit/explicit distinction more fundamental than the conscious/unconscious distinction. The example I examine from Stern’s work is an ordinary human situation that can equally be applied to psychotherapy process, yet is vivid, paradigmatic and takes the form of poetic communication.
Stern is writing not merely about *narrated* and *shared* feeling processes, (which he designates “shared feeling voyages”, Stern: 172), but about *experienced*, and hence *enacted*, lived experience. He wrestles to elucidate this experience linguistically. It is significant that Stern is riding on a wave of metaphor (he too loves Blake, and the passage ends with Blake’s very Derridean - ‘nothing outside the text’ - ‘world in a grain of sand’):

During a shared feeling voyage (which is the moment of meeting) two people traverse together a feeling-landscape as it unfolds in real time. Recall that the present moment can be a rich, emotional lived story. During this several-second journey, the participants ride the crest of the present instant as it crosses the span of the present moment, from its horizon of the past to its horizon of the future. As they move, they pass through an emotional narrative landscape with its hills and valleys of vitality affects, along its river of intentionality (which runs throughout), and over its peak of dramatic crisis. It is a voyage taken as the present unfolds. A passing subjective landscape is created and makes up a world in a grain of sand. (Stern: 172)

A limit on the scope of Stern’s analysis is implicit, in its being clear that any metaphoric physical evocation of temporal dynamics simply *presumes* the temporality it seeks to clarify. Therefore, if the analysis is indeed to *elucidate* temporality, it has to be a metaphor *used in certain way*, as Heidegger (1967), for instance, does. Stern continues:

Because this voyage is participated in with someone, during an act of affective
intersubjectivity, the two people have taken the voyage together. Although this shared voyage lasts only for the seconds of a moment of meeting, that is enough. It has been lived-through-together. The participants have created a shared private world. And having entered that world, they find that when they leave it, their relationship is changed. There has been a discontinuous leap.

The border between order and chaos has been redrawn. Coherence and complexity have been enlarged. They have created an expanded intersubjective field that opens up new possibilities of being-with-one-another. They are changed and they are linked differently for having changed one another. (Stern: 172-3)

Stern resorts to the language of chaos and catastrophic change, in my view, partly because he is embarrassed by the risk of accounting for intersubjectivity in purely personal, phenomenological, non-physical, terms, which would take the matter out of the realm of neurological investigation, and into the realm of the phenomenological temporal intersubjective a priori. He continues:

Why is a shared feeling voyage so different from just listening to a friend or patient narrate episodes of their life story? There, too, one gets immersed in the other’s experience through empathic understanding. The difference is this. In a shared feeling voyage, the experience is shared as it originally unfolds. There is no remove in time. It is direct – not transmitted and reformulated by words. It is cocreated by both
partners and lived originally by both. (Stern: 173)

Shared feeling voyages are so simple and natural yet very hard to explain or even talk about. *We need another language that does not exist (outside poetry) – a language that is steeped in temporal dynamics.* [my italics] This is paradoxical because these experiences provide the nodal moments in our life. Shared feeling voyages are one of life’s most startling yet normal events, capable of altering our world step by step or in one leap. (Stern: 173)

Stern is writing about what I am calling enactment. As anyone who reads his remarkable book may know, he moves his dialectic forward by way of generating antitheses. These antitheses, like Freud’s own use of them, continually dissolve and reshape themselves (c.f., Wilkinson, 2003a). Here Stern is playing with the antitheses of the *implicit* and the *explicit*, and the *non-verbal* and the *verbal*, the latter as foils to the former. These antitheses readily ally themselves with his concern for the neuroscientific level, mirror neurons and perhaps, not surprisingly, there is a very strong pull towards the concrete.

The temptation [note iv] to contrast elements which are *absolutely immediate*, with ones which are secondary, verbal, and ‘after the event’ is strong. I believe that this pull towards a *concrete* characterisation of enactment is what leads Stern into the conceptual trap of momentarily equating the *enacted* with the *non-verbal*: “In a shared feeling voyage, the experience is shared as it originally unfolds. There is no remove in time. It is direct – not transmitted and reformulated by words. It is cocreated by both partners and lived originally
From a Derridean point of view, this equation presumes the direct, the immediate, the “pure expression”, the metaphysics of presence. For Stern, “It is direct – not transmitted and reformulated by words.” (Stern: 173)

Instead, as we have now seen by way of the distinctions I have drawn, the enacted can equally be verbal, reflexively invoking the quasi-permanence of language and writing, and yet still be an enactment, and indeed always is enactment. And Stern immediately illustrates this, affording us opportunity for a modest deconstruction, by the spelling out his latent paradigms. Stern narrates and evokes an enactment. In other words, to make sense of what this is about, he himself resorts to poetic process. And in resorting to poetic process, he also enacts the distinction I am drawing.

