I was drawn to the title of this book, *Separation and creativity: refining the lost language of childhood*, because I have lost a language, my ‘mother tongue’, coming as I do from a Welsh background, when it was a requirement of the vast majority of schools that education be taught through the medium of English; this entailed, for many of us, relinquishing our mother tongue, with an accompanying loss of identity. Unlike L. Wolfson, in ‘Le schizo et les langues’ (1970), cited by Mannoni (p. 54), ‘[who] cannot bear to hear his mother speak and therefore begins to convert the words of his native language into foreign ones’, Welsh children were forced to give up the language of their heart, enforcing a premature and often permanent separation from the mother, father, family and community. Maud Mannoni, in this book, is of course not so much concerned with the consequences of the literal loss of a language of childhood, as with the loss or the non-establishment of language as a potentially creative expression of the distress and horror that may be experienced in childhood.

Maud Mannoni was a Lacanian analyst who worked with children, often children with learning difficulties whom she tried to understand in terms of the child’s history within the family. Through the play, art and the talking of therapy, Mannoni made contact with the child’s disturbance and ‘inner psychic-body reality’ (p. viii), to better understand the meaning of the child’s illness for the family. Her work at Bonneuil, a school she established in 1969, was reminiscent of the contemporary challenge to psychiatry being made in England by R. D. Laing and David Cooper. In Bonneuil:

> We had to ensure the existence of a permanent frame in which free expression could be maintained, a frame that reflects the way in which human beings deal with aggressivity. If the frame is not maintained the patient finds himself alone in his fantasy world, and when he suddenly loses the container for his anxiety, he acts out ...

In each studio, the session opened with a mythic ritual serving to bring the children together. What they did after that was up to them. Speech can arise from the field of language, but not from cacophony. (pp. xxi–xxii)

The child’s creative space was protected from the demands of the world; psychotherapy was kept separate from education. The children were required to deal with the difficulties of the outside world while at the same time being encouraged to find a means of expressing verbally their most primitive fears and destructive urges; this was in keeping with Lacan’s emphasis on the role of language and speaking in the formation of the ‘subject’ and intersubjectivity. Mannoni emphasises the way in which the mother and presumably both parents’ histories and fantasy are written into the child’s symptoms, body image, language play and creative endeavour. She focuses her attention on the way in which the desire and the demands of ‘the Other’, for the child, the mother and father, influences the formation of the symptoms, the desire...
and identity of the child. She seeks to free the child from the suffocating effect of the parents’ anxiety and desires by helping the child find a language of his or her own, so that empty speech (parole vide) might become full speech (parole pleine).

Central to Mannoni’s therapeutic approach is the cultivation of the capacity to play. Like Winnicott, with whom she makes a bridge and to whom she acknowledges a debt, she emphasises the vital function of play as a condition for the truth of the ‘subject’ and as a means to ensure a successful transition back and forth from dependence to independence. A child whose sense of trust has broken down can no longer transcend loss by experiencing separation as a pleasure to be relished. Citing Winnicott, she speaks of a stage in which the infant creates the object, the breast that he can rediscover later. The child loses a sense of omnipotence through being able to ‘use his object’, a loss that occurs as a consequence of aggression in fantasy and the survival of the object in reality. The loss of omnipotence admits the possibility of symbolisation.

Elaborating on a Lacanian view of early development and the process that leads to a sense of separation, she quotes a colleague, Francoise Dolto (1981), who said:

at first the child does not have the object; he is it: the lost object is the self. It is only after the mirror stage (see: Jacques Lacan (1949). ‘The mirror stage as formative of the function of the “I”) that the subject becomes a “me for a you”, “a me with you”. It now becomes possible to divide up “having” so that the child can have the breast, on the assumption he is not it. (p. 5)

Overcoming the trauma of separation requires an act of the imagination. However, not everyone, however gifted they may be, can create something of artistic value that overcomes trauma, for this may require the recreation of the initial experience of distress.

Still others remain prisoners of their trauma, brooding over it monotonously ... For such patients it as though their activity were cut off from life. (p. 6)

She discusses the relationship between the childhood distress of various authors including Edgar Allen Poe, Edith Wharton and Hans Christian Andersen and the freedom they found in their various creations. In contrast, she describes the difficulty encountered by sufferers of severe trauma, such as that experienced by Holocaust survivors, in being able to find the ability to play creatively, a consequence of the humiliation of being rendered helpless, in the face of extreme terror. For those who have suffered in such extreme situations speaking may bring no relief.

What remains unsaid remains a wound that is handed down from generation to generation, a wound of memory the effect of which is to rob the victim of the pleasure in life. (p. 31)

She is at her best when she speaks of the extremes of human suffering. Her compassion and the acuity of her understanding of the depths of the human mind come to the fore. In the chapter ‘The survivors of genocide’ she speaks of how survivors of internment cannot mourn; they shift the experience away from themselves until it returns to possess them. Their memories and dreams are out of reach. Until they can recover the hope of being understood, they cannot speak of their memories; it is through the recovery of memory that their children are freed to live normal lives. The children of the survivors of terror are themselves constrained from play by their parents’ anxiety. These children have to construct a false self (Winnicott, 1960): ‘based on that of a mother who cannot locate herself on the side of life, given her own pre-
occupation with her own problems of hatred and death’ (p. 38).

