Metanoia Psychotherapy Doctorate

*A Terrible Beauty is Born: The Aesthetic basis of Psychotherapy*

Review and Revaluation of my Paper on Phenomenological Causality – Submission for RAL 4

Review and Revaluation of work and papers subsequent to my Paper on Phenomenological Causality – submission for RAL 5
In what follows I present my submissions for RAL 4 and RAL 5 as successive pieces of work, with a glimpse ahead to the link to the praxis based teaching which prospectively will be encompassed in my learning agreement.

Review and Revaluation of my Paper on Phenomenological Causality – Submission for RAL 4

§1. Background
In 1997 I began to write a paper about the significance of Julian Jaynes, and his theory of the emergence of consciousness from the bicameral (hallucinatory) mind, for the International Journal of Psychotherapy. In my very first editorial in the Journal at its launch in 1996 I had mentioned Jaynes’s book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind as having an epoch-making significance which makes it comparable to The Interpretation of Dreams. I was at that time a member of a group of four of us, senior psychotherapists or university lecturers, which we called the ‘consciousness seminar’, which was organised around considering the nature and function of consciousness and related matters – usually in the genial context of good food and drink at the Royal Society of Arts, of which two of our group were members. The discussions ranged, impishly, from the sublime to the ridiculous, but some real thinking and wrestling was done, and this, along with conversations with one or two other friends, for me became a major catalyst for the explorations I am now considering.

In the process of preparation for the writing of that paper on Jaynes, and making clearer what Jaynes was about and why he is important, I found myself, in preliminary fashion, formulating a conception of psychic change. Jaynes entitles one of his chapters, ‘A change of mind in Mesopotamia’; he meant it literally, and I wanted to conceptualise the implications, as a matter of routine exposition of him, as it were.

I first casually labelled it, merely in passing, with the label which eventually became part of the title of the paper: ‘Phenomenological Causality’. But I soon realised that it was not something I could take as read, by any means, and eventually it demanded a whole paper in its own right (the beginning of an unfolding which is not yet finished), and I set about presenting the whole thing in two parts, which were published in successive years in International Journal of Psychotherapy.

In it I laid down the template which was to govern my subsequent thought, albeit in an extremely compressed way whose full significance is still unfolding for me. But this turned out to be, almost accidentally, my groundbreaking pioneer paper, the most important thing (though not the best thing) I have written, since I wrote my MA Dissertation on the Religious Studies MA Course at Lancaster University, in 1969, on ‘Kant’s Doctrine of Time’. Philosophically and psychotherapeutically it created the template for my thinking at an Advanced Research level. As an initial indication, it is phenomenological, not empirical, research, but beyond that it is foundational in a way I shall try to indicate.

I also overloaded my exposition of it with such a multitude of inferences and linkages, which I did not explain from the ground up, that it was no wonder that virtually no one made anything of it at the time. (Except that James Grotstein appreciated it, felt I was on to something important, mentioned it in his next book, and dubbed it my ‘93 theses’!). My colleagues in the consciousness seminar were amusedly baffled by it.
This overloading, with a second or third inference before the previous step has been assimilated, makes my writing in this paper very condensed and indigestible, except for anyone who has already been round these tracks many times.

But, even if expounded step by step (as far as that is possible with a conception offered as an analysis of a situation which is an ‘organic whole’), I still believe it is a difficult conception to grasp, because it is counter to Western/Anglo-Saxon canonical assumptions. My own difficulty lay first in the illusion which arose from the fact that the first steps seemed very obvious and evident.

I think I had in fact, almost inadvertently, stumbled on something so fundamental methodologically that I did not then realise its full significance, and I shall now explore this here.

§2. Methodological considerations
Despite the paper being so condensed and not fully clear as to its own intentions and scope, a central methodology is implied in it.

My general meta-level aim in this paper, as it is in the Doctorate, (though not then fully articulated), may be summed up as:

To demonstrate the philosophical basis of literary-aesthetic methodology in psychotherapy, (as well as the unrecognised breadth of the scope of, literary-aesthetic methodology in psychotherapy).