Here, in parallel with what has been said already, we must pause to more sharply distinguish two aspects of the characterisation process. First, there is a dimension of the evocation of a poetic process which consists in an epitomisation, and at the same time a reproduction of it. Although literal total reproduction is, a logically contradictory conception, poetic reproduction participates in that deferral, that quasi-permanencing aspect, iterability, of the poetic process of events which makes them universals, in the Platonic sense. I awkwardly label this process enactive-reproductive epitomisation. Secondly, the relevant aspect is the descriptive task which involves process-characterising conceptualisations, which may well also involve poetic coinage. (Mimesis and diegesis, Aristotle, op. cit. [note v]) This
would include both *evocative characterisation*, which Stern’s passage mainly illustrates and *technical characterisation*. The immensely subtle struggle, to both formulate and enact at this level, is indeed Derridean territory, as it is the territory of psychotherapy.

All these are illustrated, positively or negatively, in the graphic transition Stern now makes. Here Stern, in however sober academic terminology, is actually describing a *seduction*, with all the viscerally physical intersubjective potency a seduction involves. Despite his academic mask, he actually manages to characterise this seduction quite evocatively; in other words, Stern is also functioning as a poet, in evoking one of the great subjects of poetry.

A seduction is peculiarly central to Stern’s purpose because of the profound level of intersubjectivity achieved in deep erotic encounter. In Stern’s almost coyly academic evocation, with a quotation from the writing of a peer (‘Kendon’), of the process of ‘intention movements’, leading up to the ‘moment of meeting’ of holding hands, it may occur to us that, erotically, *he is also paralleling and cross-referencing the process of foreplay in sexual intercourse*, the consummation which is overtly omitted from the account, but surely implied. How dare I suggest such a thing? Well, to the extent that it is valid (and it only has to be *possible*, irrespective of Stern’s own intention), it illustrates the inherent textuality and metaphoricity of the evoked field of mnemic resonance and instinct, which I have described as poetic.

Throughout, Stern’s analysis is bedevilled by the power of the objecthood or objectivity paradigm. His instinct is to feel that an event must have occurred in the spatio-temporal
Stern (173) alludes to the difficulty in grasping the concept of shared feeling voyage because of the exclusion of explicit content. But this does not entail the exclusion of implicit metaphorical meaning and cross-referencing. And it is only “difficult to think of two people cocreating their joint experience in an intersubjective matrix” (Stern: 173) because it cannot be done within the framework of the objecthood paradigm, for which there is no intrinsic connection between what happens in me and what happens in you. This is indeed why I believe the analogues of intersubjectivity belong with the core deconstructive concepts.

In the narrative of the skaters, the significance of Stern’s (174) parenthesis - ‘(Note that each is also participating neurologically and experientially in the bodily feeling centred in the other. And each of them knows, at moments, that the other knows what it feels like to be him or her.)’ - is the blurring of the differentiation between the physical material body and the experienced phenomenological body, which opens the way to either a neurological reduction or to thoroughgoing psychophysical parallelism, without heading further towards mysticism than that. But the neurological reference in this example is an inference for us here, however
direct it may be ‘in itself’. This is a characteristic instance of how Stern elides this difference, and does not tackle the dualistic issue.

Stern turns to describe the skaters pausing to have a drink and evokes their changed intimacy. He now leans boldly towards a ‘mystical’ or ‘telepathic’ strand when he says, unequivocally, “They have directly experienced something of the other’s experience. They have vicariously been inside the other’s body and mind, through a series of shared feeling voyages. They have created an implicit intersubjective field that endures as part of their short history together.” (Stern: 174) If taken at all literally, this passage seems a far cry from Stern’s earlier The Motherhood Constellation (1995: 42) with its blunt repudiation of the mystical and telepathic elements in projective identification, not to mention from the neurological references of the previous paragraph. But something like attunement, it now becomes clear here, belongs with those irreducible core deconstructive concepts I have mentioned.