Survivors feel as if they owe their own lives to those who have died. Their children carry a heavy burden of guilt they scarcely comprehend.

A past cannot be erased; its ghosts quickly catch up with you and break out into the real. Survival is experienced as a mistake, and the more heavily silence weighs on the trauma, the more the subject pays the price in various symptoms. It is only when the trauma is finally expressed in words that mourning can take place; as a result reparative forces can be employed in the service of pleasure or simply of permission to live. Otherwise any success or satisfaction will produce depression, somatisation or the need for failure. (p. 44)

Without grief there can be no joy, no pleasure in life that enables an individual to flower. Integration, birth into a body differentiated from the mother, can only take place through mourning, a grief we have to experience at each phase of life: ‘a lifelong mourning process in which at each stage, a certain quality of relationship has to be given up, never to be found again’ (p. 74).

The mother has to mourn the baby she has carried inside her. The space for play created between mother and baby, uniting and separating them, calls forth creativity that makes loss bearable. Mannoni stresses the importance of Winnicott’s ideas about the importance of the maternal environment, on the need for the foundation of being to emerge out of symbiotic relatedness. If the mother-part is dead or no longer exists, there is a ‘decathected psychic space’ (p. 80); the individual is cut off from himself, from his imagination and from his dreams and desire. She acknowledges the importance of his ideas on play: ‘the infant does not find the object if the environment does not give him the opportunity to be alive amid the objects surrounding him. Creative play and self-fulfilment arise from moments of relaxation’ (p. 82).

The infant needs to be reflected in his mother’s face; if the mother is indifferent, the baby can collapse into chaos and become inhabited by the death instinct. It is the mother’s capacity for joy in her own life and that of her baby that enables creative play and authentic being.

As Winnicott (1971) observes, creation is not the same thing as works of art. The creativity that interests Winnicott entails a certain joie de vivre and presupposes an inner world in which peace and war alternate. (p. 93)

But Mannoni also stresses the importance of the symbolic matrix of the triangular structure of mother/father/child, which the child needs in order to locate himself securely within a circuit of human exchanges. In addition, she emphasises the vital function of language, to symbolise and share the emotions experienced, but not always understood by the child. The child who cannot find a sense of safety cannot develop trust. Such a child cannot play without fear of being flooded by feelings of persecution and thus becomes incapable of an imaginative life, cuts off from all that is authentic, and seeks refuge in a false-self structure. The child has difficulty with speech, refusing communication or communicating only what is expected of him; his speech is ‘empty’. For Lacan:

the aim of analysis is to give the subject access to full speech and thereby to a fuller authenticity, which can occur through speech that has been loosened from its moorings. When the subject’s speech is thus reworked in analysis, it becomes possible for him to recognise his desire. (p. 94)

The child is in bondage to the language of others; for Lacan and Mannoni, play can be a playing with words that enables the symp-
tom to speak and the patient to free himself.

While acknowledging a debt to Winnicott, Mannoni implicitly criticises him frequently, using her husband’s voice, notably in the chapter entitled ‘The symbolic dimension of play’:

Octave Mannoni (1980) stresses the difference between the Winnicottian object that fills the gap left by absence and the Freudian object that opens out onto the ‘witz’, the joke. While Freud tried to give a rational explanation for play on the basis of the joke, for Winnicott rational thought itself is derived from play. These different positions suggest two contrasting pedagogical approaches: either teachers use achievement orientated techniques to promote an increasing adaptation to reality or they listen to the nonsense of desire. Now, Octave continues, we have no guarantee that the world will reject a frenzied pursuit of adaptation; if it does not do so, there will be only one universe of false selves (including analysts) congratulating themselves and one another. (p. 99)

By Winnicottian object, I presume she is referring to his idea of the transitional object which this statement infers is a kind of fetish; the transitional object certainly is not a fetish.

Furthermore, it is a complete and wilful misreading of Winnicott to assume that the Winnicottian position leads to ‘achievement-orientated techniques to promote an increasing adaptation to reality’; quite the opposite. Maud Mannoni is a powerful and persuasive writer when she speaks with her own voice; her writing loses conviction when she assumes another voice, which I suspect is the voice of a patriarchal authority.

She writes with intelligence and deep compassion of the children at Bonneuil: of the way in which the community set up its own structure and law, fundamental to which was the prohibition of incest; and following on from this, of the importance of communication with the children, in authentic speech that can ‘circulate once it is located in a register beyond the imaginary other’ (p. 101); of the importance thereof of play, ‘between the subject and the other so that the imagination can be accepted and the subject can take up speech’ (p. 102); of the importance of the relation of desire to the law and how this necessitates a constraint, an acceptance of ‘castration’, on the part of the child and those who care for him, in relation to the pursuit of pleasure.

It was thus that these children were encouraged to enter a world in which their pain could be contained within a symbolic dimension. In the service of enabling the communication of the children, myths were introduced; theatre was used, ‘a theatre that brings the body and its inhibitions into play’ (p. 115), to overcome a fear of the body and a fear of words. At Bonneuil, listening to the blocked body of the autistic child was vital, so that he could come to inhabit his own body. Theatre acted as a container for the primitive emotions of the children, where they were able to protest against the deafness of the adults around them. Other means employed at Bonneuil included story-telling, work with clay, painting. I cannot begin to do justice here to the richness of experience offered to these children nor of what they were able to give back in turn.