The full analysis and exploration of what literary-aesthetic methodology in psychotherapy means is the business of the Doctorate. I have also written about the higher levels of it in terms of Scenes in my RPEL presentation already submitted, ‘Scenes and Episodes’ (especially §7., et seq., see website). Here I will simply enumerate what it comprises without further analysis or justification:

1. Symbolic processes, particularly verbal forms of symbolic process, have, and enact, their own meaning and cross-referencing at their own level, and are not reducible to a quasi-positivistic causal analysis in terms of such things as units of behaviour, or developmental phases, or modes of transaction, or personality types, and so on.

2. The enactive symbolic processes involved, whether verbal or quasi-musical, cross-reference with one another, as a manifestation of process, indefinitely. (To take a corny example, if a Church is a Mother, or the Bride of Christ, c.f., Letter to the Ephesians, likewise, conversely, a Mother or a Bride may be a Temple, and indeed Paul also refers to the human body as a Temple. So there is no primary real which is the ultimate level of reference; all is reciprocal.)

3. We may take metaphor, in an extended sense, as a paradigm of such cross-referential processes. (There is a level of analysis of the aspect of enactment where music may be argued to be an even more primary paradigm – c.f., Schopenhauer, - but I postpone this complication.)

4. Classical interpretations, in Freudian or Jungian or related terms, are primarily metaphoric in this sense, even when they appear to present themselves, reifyingly, as developmental reductions, etc. Jungian interpretations are close to operating within the framework of metaphor without reductivism, except that Jung’s thinking about archetypes and the collective unconscious does involve a good deal of reifying.
5. The paradox is that the reifying process itself, that all accounts aspiring to be positive science in psychotherapy involve, is itself dependent on the metaphoric framework!

The paper on *Phenomenological Causality* set out to provide an analysis of how this fundamental ‘metaphoricity’ works, at the level of the engine room of the psyche, in terms of the process of the intentionality of temporality and its inherent causality.

So, in arguing that phenomenological or intentional causality is genuine causality, whose basis is in the temporal nature of intentionality, I was developing the basis for recognising that the primacy of literary-aesthetic meaning in the psychotherapeutic process genuinely is a form of causal analysis. What this means is that the invocation of significance, as we do it in our innumerable interactions, not only in therapy, but in daily commerce and the full spectrum of human relationships – and equally in both fiction and fact – is genuinely mutative. Words and meanings actually cause change (in particular they change feelings and energy levels in living human bodies of human beings).

Of course no one actually doubts this in practice. But people have the mistaken idea that causality lies in something more ‘real’ than meaning, or that the meaning is a mere accompaniment of physical changes, and therefore overlook it. This is the idea I am combating in all my work. My point is that ‘qualitative’ analysis, and ‘philosophical’ insight, are causal. In this paper I was laying the basis for that recognition. I addressed the heart of it, the temporal-causal nature of intentionality.

This analysis opened a space for the richness of detailed enquiry, but it itself is mainly a prolegomena to that detailed enquiry (though I had to touch on such things as the understanding of transference/countertransference in its light to illustrate the potential). As indicated, I am retrospectively clarifying something which was to a considerable extent implicit and inarticulate for me at the time. It was also one part of a developing whole whose various ‘pieces’ have only gradually manifested their inner relationship.

Since the phenomenological causality analysis of temporal intentionality overturns, in the name of another logic for which we have no analogy, our fundamental logic, but overturns it in the name precisely of temporal influence, which is ‘factual, empirical’, in the contingent realm, it occupies a ‘third realm’ between the contingent and the a priori, and by the same token between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, and so on. This ‘third realm’ concept (which Jung also calls the ‘transcendent function’) is a concept shared between thinkers as disparate as Karl Popper, DW Winnicott, FR Leavis, Derrida, and CG Jung.

As such, though it is phenomenology, it is neither simply a priori phenomenology nor simply empirical-observational phenomenology, but a third possibility. At this point there is no disjunction between psychotherapy and philosophy, psychotherapy and literary-aesthetic enactment. This is literary-aesthetic psychotherapy as practical philosophy. Phenomenological causality is the most general form of psychotherapy as practical philosophy; it is the foundational form and the foundational *dunamis* or dynamic. As such it is neither philosophy nor psychotherapy, or rather it is both.
§3. Paving the way for later developments
So, despite, or rather perhaps because of, its apparent abstractness, this paper cleared the way, methodologically, for me to explore a mixed conception of psychotherapy-cum-philosophy, and gradually to assemble a mass of commentary on approaches akin, or creatively contrasting, to mine, mapping an approach which integrated substantially psychodynamic and existential elements, but within a wider frame which embraced literature, music, philosophy and theology, and, as such, offered an alternative to the positive science model of psychotherapy. Illustrating how I put all that into practice will be a later step in this Doctorate process, and the eventual aim will be the clarification, in the light of literary-aesthetic methodology, of the relationship between psychotherapy and philosophy.