What seems to me Stern’s over-emphasis on the non-semantic dimension of the implicit, which enables him to relegate, what he thinks of as the verbal unconscious dimension, to the realm of the repressed (the Freudian unconscious), also enables him to posit that this will all eventually be assimilated by the neurological accounts. Stern continues the story:

What will our skaters say? They will talk across the table and share meanings.

And while they talk, the explicit domain of their relationship will start to expand. Whatever is said will be against the background of the implicit relationship that was expanded before, through the shared feeling voyages they had on the ice. Once they start talking, they will also act along with the words – small movements of face,
hands, head, posture. The explicit then becomes the background for the implicit, momentarily. The expansion of the implicit and explicit domains play leapfrog with each other, building a shared history – a relationship. (Stern: 174-5)

If their implicit and explicit shared intersubjective field has altered enough that they mutually feel that they like one another, enough to want to go further in exploring the relationship, what might happen? They will engage in a sequence of intention movements. Kendon (1990) described intention movements exchanged between people to test the waters of their motivations towards each other. They consist of split-second, incomplete, very partial fullness of display, abbreviated movements that belong to the behavioural sequence leading to the communication of an intention or motivation. (They are the physical-behavioral analogs of intersubjective orienting.) (Stern: 175)

Our skaters will now engage in a series of intention movements. Short head movements forward, stopped after several centimetres, slight mouth openings, looks at the other’s lips and then their eyes, back and forth, leaning forward, and so on, will take place. This choreography of intention movements passes outside of consciousness but is clearly captured as ‘vibes’. These vibes are short-circuited shared feeling voyages and deliver a sense of what is happening. An evolving patterns develops as the sequence of intensity, proximity, and fullness of display, of their intention movements progresses. These relational moves are enacted out of consciousness, leading up to the moment of meeting – their hands move to meet.
Here, too, a notion of readiness is needed, because suddenly the full act is executed in a leap. The present moment surfaces quickly like a whale breaching the water’s surface. There is not an incessant, agonizing progression up to the final act. (Stern: 175-6)

The above account can only make limited sense if we remain blind to temporal dynamics and fail to see them as the tissue of lived experience. (Stern: 176)

Here, now, is the very striking, exemplification of a poetic shift in the emergence of a metaphor (from the earlier ‘leap’, and the ‘ocean’ of the waves of temporal dynamic), namely in the movement from: “Here, too, a notion of readiness is needed, because suddenly the full act is executed in a leap.” (Stern: 175) In the repetition of the language of leap, there is a hint of the leaps which the skaters have just been involved in. But in a Shakespearean shift, a piece of genuine poetry, the characterisation suddenly emerges from its dormancy within the image of leap, emerging into full concreteness, in a fully developed and very graphic metaphor: “The present moment surfaces quickly like a whale breaching the water’s surface.” (Stern: 175-6) Now, the event of the hand-contact, is the present moment, in Stern’s terms, and into the metaphysical or the conceptual, that is, into the poetic, in our terms, and writing, in Derrida’s.

The resonance of penetration which I earlier invoked is not at all gainsaid by this, and the
The Scope of Enactment

The power and generalising capability of a fundamental principle, if it genuinely is the relevant generic principle we are looking for, is huge. The scope of enactment as a hermeneutic and analytically clarificatory principle is therefore vast. This principle of practical reason (the rationality of action, Kant, 1788/1997) makes sense of how many, caught within, and seeking a ‘beyond’ of, a cognitivist understanding, have again and again been compelled to invoke a dimension of ineffability--the neo-Platonists, Augustine and
the mediaeval mystics, Nietzsche, Freud, and Bergson, the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus (Wittgenstein, 1921/2001) and, in part (c.f., Dews, and MacIntyre, op. cit.), the earlier Derrida (1968/1982) of Différance.

Not only does enactment apply to the whole range of literature and psychotherapy. If the understanding I have developed is correct, it makes sense of a vast movement over the millennia in philosophy and theology in the West. Enactment moves away from logos-based or logocentric understandings of philosophy and the world, including empiricism and rationalism, of the philosophies since Descartes. At the same time, since, as a principle of action or practical reason, it does not challenge the domain of rationality as a comprehensive principle, in the way the ineffabilist trend does; the principle of enactment, as Derrida’s work ultimately indicates (see endnote ii.), resolves the dilemma.