These children, so severely stricken in their very being, were thus able to go the small distance from the place of desire alienated in the other (the place that is occupied before the advent of language and that entails the destruction of the other) to the stage at which the subject apprehends himself as ‘me’ after which he can project his desire outside himself. (p. 140)
In Bonneuil, by these various means the staff became attuned to a language without words, which enabled the child to become integrated through authentic speech.

 Appropriately for a book about childhood distress, the book ends with an account of the life and work of Hans Christian Andersen, and a conclusion which includes an account of ‘Where the wild things are’ by Maurice Sendak. Sendak’s account is remarkable for being a dramatisation of a young child’s dream, a transitional space between fantasy and reality and a delightful refining of the lost language of childhood.

 I recommend this book to all who work and spend time with children; not only to those involved with children, but also to all who are aware of the risks of conformity and of adaptation to an increasingly intrusive and controlling technological culture, a culture which can, to a greater or lesser degree, render us all autistic.

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 Summary  This book, by Maud Mannoni, a Lacanian analyst, is concerned with the relationship between play and the establishment of authentic speech, as a means of relieving trauma and childhood distress. Mannoni describes her work with children, whose anguish she is able to understand through play, art and verbal therapy. She established a school at Bonneuil, where children were encouraged to give voice to their most primitive fears and destructive feelings; here children found their own language and were freed from enmeshment in their parents’ history, anxiety and desire. Drawing on the work of Winnicott, Mannoni believes that play is a condition of the truth of the ‘subject’, ensuring a successful passage back and forth from dependence to independence. She differs from Winnicott in the stress she places on the importance of the triangular structure of the matrix of mother, father and child, within which the child needs to be located in order to use language to symbolise and share emotions experienced but not always understood. Mannoni offers a psychoanalytic understanding of the relationship between traumatic loss and the writing of Edgar Allen Poe and Edith Wharton. She also speaks of deep compassion of survivors of severe trauma, including holocaust survivors whose grief is so great that creativity fails them.

 Résumé  Ce livre par Maud Mannoni, une analyste lacanienne, s’adresse à la relation entre le jeu et l’établissement d’une parole authentique comme moyen de soulager le trauma et la détresse de l’enfance. Mannoni décrit comment son travail avec des enfants lui permet de comprendre leur angoisse par l’intermédiaire de jeux, d’art et de thérapie verbale. Dans l’école qu’elle a fondée à Bonneuil, les enfants sont encouragés à donner voix aux peurs les plus primitives ainsi qu’à leurs tendances destructives; les enfants trouvent ainsi leur langue personnel et se libèrent de l’emprisonnement de l’histoire de leurs parents, de leurs anxiétés et de leurs désirs. S’inspirant du travail de Winnicott, Mannoni croit que le jeu est une condition de la vérité du sujet, qui permet le passage avec succès de la dépendance à l’indépendance et vice versa. Elle s’écarte de Winnicott par l’accent qu’elle met sur l’importance d’une structure triangulaire de la matrice mère, père et enfant au sein de laquelle l’enfant a besoin de se situer à fin d’utiliser le langage pour symboliser et partager les émotions vécues mais pas toujours comprises. Mannoni offre une compréhension psychanalytique de la relation entre une perte traumatique et les écrits de Edgar Allen Poe et d’Edith Wharton. Elle parle aussi de sa profonde compassion pour les survivants de traumas sévères, y compris ceux de l’holocauste dont la douleur est si grande que la créativité les éloignent.

 Zusammenfassung  Dieses Buch von Maud Mannoni, einer Lacanischen Psychoanalytikerin, behandelt die Beziehung zwischen Spiel und der Einrichtung von authentischer Sprache als Mittel der Offenbarung von Trauma und Stress in der Kindheit. Mannoni beschreibt ihre Arbeit mit Kindern, deren Schmerz sie verstehen lernt durch Spiel, Kunst

In the second half of the 20th century psychoanalysis and its derivatives have based much of their work in both theory and technique on the centrality of the image of mother and infant. This has had undoubted benefits in giving to the woman in both psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory a place that she needed. Nevertheless, the feminists were not slow to point out the problems outstanding for femininity and particularly for lesbianism and homosexuality more broadly. Masculinity has not up to now claimed its own full problematic status. Few books have made much of an attempt to claim the territory: Andrew Samuels’ book The Father published in 1985 by Free Association Books might have begun something but was not followed by any broad scale assault on the outstanding questions.