Heward Wilkinson
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http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk
A Terrible Beauty is Born: The Aesthetic basis of Psychotherapy

Review and Revaluation of work and papers subsequent to my Paper on Phenomenological Causality – submission for RAL 5

§1. Introductory
Following my paper on Phenomenological Causality I developed connected theses in many subsequent papers, and in this submission I map how it all hangs together, in the light of my intended eventual thesis for my Learning Agreement.

I pursued three related theses in a number of papers. (This statement is a retrospective approximation, since much of this work was exploratory, and I had not achieved full clarity, neither do I think they are neatly divided.)

I indicate them first, then list the relevant papers under the most appropriate section (there is much overlap) and after that I proceed to map it more fully, in the light of the overarching concept which I am labelling ‘the aesthetic basis of psychotherapy’, and also indicating the gaps and areas for further work:
1. Developments of the Phenomenological Causality thesis: Integrated Field Theory of Psychotherapy
2. The Concept of Pluralistic Integration
3. The Integration of Psychoanalysis and Existential-Phenomenological Psychotherapy

I here address the following published papers and editorials, all published in *International Journal of Psychotherapy*, (and all available on my website: [http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk](http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk)):

1. Developments of the Phenomenological Causality thesis: Integrated Field Theory of Psychotherapy
   - The Significance of Julian Jaynes and Schizophrenia (1999)
   - 'The autonomy of psychotherapy - Why psychotherapy can be subordinate neither to psychology nor psychiatry', (2003)

2. Papers on Pluralistic Integration
   - Pluralism as Scientific Method in Psychotherapy (1999)
   - The Power and Danger of Pluralism in Psychotherapy (2002)
   - 'Retrieving a posthumous text-message; Nietzsche's fall: the significance of the disputed asylum writing, 'My Sister and I'' (2002)

3. Papers on the Integration of Psychoanalysis and Existential-Phenomenological Psychotherapy
   - 'Impossible meeting: too strange to each other for misunderstanding', Review Article on Darlene Bregman Ehrenberg's The Intimate Edge (2003)


§2. Overall Mapping
Here then is a sketch of the overall cat’s cradle of connected concerns and theses.

i. Developments of the Phenomenological Causality thesis: Integrated Field Theory of Psychotherapy
The fundamental conception of the Phenomenological Causality thesis is that of grounding causation. The thesis of grounding causation postulates that our ordinary objectivised linear, spatially modelled, conceptual mappings of space time and causality are grounded in something more foundational, which can only be indicated elliptically and in via negativa fashion. This is something which can be pointed to very simply, as Augustine, and many others earlier and later, found, thinking about the most elementary aspects of the intentionality of time-awareness. As I wrote in the Phenomenological Causality paper:

‘The causality involved in psychotherapeutic process, like that involved in music, overturns the whole conventional concept of time and the present, because it affirms that every moment of such experience embraces the whole of a span of time and implicitly the whole of time, so that each moment of experience is causally related to all the others, but forwards, backwards, and sideways! In other words, it abolishes linear time concepts and linear concepts of causality.

The implicit structuring of time, as Kant partly grasped in his account of ‘imaginative synthesis’, as the basis of time structuring of experience, in the first edition of the Critique of pure reason (Kant, 1964, Heidegger, 1990), is also in a deep sense prior to our actual experience of time-succession, and is intuited and partly inferred rather than experienced; the basis of causality is beneath and outside the time-sequence. I shall refer to this dimension of the phenomenological causality hypothesis as grounding causation.’

We need not go so far as Nietzsche, as to say that all our structuring concepts of experience, such as rest and motion, and sameness and difference, are illusory fictions, to recognise that, nevertheless, they are rooted in something which we cannot conceptualise within them. We enact it - and we can allude sidelong to that enactment in innumerable ways, but we cannot conceptualise what we cannot conceptualise! (And that is more than just a tautology.) Such enactment is profoundly present in the change process of psychotherapy, and its concomitants can indeed be described, ad infinitum, but, as is said, here, ‘the map is not the territory’; nor, of course, is ‘the territory’ a something else; we just can’t conceptualise it, except in this sidelong way, that’s how it is.