Derrida’s poetic-enactive understanding appears throughout his work; in particular, in Politics of Friendship (Derrida, 1997), after celebrating a fabulous and stunning sentence of Nietzsche’s, he summarises as follows:

By way of economy – and in order, in a single word, to formalise the absolute economy of the feint, this generation by joint and simultaneous grafting of the performative and of the reportive, without a body of its own – let us call the event of such sentences, the ‘logic’ of this chance occurrence, its ‘genetics’, its ‘rhetoric’, its ‘historical record’, its ‘politics’, etc., teleiopoetic. Teleiopoios qualifies, in a great number of contexts and semantic orders, that which renders absolute, perfect,
completed, accomplished, finished, that which brings to an end. But permit us to play too with the other tele, the one that speaks to distance and the far removed, for what is indeed in question here is a poetics of distance at one remove, and of an absolute acceleration in the spanning of space by the very structure of the sentence (it begins at the end, it is initiated with the signature of the other).

This is enactment.

The reach of the positive concept of enactment or teleiopoesis also explains Derrida’s perhaps excessively laboured exposure of Lacan’s decontextualising of Poe’s (1844/1982) dramatisation in The Purloined Letter (Derrida, 1987, chapter, Le Facteur de la Vérité).

Derrida argued previously (Derrida, 1987: 371-2) that Freud, in his use of Aristophanes’ myth of eros, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, is theorising totally without regard to the enactive context of the setting in which the theory is enunciated. In avoiding the significance of its reference to Aristophanes, (the enemy, the betrayer, the satirist, the Other to Plato’s Socrates), Freud’s avoidance itself has huge enactive significance. This is extended to Lacan also [note vii].

The enactive implication, then, is that the analyst cannot avoid being wholly implicated in the analysis he/she seeks to objectify. Clearly that has to apply, not only to Lacan, but to the waspish intent of Derrida also in relation to Lacan, and indeed to Derrida’s entire ‘mimesis’ of Freud (and the ‘mimesis’ of deconstruction in general), in work after work, obsessively.

A simple principle, enactment’s basic application to psychotherapy and poetry is fairly easily grasped, but its scope – both in theory of psychotherapy, and in literary, theological, and philosophical understandings – is vast and complex. Enactment enables a thorough
revaluation of descriptive understandings of both the world, and of relevant spheres of discourse. At the same time it embraces both ethics and aesthetics as a unified sphere of evaluative enquiries (c.f., Wilkinson, 2003a, and Wilkinson, In Press).

It also sheds light on psychoanalysis, on para-analytic approaches such as Gestalt and Psychodrama, and also on the alchemical development of Jung’s psychology. We can, for example, view transference as enactment (e.g., Joseph, 1989), as the inherent medium of the work or ‘opus’, of the process of transformation in the work [note viii], without attempting to try to reduce it to some other system of knowledge, be it developmental theory, libido theory, or contact theory in Gestalt (Perls, et al., 1951/1994) and in Reich (c.f., Totton, 1998). We can also, non-reductively, do justice to the understanding of frame and context, of which Erving Goffman (1974/1986) wrote so profoundly, as not extraneous to, but inherent in, the full apprehension of transference/countertransference. Thus transference/countertransference emerges as part of a multi-faceted whole which is, in a broad sense, always transferential, since enactivity is the realm of the work and its process.

In what follows, I sketch all too briefly some more concrete terms of praxis of what a Derridean psychotherapy might look like.

Derridean Psychotherapy: Who writes whom?

Taking psychoanalysis as point of reference, I outline some features of a possible Derridian psychotherapy. First, our understanding of frame opens out. We cannot absolutely privilege
certain paradigms of neutrality; they are only apparently neutral. The intersection of frame and process is profound, and is constantly being enacted and re-enacted. How we reflexively address the process as such is what counts. Acting out – or acting in – is an altered concept and it is half dissolved. It cannot be absolutised, so is replaced by a more pragmatic spectrum of tolerability and containment.

In a Derridian psychotherapy, interpretation would be fine, but not paramount; the rule of thumb would be to honour the client’s sense of justice by negotiating around interpretation, - such a powerful form of intervention, comparable to touch, - if at all possible. Personhood and mutuality in the process become crucial – but in very specific, historically contextual, forms, not as contextless absolutes, and with an awareness of multiplicity and self-synthesis as a process. There will be a massively increased emphasis on context in the work, in general. There will be, as a corollary, a de facto pluralism of method – based on taste and individuality, not just of the client but the therapist also, thus integrative - but not predetermined in its mode. The relational base is important but not a shibboleth either, especially for those with elements of autism in their nature whose ‘relationship with relationship’ may be different.