Taking the modern versions of science and the preoccupations that underlie our reverence for it, Figlio has used it as a paradigm for investigating some of the underlying anxieties in what defines masculinity. The book is a series of essays, some of which have been published elsewhere. This does at times make it difficult to follow a coherent argument throughout the book. Nevertheless, the book is very rich in ideas and if the reader can take each chapter or group of chapters as an entity in its own right there is a cumulative picture that emerges. Satisfactorily the book begins with beginning and an enquiry into the need of modern man (in the generic sense) to pursue beginnings and to know both the origin of his life and the event of the beginning itself. Figlio writes of the urge of modern science being always to be in at the begin ning and to appropriate by the controlling function of knowledge the acts of creation that are conveyed in the process of conception:

The phenomenon to which I am referring implies not the planting of a seed but an inner appropriation, a commandeering of procreative capacity. This is what is
typically modern and constitutes the masculine character of science. (p. 21)

Not only is this an attempt to get to the heart of the restless searching, the relentless seeking for more knowledge and more mastery that constitutes modern science, it is also a demarcation of modern man in his scientific manifestation as homo faber, the man making or doing. Figlio claims that a defining characteristic of modern science is its desire for mastery in the sphere of action. In psychoanalytic terms this kind of enquiry is tantamount to the processes of projective identification. The mother (Mother Nature) is taken over from the inside and is dominated and controlled.

The scientific imagination, Figlio claims, is a virtual technology. Man assembles the entities that he intends to study, hence the emphasis on experimentation and technology. Hence also the anxiety that is set loose when science is accused of invading and destroying the mother from the inside. Current anxieties over genetic technologies are an excellent example, although they may have arisen too recently for this book. Noticeably the arguments very soon become matters of ethics, not just practicalities of what will serve us best. Always lurking in the background are the questions of whether we have the right to know or to intervene in creative processes.

The book goes on to develop these fascinating and important ideas in various different contexts. One major theme relates the narcissistic omnipotent needs which Figlio assigns specifically to masculinity to the concept of the inanimate in nature. Human narcissism makes death and dying an intolerable blow. Because of this we constantly seek eternity through the control provided by knowledge. We also have to envy the eternity of the inanimate. At the same time, we are confronted with Freud’s statement that there is no such thing as death in the unconscious. We cannot grasp either the notion of death or the notion of negation, nothingness. We are therefore ill equipped to grasp the idea of the inanimate. These chapters are of great interest but seem to me to wander from the issue of masculinity. As a woman, I would find myself wholly involved in such problems of narcissism, control and the unconscious.

The later chapters of the book return much more forcefully to the questions of masculinity such as the conflict between phallicism and seminality. ‘Where do babies come from: men or women?’ is a question not asked within the reaches of common scientific sense in the Western world of the 21st century. It is too obvious to be noticed, but is nevertheless of major concern to the boy and man continually struggling with the narcissism of the woman. Is knowledge of the part played by semen used to signify the invasive force which takes over the woman or is it surrendered, the way in which the battle for phallic mastery is always lost? Figlio claims that Western scientific naturalism is driven ‘at least in part by the insecurity of identification … with the father and therefore in the male lineage and by the power by which maternal narcissism engulfs the son’ (p. 186).

Given the crisis of masculinity confronting us in every aspect of our society and culture and the difficulty for men in tolerating that creativity might lie elsewhere, perhaps in women, this book provides some vital questions for all psychotherapeutic practitioners to consider. It also deserves to be considered by scientists who might well find that they are able to modify and control the nature of their quests within a more humane framework. At the moment I think the psychoanalytic terminology and the rather dense nature of Figlio’s style might make such broad access difficult. Nevertheless, this is a most valuable book and deserves a great deal of discussion and debate.

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Summary This book is a study of the nature of science in the 20th and 21st centuries from the point of view of a psychoanalytic analysis of motivation and unconscious desire. It is a collection of essays which deal with various aspects of the way in which science reflects the search for the omnipotent phallic and a solution to the problem of feminisation.


Résumé Ce livre étudie la nature de la science au vingtième et au vingt et unième siècle au travers de l'analyse psychanalytique de la motivation et du désir inconscient. Cette collection d'essais traite des aspects variés par lesquels la science reflète la recherche d'une omnipotence phallique et la solution au problème de la féminisation.


Introduction
This conjoint review of: (1) the synoptic work which Stephen Mitchell published only shortly before, alas, his untimely death; (2) the integrative vision of Erskine et al.; and (3) Goldberg's examination of the primacy of the moral dimension in the psychoanalytic treatment of those who commit evil, may serve in part as our own memorial to Stephen Mitchell's work. It may also serve as the lament that it will not now be possible for our protest, at the bifurcation, and the ideological limitation, of the field in practice, which is part-theme of this review, to come to his attention. This is a field in which it should be, though it is not, automatic for the issues in books such as these three to be routine matters of dialogue for those who would read any one of them. Stephen Mitchell was one who, for reasons we shall come to, would have been more likely than most psychoanalysts to have been open to the possibility that a widening of methodology, even beyond what he himself envisages, is called for by his own insight. For many of those of us who are psychoanalytic in an integrative sense, yet therefore not in the mainstream of orthodox psychoanalytic thinking, Stephen Mitchell was a witness that psychoanalysis is alive and open, for all its faults. In this loss of an opportunity, we are, in a smaller way, reminded by his death of Dr Samuel Johnson's memorable lament for Gilbert Walsmsley and David Garrick:

At this man's table I enjoyed many cheerful and instructive hours, with companions such as are not often found; with Dr James, whose skill in physic will be long remembered; and with David Garrick, whom I hoped to have gratified with this character of our common friend: but what are the hopes of man! I am disappointed by that stroke of death, which has eclipsed the gaiety of nations, and impoverished the public stock of harmless pleasure. (Johnson, 1779–1781)

We shall return to the emotional wisdom, and metapsychological roundedness, of Stephen Mitchell's vision, and we shall explore our commentary and comparison of these three books in an interwoven fashion. But first we shall outline them.
Summaries

Mitchell

The outline account of *Relationality* is as follows.