In evoking that description of the concomitants, because of the interrelatedness of everything in the ‘cosmic field’, the ‘aesthetic’ dimension I shall be coming to is the
most fundamental first layer of elaboration, and social-psychological science modes are much more secondary, which means that to put all empirical forms of validation first in underpinning psychotherapy epistemically is to invert the true order.

My most sustained attempt to evoke the nature of the presence of ‘grounding causation’ in the psychotherapy change process hitherto, is the paper on Julian Jaynes, in which I construe Jaynes’s conception of the historical transition from bicameral (hallucinatory) modes of decision-making, to consciousness-based modes, in terms of the ‘grounding causation’ analysis, by particular reference to its validity in terms of the mode of the transition from schizophrenic modes of experience, to consciousness-based ones, through psychotherapeutic process. I refer to Harold Searles’s, Marion Milner’s, and Daniel Dorman’s work, in particular, but also to Piagetian understandings of the development of children’s modes of thought and imagination, and to the great movements of civilisation catalysed by the great transformers of consciousness. Socrates, Christ, the Buddha, and more modern innovators (Blake, Nietzsche, Freud, Jung, and Wittgenstein, Hegel and Heidegger), are all of them partly understandable as bicameral moving to post-bicameral. I end up with a sketch of the whole movement of civilisation understood in these terms. This is a very global and compressed paper and I only partly managed to carry out the elucidation it envisaged.

I have not directly carried further the ‘grounding causation’ analysis of the micro-process of change in psychotherapy; this would be one of the directions of further enquiry opened up by the postulate. I do come some way to returning to it in the paper on Daniel Stern, where I also revisit Jaynes, but I will return to what I was doing therein shortly.

Rather I have circled round, creating a wider context, which I envisage as the unique province of psychotherapy, in which this can all be seen. The ‘Grounding causation’ postulate is complemented by the consequent recognition of the huge breadth of the scope of mutative activity in psychotherapy, which is psychotherapy’s unique province and gift.

In ‘The autonomy of psychotherapy - Why psychotherapy can be subordinate neither to psychology nor psychiatry’ I formulated it thus: ‘Once again, the very pluralism for which psychotherapy is often taken to task would precisely be its merit! It would fundamentally be defined horizontally, relationally and contextually, in terms of its function and process, and its effortless capacity to turn virtually any form of human intellectual discipline and activity to good account, in one way and another, one form of psychotherapy and another, would fall into place as the basis of its pluralism. This would also account for its tendency to rapidly ‘fill up’ the entire ecology of the field over the hundred years or so it has been functionally nameable as such (for psychotherapy under different names has existed for thousands of years).

An inclusive general psychology

It would indeed lead us on to a new kind of general psychology and a new model of human science. This would be an account of human nature which would be inclusive, comprehensive, descriptive, non-single-discipline based, non-reductive, inclusive of the value dimension, drawing from
artistic and philosophic resources, as well as from ‘hard science’ resources, ecumenical and non-prescriptive, non-hierarchical and non-imperialising, in its trend, based upon dialogue and qualitative resources, as well as ‘factual’ and quantitative materials, which would be valued servants not masters of the process of enquiry, yet equally not rendered redundant either. Here and there today, unsystematically, there are signs of the emergence of such a general psychology and model of human science. William James’ catholic and ecumenical conception of psychology is in this mould, as is the phenomenological psychology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty……… [etc]’

I return to this wider conception in the third section.

ii. Papers on Pluralistic Integration
From this it will be seen that my concern with pluralism is also the correlate of a catholic and ecumenical conception of the field, which regards the valuing of difference, and the rigorous articulation of such difference – but in vigorous pluralistic dialogue with alternative positions, rather than the anxious protection of ‘church’ doctrine in psychotherapy - as the means to an inclusive conception of the field facilitating mutual learning in it and its growth. I am not going to explore these papers here in detail, as the general idea is quite clear enough. But I shall touch on the further dimension of this again briefly after considering the more detailed exploration of these general conceptions in relation to the integration of psychoanalysis and existential-phenomenological psychotherapeutic approaches, which leads us on to the recognition of the aesthetic basis of psychotherapy, and thence to a higher level understanding of the pluralistic concern.

iii. Papers on the Integration of Psychoanalysis and Existential-Phenomenological Psychotherapy
These papers have the following major elements, among others:
A. They display the multiplicitous and asymmetrical complexity of the elements psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are concerned with and the methods they use.