Therapeutic work will be experimental in certain aspects, made up as we go along. Drama, play, humour, enactive elements in general, take on more central roles. There will be a strong emphasis on countertransference – but in a broadened sense (Searles, 1999, being nearest to mapping this). Therapeutic goals will be as open as possible, determined substantially by the client – again, on a basis of contractual justice.
I end with two examples, first a brief vignette of live work, and then a partially or quasi-fictional example of how this might work at the counter-transference level. Counter-transference is understood as enactment, evoking the other aspect of enactment in mimesis.

First Example

I have a client who, like me, regards Dostoeivsky as the ne pus ultra of novelists, and as perhaps the single human being who has most endured the sight and feeling of the terribleness and sheer brutal horror of human existence. My client does idealise him, and me, and his tendency to idealisation is linked to his predicament. This is the background to what transpired. In the course of conversation which had touched upon creativity and dramatic art and experience, including Shakespeare, we reached Dostoeivsky, and he remarked, very earnestly and shyly, with a pause in the middle, as if whispering a secret: “But I have realised that in Dostoievsky – there are some cracks…” I chuckled and paused, and then said, “But, - you know, - no one’s perfect.”

We both fell about laughing. What was the joke? Very hard to explain! Something about the extreme contrast between Dostoievsky’s supreme greatness and the hyperbolic perfectionism that would find fault even with him – and, in a sense, thus, even with life itself! Such a moment is impossible to capture (even for myself in retrospect), virtually impossible to explain, because it depends on the ramifications and idiosyncrasy of persons, and context, depends on enactivity. In its accessing universal themes, and in its participation in language, in iterability, the enactment transcends the moment, as a poem transcends the moment. But this embraces also ‘real life enactivity’, as, for instance, Boswell’s dramatic evocations

**Second Example**

A nearly silent session with a silent client…

Enactments at the level of countertransference…

I imagine something vaguely erotic…

I then experience a sense of paralysis and frozenness…

Against that background I consider my erotic image…

It is as if it is excluded by the frozenness of what I suddenly recognise as shame…

Images of shrivelling and frozen breaking up with such a hard frost come to me…

I share with my client an image of the perma-frost…

She nods assent – recognising this completely as a conveying of the atmosphere…

After scanning the element of risk in saying this, I say I can imagine the spring that is to come…

I see the ghost of a smile on her face and her colour changes but she remains silent…

I am certain she has sensed the erotic connotations and I feel a connection and a warming…

Now I can hear the thunder of the melting waters beneath the ice…

I share my image with her…

She smiles again…

I am aware I am beginning to write a poem in my mind…

Her silence has not been broken…

But the spring poem has begun to be written…
I think of Tolstoy’s *Anna Karenina* and the Russian spring…

A Russian winter lay across Tolstoy’s own soul…

Tolstoy tried to shout down his eros…

In her silence her eros is free to unfold…

I think of Cordelia, Lear on his ‘wheel of fire’ of shame…

And Tolstoy’s hatred of *King Lear*…

Winston Smith’s wonderfully Blakean dream in Orwell’s *1984*…

Suddenly he was standing on short springy turf, on a summer evening when the slanting rays of the sun gilded the ground. The landscape that he was looking at recurred so often in his dreams that he was never fully certain whether or not he had seen it in the real world. In his waking thoughts he called it the Golden Country. It was an old, rabbit-bitten pasture, with a foot-track wandering across it and a molehill here and there. In the ragged hedge on the opposite side of the field the boughs of the elm trees were swaying very faintly in the breeze, their leaves just stirring in dense masses like women’s hair. Somewhere near at hand, though out of sight, there was a clear, slow-moving stream where dace were swimming in the pools under the willow trees.

The girl with dark hair was coming towards them across the field. With what seemed a single movement she tore off her clothes and flung them disdainfully aside. Her body was white and smooth, but it aroused no desire in him, indeed he barely looked at it. What overwhelmed him in that instant was admiration for the gesture with which she had thrown her clothes aside. With its grace and carelessness it seemed to annihilate a
whole culture, a whole system of thought, as though Big Brother and the Party and the Thought Police could all be swept into nothingness by a single splendid movement of the arm. That too was a gesture belonging to the ancient time. Winston woke up with the word ‘Shakespeare’ on his lips.