In the first of three parts Mitchell gives an account (affirming this less well-known psychoanalytic thinker’s great importance) of Hans Loewald’s modifications of psychoanalysis, which take place within the Freudian framework, including the concept of drives, but in a radically modified way, in which the totality of the field of experience is conceptualised as prior to the differentiation of the discrete drives, thereby making the drives intrinsically and inherently relational, and which, therefore, Mitchell argues, is fully congruent with Fairbairnian object relations.

In the second part he integrates his relational and object relations vision with Bowlby’s evolutionary attachment theory, and also outlines his ‘map’ of the modes/levels of psychoanalytic focus (as discussed below) with which he effects this integration. In the third part he offers a systematic defence of Fairbairn’s emphasis upon libido as relational and object seeking, as both encompassing and superseding Freud’s drive theory of impulse seeking satisfaction/pleasure (he compares this to the way Copernican theory assimilated Ptolemaic), and then goes on to offer some, both touching and robust, clinical illustrations, which cautiously address the tension between expressiveness and restraint in the psychoanalytic relationship, though with too little scope for real wider integration of methodology, as offered in different ways, as indicated below, in Erskine *et al.* and Goldberg—and here is where we would have hoped, alas, to dialogue with him. This book is written in richly reflective style.

Erskine *et al.*

The outline account of *Beyond Empathy* is as follows (a summary of material relating to this has been published in *International Journal of Psychotherapy*, in 1999).

The first chapter offers an overview of the basic concepts of the developmental model of integration, and of integrative psychotherapy, drawing from Gestalt contact theory, attachment theory, object relations and self-psychology, making active and interactive relationship central (hence the reference to the limitations of Carl Rogers’ client-centred position, though recognised in its pioneering importance, in the title itself), and leading up to the outline of the basic elements in their methodology, of inquiry, attunement, and involvement.

These are then developed in detail, in separate chapters, leading on to a fuller account also of the relational needs which underpin the whole process and which are reworked in the process of the therapy. There then follows a summation of the whole process in diagrammatic terms, in which it is modelled as, and in the shape of, a keyhole, with both vertical and horizontal, and thirdly, temporal sequence, dimensions. Six chapters of clinical illustration (similar to, but fuller than, those in the earlier book, *Integrative Psychotherapy in Action*, which also lacked the range and depth of theoretical mapping and linking this book offers) then follow, the first five of these being detailed transcripts, with commentary, of individual sessions. One of these is with one client extended over two sessions, illustrating what has commonly become known in integrative circles as the ‘parent interview’, a therapeutic session, constituted through a kind of partly psychodramatic process, with an ‘internal parent’ (the actual parent, but enacted as embodied within the client) of the client, who receives therapy in their own right, to enable internal reparation to the client, and to enable the client to enter freely into their own space, less impeded now by the parental introjects. Many of these illustrations are exceedingly moving. The sixth of these chapters is miscellaneous illustration from couple work in this mode. Finally, the ‘keyhole’ is revisited, in the light of the actual illustrations. This book is the only one of the three to offer a fully-fledged
methodology using enactive psychodramatic methods within the session. It is written in a clear expository prose.

Goldberg

The outline account of The Evil We Do is as follows (several papers relating to this book have been published in the International Journal of Psychotherapy).

Following a forward by Dr James Grotstein, evoking the kind of confrontation this book constitutes for Freudianism, Goldberg’s first chapter outlines the challenges, faced in the reclamation of a modified psychoanalysis, to be more responsive to its full ethical responsibility to a troubled society in which psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are major beacons of hope. He outlines the contrast between orthodox analysts and humanistic analysts, in whom he counts himself, and others including Mitchell (and no doubt they would include Erskine, if put to the test—for although here as elsewhere his inclination towards stark either/or contrasts leads him mostly to overlook the humanistic psychotherapy tradition. Though Bugenthal gets a mention, it is clear that many of these would count as ‘humanistic analysts’, in his terms).

This contrast is fused together, in characteristic stark emphasis, with that between Freudian determinism, and a humanistic belief in free will and moral hope. In effect, Freud’s (admittedly ambivalent) tendency to reduce and explain away the moral dimension in early developmental terms is overturned. The core question of the book is whether this is still psychoanalysis or whether Freud’s fundamental wider concerns would in fact still be met, and better met, within a psychoanalysis which is no longer divorced from the moral traditions, (like Dr Johnson’s) Christian and post-Christian, which countenance altruism and a primary social contract at their heart, and focus upon the conditions of the good life. This is then illustrated through absolutely gripping, and again very moving, accounts of encounters with clients and others in Chapters 2–9; covering issues like wider concern for social well-being, the conditions for self-examination, emotional literacy and expressiveness, self-deception, defences against concern, dealing with dangerousness, constructive social shame (or remorse) as related to inequity, reparative concern, and a presentation of a conception of mature, as opposed to romantic, love. Chapter 10 summarises the institutional changes he believes are required in psychoanalysis, in this light, and then in three sections a part covering theory and method deals, in the light of all that, with the sources of moral cynicism, offers profound commonsense reflections on the causes of evil doing and violence (such as the obvious—but rarely made—point that it is not the chronic watching of violent videos, etc., per se which causes the violent tendencies, with which they are undeniably statistically linked, but the implicit parental neglect which permits these to become the primary source of value identifications), and puts forward an invaluable map of how to teach emotional and moral literacy. This book is written in a sharp clear commanding style—by a master of the written word.