In 'An inspired resurrection of Freudian drive theory: but does Nick Totton's Reichian 'bodymind' concept supersede Cartesian dualism?': Review article on Nick Totton's ‘The Water in the Glass: body and mind in psychoanalysis’, I seek to demonstrate that Freud himself inescapably is entangled with all those complexities, envisaging at least three major shifts in theory and focus in his lifework, embracing the three major elements of energy, relationship, and significance in his evolution, in a way which leaves us and psychotherapy creatively dependent on Descartes’ invention of the phenomenological approach to the psyche (often assumed to be superseded, but actually crucial to our defining psychotherapy’s uniqueness).

In ‘Psychoanalysis as Finite Psychoanalysis as Infinite: Psychoanalysis’ Religious Potential: Review Article on 'Who is the Dreamer who Dreams the Dream?', by James S. Grotstein’, on the basis of an elucidation of Grotstein’s extraordinary book, I seek to show that, in its implication of cross-referentiality, psychoanalysis, including Jungian analysis, in a way which allies psychoanalysis with, not differentiates it from, existentially-based psychotherapy, that is, nearly all the humanistic and integrative psychotherapies, invokes possibly the three major different kinds of philosophical infinite – Kantian, Hegelian, and Post-Modern/Textual – which are all present in the psychoanalytic tradition, though in no simple symmetrical way.
In the ‘Conjoint Review’ I draw from Stephen Mitchell to map the ethical levels of intervention in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, in a way which draws from developmental levels in a manner analogous to Kohlberg’s, and at the same time point to the complexity which leads naturally to integrative approaches.

In both 'Impossible meeting: too strange to each other for misunderstanding', Review Article on Darlene Bregman Ehrenberg's 'The Intimate Edge' , and 'The Shadow of Freud: Is Daniel Stern still a psychoanalyst? The creative tension between the present and the past in psychoanalytic and existential psychotherapies, in Daniel Stern's 'The Present Moment', and his humanistic- existential partners in dialogue', Review Article on Daniel Stern's 'The Present Moment: In Psychotherapy and Everyday Life' and 'Creative License: the art of Gestalt Therapy', M. Spaniolo Lobb, and N. Amendt-Lyon, Eds’, I tackle the relation between past understanding and interpretation, and present moment based process intervention, in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. I challenge a whole cluster of spectrum differentiations, which are reified into dichotomies by even someone as subtle and intelligent as Daniel Stern. But the Stern paper in particular leads on to a wider envisaging and synthesis to which I shall now turn.

B. These papers also gradually evolve the basis for the literary or aesthetic basis for psychotherapy and psychoanalysis I am trying to adumbrate, and which merges with the wider conception of the mutative process and of scientific psychology I referred to above. The Stern paper in particular welds these elements into a whole fairly clearly, where also the function of my invocation of Jaynes, as equating the bicameral with the inherently social and ‘non-private’, once more, becomes clearer. In a passage (which I shall comment upon) which gives quite a good synopsis of the point I have now reached, I summarised the whole thing as follows (though in rather long sentences with many sub-clauses):

This opens the way, in the light of the history of consciousness offered us by Jaynes, which enables us to understand the derivative nature of ‘privacy’ in a Wittgensteinian way (Wittgenstein, 1967), to take a view from a wider perspective. In our total perspective, from where we are now, we have reflexive consciousness; we have access to the poetics, the epos, of language, which can evoke the sensory-implicit in the way Stern thinks we have lost, as well as the prose abstractions and general logic aspects of language; we are able to grasp that the kind of partial repression of signifiers, with which the most subtle psychoanalysis is concerned, invokes a many layered conception of language, which is entangled with the time concept through deferral (see, e.g., Poe, op. cit., or Macbeth, the great speech at the beginning of Act 1, Scene 7, and, on time structuring, the whole play (Shakespeare) ), and that, therefore, the ‘present moment’ is only very rarely, if at all, totally ‘present moment’ (subject to reservations from the field of mystical experience, to be sure); we can grasp that there is the most subtle play between forms of relationship in therapeutic work (Clarkson, 2002), the transferential, the therapeutic alliance, the I – Thou of dialogue, the developmentally corrective, the sacred or alchemical relationship in the context of religious rite or process, in some sense, (of which arguably the psychotherapy relationship is a low-key instance); in the subtle interplay of all of these the depth of process emerges in the work,
and the shifts are manifold and unfathomable. It seems a gross narrowing of perspective, then, to say this is either primarily conscious (non-conscious, implicit), or primarily unconscious; both concepts have their place, but so does that of a total communication network, in frame, partly fictitious, partly actual or real (in the mentioned paper in ‘Creative License’ Wheeler explores this skilfully), of which the overt ‘present moment’ relationship is but one manifestation, and which remains comprehensively the medium of psychodynamic effects.