And I think of the affirmation of desire in Blake’s *Ah Sunflower!*

My client looks at me dewy eyed – and sighs deeply and contentedly…

Without a word, she has welcomed her eros…

No more need be said…

The session ends.

I am able to process my images to the point where I can offer her part of one of them – the perma-frost. My relationship with her is such that I know, normally, what she will comfortably receive from me, and this is one such. I then risk mentioning the spring to come – and again she receives this. The third image I share is of the thundering melt-waters beneath the ice. For a third time she receives [note ix]. Then, because she has received my comments and images, I am free to become aware of the poetic flow of my thoughts, and I simply allow them to unfold, and of their own sequence they pass from the Tolstoyan winter in relation to eros to the Shakespearean and Blakean spring and awakening. The flow engages us both at the embodied level without the need of words, but expressed in her dewy-eyed sigh of welcome – which of course is, at the subtlest level, erotic arousal and satisfaction. For the moment, she has passed beyond shame.

These connections of the poem have come up just here; even though the pathway was
familiar, but unexpected was the passage into the recognition of Tolstoy’s own shame and shouting down of his own eros, and the greater creativity (and eros) of Shakespeare’s Cordelia. The shame of eros is as equally present in Blake as the release of eros. The range of cross-connections is so vast it is not possible except as an enactment, and as writing.

This, then, might be a little of how one – broadly integrative – version of a Derridean psychotherapy might look like.


**Notes**

i. Enactment in this extended sense is not Derrida’s term, but mine via FR Leavis, (e.g., Leavis, 1952/1962, pp. 110-111). When I say ‘mine’ or ‘my’ in what follows, it is with this proviso. The speech act term “performativity” Derrida modifies from J. L. Austin (1962).


iii. From Violence and Metaphysics, by far the longest essay in his Writing and Difference from 1967 (Derrida, 1978a), onwards.

iv. Compare a similar system of assumptions when Wittgenstein, in §244/5 of Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 1967) writes:

> How do words refer to sensations? – There doesn’t seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about sensations every day, and give them names?

> But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up? This
question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the
names of sensations? - of the word ‘pain’ for example? Here is one possibility:

words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the
sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and
then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child
new pain behaviour.

“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying? – On the contrary: the
verbal

expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

v. I am most grateful to Alice Lombardo Maher for drawing my attention to this prototype of
the distinction in Aristotle.

vi. This all relates to my account of what previously I called ‘phenomenological causality’

to Lacan’s analysis of EA Poe’s The Purloined Letter (c.f., Forrester, 1991, for an account
creatively sympathetic to both parties; Dews, op. cit., aligns himself fairly vigorously with
Lacan), and urges that Lacan’s restriction of the enactment concept also is an enactment, as is

viii. Darlene Bregman-Ehrenberg, in a remarkable book, comes closest to this conception in
ix. And then the cock crowed! The signifiers multiply – as they do in enactments. I realised only afterwards that this composition had echoed Peter’s three denials in John’s Gospel – which turns my thoughts also to the resurrection of the flesh in DH Lawrence’s The Man who Died. I also realised I was walking in the footprints of Derrida’s account (1987: 295-6), in The Postcard, of Freud’s, this time, four dismissals, of any ‘beyond’ of the Pleasure Principle in chapter 2 of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.
References


METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST


METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTARY ON THE MUSE AS THERAPIST


< http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/Episodesand Scenes.pdf >


Appendix B

Presentation of work done in relation to the UKCP Conference and Publication, *About a Body*, as equivalent to one Professional Knowledge Seminar

As Chair or Co-Chair (with Jenny Corrigall) of the UKCP Professional Conference Committee, I was co-responsible for organising at least four Professional Conferences, two of which (*Revolutionary Connections: Psychotherapy and Neuroscience*; and *About A body: Working with the Embodied Mind in Psychotherapy*) were then edited into the form of books.