Implications

What are the implications of these different yet related visions of integration? The foremost living philosopher, coinciding with Goldberg’s social-cultural analysis, alludes to our age as the age of psychoanalysis (Derrida, 1998, writing about Foucault, pp. 70 ff)—no doubt, not only of that, but centrally that—giving it a certain canonical status in defining who we are. The ‘psychoanalysis’ he accords this status is one that has, at least, the possibility of passages connecting it with the greatest (and least trivialising, for there is a lot of that!) elements in post-modernist thought, such as those associated with the name of Nietzsche.

Within ‘orthodox’ French and American psychoanalysis, as came out in the discussion of the reissue of Janine Chasseguet-Smirgal’s book on perversion, at the
December 2000 meeting of the American Psychoanalytical Association, there is now even a trend to associate psychoanalysis itself with traditional moralism, as if it had always been that, to define it as that which restores the possibility of moral normality, and sets a clear boundary against everything associated with, for example, ‘perversion’.

Now, Goldberg’s work indeed offers a connection with traditional moralism, but one which connects with the work of writers like the novelists Joseph Conrad and Fyodor Dostoievsky, and would not be reassured by the psychoanalytic parochialism of the above trend. It remains within post-modern psychoanalysis alone (including Lacan’s work, and the dimensions addressed by Derrida) that traditional moralism is deconstructed in a deeper way than simplistic versions of Freudian drive theory would allow, grounding it rather in a kind of infinite displacement of meaning, which deconstructs any possibility of a fixed centre or traditional normative resolution (though a complex norm ambiguously re-emerges in Lacan). This version of Freudianism has a scope which might align it after all with Goldberg’s however traditional, yet Dostoievskian, moralism. What they have in common, distinguishing them from the above parochial moralism internal to psychoanalysis, is a reflexivity which includes the historical (which they also share with Grotstein’s, 2000, recent book). They share a sense of historical overview, placing it in a pan-Western context, which properly honours the significance of psychoanalysis. And this aspect of a sense of wider history is the major element in Goldberg’s work, which is absent from both the other books. They are ‘within psychoanalysis’ or ‘within psychotherapy’, respectively. And, in this respect, Goldberg’s, in the last analysis, is a wider and more mature vision.

**Pursuit of maturity**

We are inescapably engaged, in psychotherapy, in a pursuit of a value system of mature values. We are inevitably engaged in identi-
valuational, dimension of life, which may be helpfully enlightened by it, but to which it remains always ultimately accountable.

This shows in, for instance:

1. the appeal to the core validity of social contract thinking, or equity theory: the thesis that *actual ethical exchange in the actual world* at the level of ethical action, in a Kantian sense (not merely behaviour, and not in a sense which could be labelled ‘acting out’), is necessary for healing;

2. the recognition of positive, not merely negative, significance in *shame*; and

3. the recognition of the non-reducible *reality* of mature love with its basis in intimacy, not simply romantic *eros*; and similar emphases.

This comes out in part in his (seriously defensible though exaggerated) comment:

> Psychoanalytic theorists who regard relational and existential issues as no less significant than—intrapsychic issues are those who have written most extensively about social and moral values in the analytic situation. I include Carl Jung, Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Homey, Alfred Adler, Erich Fromm, Erik Erikson, Stephen Mitchell, and Jay Greenberg most notably in this group. However, except for Erikson, these theorists focus more on the analysis (examination) of patient dysfunction than they do on proposing ways to **rebuild** lives. Only Erikson gives attention in his writings to the client’s social and moral responsibilities to others—which, as I have attempted to show in the cases I have presented, is essential to rebuilding lives. (p. 190)

Though Goldberg points the way in such highly significant passages, we may still ask whether he is fully free of psychotherapy ideology—whether, for instance, his indictment of psychoanalysis still hubristically presupposes that psychotherapy has and ought to have the moral answers—and the same may be asked, in much the same way, of an author opening up the field to the existential—ethical dimension in similar ways, to whom we would have wished Goldberg had referred, Irving Yalom.

### The major issues about integration

This ‘ethical, and valuational, dimension of life’ goes beyond, though it includes, the values of personality integration, and its servant methodologies and existential dimensions (whether or not, with Erskine et al., it actually calls itself ‘integrative psychotherapy’) with which all three books are concerned. There are therefore two fundamental problems together posed by these books: how far an approach in psychotherapy, which is integrative, perforce compels us to take account of the wider ethical and existential dimension we have been touching upon, and in what way? And, secondly, the more methodological question, what is the relation between psychoanalysis, and integrative methodology?