In the light of this the ‘present moment’ emphasis becomes an heuristic one, an enormously important methodological emphasis, but part of an integrated approach. Nor does it have quite the metaphysical primacy Stern seems here and there to imply (though that is a long discussion for another time).

Is this psychoanalysis? Freud wrote to Groddeck (Groddeck, 1988) that the defining features of psychoanalysis were transference, resistance, and the unconscious. In such work as we are now envisaging, upon a spectrum, transference oscillates with dialogue; resistance oscillates with play; and unconscious or non-conscious are part of a total spectrum, to which total access even in principle is contradictory, but which exerts its awesome pressure moment by moment in our work, wherein we both study the sacred ‘Holy Writ’ of the ‘present moment’, — but in the company of angels, of the whole encompassing ‘kosmos’ of our human, animal, and cultural history brought to its head in this Kierkegaardian ‘instant’, or the ‘Moment’ of Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (cf., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part III, On the Vision and the Riddle, Nietzsche, 1883); and all of these are in continuity with what has been known as psychoanalyis; and constant and endless dynamic effects, in the fullest psychoanalytic sense (this is the core psychoanalytic discovery, not repression), play through all aspects of the process. And in the light of this, also, the distinction between ‘active’ and ‘verbal’ psychotherapies becomes minor, by comparison with the vast processes of pattern-enactments and explorations, and pattern transcendings, in the work.’

Here the manifold complexities in the psychoanalysis/psychotherapy field are absorbed into the wider conception of science, and both are interwoven with an understanding of the cross-referential totality which envisages it as an aesthetic, indeed in Nietzsche’s sense, a Dionysian whole – that Dionysian whole envisaged in Yeats’s ‘terrible beauty’. And here we come full circle, for I invoked Nietzsche’s ‘Eternal Return’ concept, in ‘The Vision and the Riddle’, wherein, I think, in his own way, he appeals to the peculiar logic I was wrestling with in the concept of ‘grounding causation’:

‘And are not all things closely bound together in such wise that This Moment draweth all coming things after it? Consequently—itslf also?
For whatever can run its course of all things, also in this long lane outward—must it once more run!—
And this slow spider which creepeth in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and thou and I in this gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things—must we not all have already existed?’
Behind that sense of total interrelatedness, which I invoked in the above passage, lies the mystery, the unspeakability, at the heart of process and of the enigma of unfathomable change, which I labelled ‘grounding causation’. And here we likewise return to the conception of pluralism as being also a perspective which enables us to glimpse a belief-free non-ideological psychotherapy, in which specific beliefs and world views are treated as gigantic experiments for exploration, and to be inhabited with an element of ‘as if’ freedom, which enables their meaning to be assimilated, whilst the dogmatic frame is suspended. This somewhat Hindu feeling kind of conception, of a kind of Shiva’s dance of beliefs at the heart of psychotherapy, is most fully expressed in my paper on Nietzsche’s posthumous asylum writing, 'Retrieving a posthumous text-message; Nietzsche's fall: the significance of the disputed asylum writing, 'My Sister and I’’. In the novel I hope to write after this doctorate a novelistic commentary on this extraordinary book is envisaged.

Thus all three elements of my approach are drawn into the framework of the overall aesthetic conception of the basis of psychotherapy.

In the philosophy and psychotherapy seminars I am offering next spring and summer I propose to put this general vehicle to the road test of praxis-based teaching.

Heward Wilkinson
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http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk

http://www.julianjaynes.org/

http://hewardwilkinson.co.uk/PhenomenologicalCausality.pdf