There is an art, which we had learnt the hard way in UKCP, in setting in motion a reasonably successful conference; there needed to be a clinical theme, a catchy title, at least one internationally known keynote speaker, a good blend of contributions in relation to the chosen theme, neither too specialist nor over-eclectic, a pleasing venue with reasonable access, but not overwhelmingly expensive, - and a weather eye needed to be kept on finances,

One of the most successful of these, the one, I believe, which produced the best book, and the one which Courtenay Young has said put Body Psychotherapy on the map in the UK, by way of national recognition, for the first time, was the UKCP Conference on *About a Body*, which took place at Robinson College Cambridge in 2004. The book of the same title, co-edited with Jenny Corrigall and Helen Payne, was produced in 2006. I wrote the introduction, which was praised by Cathy Kaplinsky in her review of it for the *Journal of Analytical Psychology* in 2008


as a masterly survey of the philosophical intricacies evoked by the different approaches to the
body, and different understandings of embodiment, developed at this conference, from neo-Darwinian, as in Jaak Panksepp’s contributions, to full-blooded spiritual-phenomenological understandings, such as those derived from Buddhism presented by Maura Sills.

In both the Conference and the subsequent introduction to the book, I was exploring how knowledge is both developed into awareness and full realisation, and in the conference encounters how that is also expressed in dialogue.

The main contents of the Conference were as follows (somewhat supplemented in the book)

http://www.routledge.com/books/About-a-Body-isbn9780415400725


**Susie Orbach, Roz Carroll**, Contemporary Approaches to the Body in Psychotherapy: Two Psychotherapists in Dialogue.

**Courtenay Young**, One Hundred and Fifty Years On: The History, Significance and Scope of Body Psychotherapy Today.

**Phil Mollon**, Implications of EMDR and Energy Therapies: The Limits of Talking Therapy.

**Michael Soth**, What Therapeutic Hope for a Subjective Mind in an Objectified Body?

**Gerda Boyesen**, How I Developed Biodynamic Psychotherapy.

**Claudia Herbert**, Healing from Complex Trauma: An Integrative 3-Systems’ Approach.

**Helen Payne**, The Body as Container and Expresser: Authentic Movement Groups in the
Joy Schaverien, Transference and the Meaning of Touch: The Body in Psychotherapy with the Client Who is Facing Death.

Maura Sills, ‘In This Body, a Fathom Long..’: Working with Embodied Mind and Interbeing in Psychotherapy.

Beverley Zabriskie, When Psyche Meets Soma: The Question of Incarnation.

For me, to give the most vivid illustration of the kind of creative dialogue which took place, the dialogue between Roz Carroll and Susie Orbach, (reproduced, much as it took place, in the book), evoked in particular an extremely vivid ‘embodied counter-transference’ in the resulting discussion, which I would now characterise as an enactment in both the psychoanalytic, and the poetic, senses of the concept. My question to them (‘Questioner 6’ in the book, pp. 79-80) particularly concerned the holistic conception of the embodied ‘It’ in Groddeck’s (not Freud’s) conception of it, which I also raised at Ken Evans’s Professional Knowledge Seminar on the Dialogical.

I developed this dimension in The Muse as Therapist as ‘the Pre-Communicable’ (which later in the book I elaborated in connection with the three dimensions of the later Freudian metapsychology). The question was answered in relational terms by both Orbach and Carroll, as it was by implication in his seminar by Ken Evans. It was pushing forward to something more than the purely relational-developmental concept, though the question was still heard in those terms.

So, in pursuing Groddeck’s conception of the ‘It’ thus tenaciously, I was already persistently...
seeking an alternative (‘third’) paradigm from i. the purely developmental-relational, and
ii. the purely language-dominated which, conversely, figures in the Lacanian model. In
referring to this, as evinced in the dialogue with Susie Orbach and Roz Carroll in particular,
I am trying to communicate how the development of my conceptualisation of the pre-
communicable, the primary thing which eventually led on to the enactment realisation
of my book, was addressing the process of realisation and articulation, and coming into
awareness, of my own insights, the emerging poetic paradigm. This was how professional
knowledge was being gained, refined, elaborated. corrected, and used, for me.