For, arguably, we psychotherapists are, **all of us**, integrative psychotherapists now. Part of the great merit of Mitchell’s work within psychoanalysis is to have implicitly conceded this, but to an extent he does not fully recognise, since he neither fully counterpoints the ethical breadth of Goldberg, nor the integrative range and freedom of methodology of Erskine et al.

### Metapsychology and autochthony

Yet he remains the better as a metapsychologist. An index of this is that Mitchell’s work remains properly psychoanalytic, in both the sense to be partly defined by Grotstein’s (2000) appeal to ‘autochthony’, or autonomous self-creationism, in some sense, and also by appeal to the extent to which transference experience and work is given a central position as a key dimension.
(This is not to the exclusion, as in some psychoanalytic supposedly purist, but actually more like hothouse, models, of the full-blooded recognition of life happening and action in its own right.)

Autochthony is profoundly related to the **primary process** aspect of the **infinite displacement of meaning** mentioned above, which deconstructs any possibility of a fixed centre or traditional normative resolution. The work of Erskine *et al.* is likewise for its part properly psychoanalytic, but more in the sense of transference than autochthony, and therefore once again to an extent which *they*, in their turn, do not fully recognise. And we urge that the work of both Mitchell, and Erskine *et al.*, is impaired in its full flowering by its failure to recognise its hidden integrative potentials in the forms we are evoking. We also argue that, from a psychoanalytic point of view, Goldberg’s position is not only fully psychoanalytic in respect of its recognition of transference experience and work, in the above sense, but also recognises autochthony at an adult level in its affirmation of human ethical autonomy and freewill, and its refusal to facilely condone *exclusively* environmental explanations, and diminishing of responsibility, for moral failure and evil choices. (This is not to say environment is not allowed for, especially in terms of attachment issues, at a deep level.)

There is nevertheless the limitation in Goldberg’s position that the recognition of autochthony is confined to an adult-based model, and therefore the **primary process** aspect of the **infinite displacement of meaning** is missed in his position. We should, therefore, indeed, be extremely interested to see what Goldberg’s position would look like if combined with the kind of emphasis on something like autochthony or creationism, as applied to the earliest developmental phases, to be found in Winnicott, Bion, Grothstein, or the work of Loewald, which is so important for Mitchell in the work under review. Here Mitchell’s (cf., his chapter, ‘An interactional hierarchy’, pp. 57ff) four modes (as he says) or levels (as, we believe, though not over-schematically, is further feasible here) of developmental analysis/intervention, offer an enormously useful, and for certain purposes comprehensive, mapping, and mark his great metapsychological sophistication, and will give us greater clarity in mapping the relations of what these three books offer.

**Mitchell’s concept of modes/levels**

They are those of (roughly, on our interpretations):

1. micro-behaviour in infancy (or later), as it appears in, for example, the work of Stern and Bowlby;
2. primal emotional suggestibility, merging, or emotional ‘mimesis’/identification (Girard, 1987), and its later re-emergences in regression, or in times of great intensity, which links with the theme of primitive projective identification, to which we return shortly; this is also the level of the mentioned **primary process** aspect of the **infinite displacement of meaning**, and the first full locus of autochthony;
3. self-other configurations, or patterned mirroring and complementarity, relational repetition compulsion, or habituality, or fixed strategy, in a script or object relations sense; and
4. the level of ethical autonomy/autochthony and symbolic reflexiveness, mature intersubjectivity, which is the level of Goldberg’s ethical–existential dimension, and of adult autochthony in his implicit sense.

Now, when Klein, Winnicott, Searles, Bion, Loewald, or Grothstein write about primitive projective identification processes, or their parallels, they are primarily concerned with Mitchell’s mode or level 2, primal emotional suggestibility and mimesis, and the **primary process** aspect of the **infinite displacement of meaning**. In terms of Mitchell’s framework, Goldberg’s examples in this book are mainly concerned with how to enable the transition from *level 3 to level*
4, which he reveals with extraordinary acuteness and poignancy, in terms of interventions mainly offered—and this is the remarkable thing about, the index of the maturity of, his book—at level 4. (But there could be still some questions, from both Mitchell and Erskine et al., about his tolerance of regression, and ‘inner child’ modes, here.)

**Active integrative methodology in Erskine et al. alone**

By contrast, Erskine et al., in their concern with the same transition (which combines it with level 1, but, we think, seriously skips, or under-recognises, or at least fails fully to name the impact of, level 2, the level of autochthonous self-creative phantasy, the primary process aspect of the infinite displacement of meaning, assimilating it either to level 1 or to level 3) effect it mainly in terms of interventions offered at level 3. Their grasp of interventions at that level is indeed superb and offered with a wealth of detail and fine grain in their examples which is magnificent, but it is by itself one-sided, and this one-sidedness is not recognised, leading to a certain thinness at the metapsychological level. Yet we also have to recognise that they alone do full justice to the process of live enacted regression in practice. Mitchell can only offer pious aspiration to ‘re-experiencing’ in such a passage as this:

> But in what Loewald (1978a) calls ‘poignant remembering’ (p66), with which we are most frequently involved in clinical psychoanalysis, we might ask the patient to see if he can get in touch with what that birthday was like, what it felt like. Our hope is that the earlier state of mind is not just being represented in an intellectual fashion, but to some extent being reexperienced. (Mitchell, p. 46)

Here, by contrast, Erskine et al., like most experienced humanistic psychotherapists of one orientation or another, can offer more than aspiration; there is a whole range of interventions and strategies, of which this book offers one of the fullest expositions going (perhaps, even, definitively the fullest), and this is perhaps the greatest merit of this book, which qualifies it as a standard text in respect of this crucial aspect. This is the contribution in which Erskine et al. surpass both Mitchell and Goldberg. If the result is more of an ‘inner-child’-centred emphasis, at the expense of adulthood, this is a corrigeable one-sided-ness.