Therefore, the present commentary, on this conference, is a chipping off the fundamental
process I explore in the Methodological Commentary, which is a study of creativity and
creative discovery as enactment, as it led up to and was realised in the achievement of my
book. The wrestling with the ‘It’ formulation, in relation to Groddeck, is one of the iconic
foci by which I gradually teased out my insight, and gradually gained reflexive and, in a
sense, poetic organisation of the totality of my themes, so as to bring them into a unity. This
was still being worked for at that time, as indeed it was in the RAL 5 presentation, which
I connect it with, because it too is an attempt (and parallel illustration) to draw my insight
together into a unity, in which the Stern review article

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/SternReview.pdf

is a key exhibit, and a further illustration of how near I was, and yet how far I still was, at
that point. The RAL 5 synopsis is bespattered with references to enactment and yet I still, in
October 2005, as in Episodes and Scenes, had not grasped it as the linchpin of the insight,
which really I only properly achieved in chapter Five of The Muse as Therapist.
It is clear, from the responses of both speakers, that my question was felt to be pertinent, especially in Susie Orbach’s final remark, about being willing to think of herself as a body psychoanalyst, even though they both translated it into relational terms. I myself also had published a review article on Nick Totton’s book *The Water in the Glass*, to which Roz Carroll refers, in 2000, which lay in the background of the developments I was making during the Doctorate:

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/TottonReview.pdf

So, my question, and the ensuing dialogue, went as follows:

HW: “This is more to Susie but I would also be intrigued by Roz’s take on it. Wittgenstein said that the best picture of the human soul ‘Seele’ (the word Freud would have used) is the human body and I’ve been racking my brain as somebody who’s crossed the floor from the psychoanalytic section to humanistic and integrative section, but still has very deep roots in psychoanalysis, what is it that makes you still a psychoanalyst in everything you are saying and this is a rather sloganeering formulation but nevertheless…”

Susie: “You’re inviting me over?”

HW: “No, no, no, I actually came to a conclusion which I would actually be interested in your response to and as I say it is a bit stereotyped and over simple, but it struck me much of what you are saying is very similar to what someone like Groddeck would say in terms of the id being manifest simultaneously…”
Susie: “The what being manifest?”

HW: The id, Das Es, you know Freud wrote a book called ‘Das Es und….’

Susie: “Yeah…”

HW: “Groddeck was the originator of that notion and he had a holistic notion of the id as a totality encompassing all, rather than a segment that was walled off by repression, which was Freud’s notion. And what came to me was that in a sense you were speaking of something like the id as it manifests through the body as its meaning and therefore, again this is sloganeering, what struck me is that you are becoming a body psychoanalyst.”

Susie: “Well, thank you very much. The only problem with that is that I don’t go for the formulation of the id. I mean, contemporary psychoanalysis, at least the school that I belong to, doesn’t use those categories at all. Incidentally, I should just say I did come from humanistic psychology.”

Roz: “I just wanted to say, I think psychoanalysis is at a turning point and the relational psychoanalytical field marks a new way (Mitchell and Aron, 1999). We don’t know where that new way will go, but I want to bring in what Nick Totton (1998) has said, and others have said this too, that Freud was attempting a body psychotherapy, and he got stuck and the tradition carried on with Reich (1972), and Perls et al. (1951). Perhaps with this new integration with this new dialogue between you and me and others there will be another form of body psychotherapy.”

Susie: “The two most important questions in our field relate to the body. One is about how we get a body, that’s my question, and the other is what is sex, and the erotic? I think they are
terribly interesting questions, and we need serious study groups to try and understand those.

I’m very happy to be called a body psychoanalyst.”

My introduction to *About a Body*, written in 2006, is completely comfortable with the neo-Darwinian/phenomenological-spirituality spectrum – and yet there is not yet a hint in it of the concept of enactment as I now formulate it, despite the fact that, as I say, in my RPPL *Episodes and Scenes* of 2005 I had already framed this concept.

[http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf](http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/EpisodesandScenes.pdf)

So hard is it to grasp and hold on to ones own insights!

In this piece, writing about Michael Soth’s presentation, I even wrote:

> Soth pursues a narrative as a kind of parable. The parable he is telling is that of convergence – convergence of the whole multiplicity of aspects of the self, in the context of the relational experience of re-enactment.

This is the recognition of what, once it is clearly conceptualised as poetic process, the concept of enactment develops into, in the poetic paradigm, containing within itself the conception of the pre-communicable. But here I am still using something like the psychoanalytic concept, of enactment as *re*-enactment; I have not yet crossed into that awareness, although it is on the cusp of such awareness. The Introduction is thus, along with my participation in the Conference, an illuminating staging post on my way, to go with the steps I progressively took in my formulations within the Doctorate.