**Goldberg’s account of shame**

What, then, would Goldberg’s emphasis look like—not so much in terms of a greater emphasis on level 3, which implicitly he is well aware of, but also on level 2? Well, one dimension of expansion would be in terms of a further amplification of his understanding and appreciation of shame, which is in any case one of the finest things in his book, and regarding which he offers superbly a level 4 emphasis, which allows him to evoke the positive moral creative dimension of shame, and its rectification (his example in Chapter 7, of his encounter, with its vicarious shame, and moral exchange, with the child Pedro, where he allows Pedro to ‘repay’ the cost, and to be freed from the shame, of being taught a meal, by giving Goldberg and his companion his box of matches, is both a very moving, and a pivotal, point in the book). But shame has also, as he implicitly recognises in that very chapter, where the shared experience of vicarious shame is agonisingly evoked, a huge mimetic or suggestive (level 2) element, the physiological agony of which, as also the drive to its repudiation, is also part of its essence and nature. Here is where very deep empathy, actively conveyed—the sort of process Erskine et al. evoke repeatedly and poignantly in their illustrations of work, at least at level 3—can set up the reverse mimesis which enables a healing mimesis or suggestion to occur.

> There is no reason why this should not be
offered upon a basis which cherishes the ultimate, level 2, autochthonous autonomy within the shame. For instance, where the shame has to do with a very deep schizoid isolation we feel such a supplementation of Goldberg's stance would be most essential. (This is all, of course, taking for granted a 'corrective emotional experience' model, as opposed to a pure 'insight' model, of the process of the work.)

Because of their overt emphasis upon level 3 rectifications, and an under-recognition of level 4, as well as, explicitly, of level 2 (though, as just hinted, they do tap it in their work), there is, conversely, a knock-back effect in this respect in Erskine et al., who work in a way which might not always be accepted as respectful of existential autonomy by one who is sceptical, or not already at least half converted to their approaches, someone whose frame of reference is mainly level 4. In practice—this is written from direct personal experience and in gratitude—the passion and active respectful care which is conveyed will often carry the day, even where there are reservations, but it would not convince anyone for whom the thoroughgoing recognition of other levels in practice than the psychodramatic reworking of level 3 issues (upon the basis of a tacit suggestive or mimetic use of level 2 identifications and inductions, which is clearly a form of hypnosis) is essential.

This would be a point of difference between a psychoanalytic approach, however relational, still veering towards the classical in its eschewing of active methodology, such as Goldberg's or Mitchell's, and that of Erskine et al. We cannot see that this difference would be easily bridged, or begun to be persuasively conveyed, without taking account of the metapsychological issues, in more depth, than Erskine et al. allow themselves to do. Because the omission of the active dimension in psychoanalysis is so glaring, and so taken for granted by default, when it can perfectly well be argued against on solid psychoanalytic grounds, this is a serious matter, a grievous pity, and opportunity missed.

The average humanistic/integrative psychotherapist will simply not, in our experience, unless this type of omission is remedied over time, have that metapsychological depth, and partly philosophical, background which, as a psychoanalyst, Mitchell can assume. On the other hand, the average psychoanalyst would probably be able to presuppose the conceptual background that the humanistic/integrative psychotherapist assumes—not the actual reading but the basic conceptual world. Their difficulty will be something else—a set of dogmatic, and fundamentally unpsychoanalytic, assumptions about active methodology, which will prevent them seriously considering what the humanistic/integrative psychotherapist puts forward.

Spirit of scientific enquiry

It is of a piece with all this that Erskine et al. 'write with authority and not as one of the scribes'. This is a teaching book, not a book geared to dialogue with other orientations, despite their brief, and far too perfunctory, remark in the preface (p. xi), that: ' Practitioners of all these theories will, we hope, find our ideas useful'.

It is perhaps paradoxical that, in a comparison of the books, Erskine et al. and Mitchell's, it is Mitchell's which embodies more of the spirit of tentative enquiry. Much of this is a philosophical, even theological, spirit of enquiry; in his (very valuable) discussion of Bowlby's disgraceful marginalisation by the psychoanalytic community of the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mitchell simply remarks, regarding the rejection of Bowlby's scientific attitude,

For the psychoanalytic establishment of Bowlby's time, all this [viz., Bowlby's stance as a full-blooded Darwinian scientist, offering testable hypotheses] was simply too much to bear. (Mitchell, p. 81)

without any questioning of this from the point of view of the question whether this
anti-scientific spirit may not, as such, call into question psychoanalysis’ status as a genuine rational discipline. (Goldberg is [willing to be far more robust on suchlike matters, challenging Freud, and psychoanalysis, on its scientific status, vigorously in a number of places!] Mitchell remains much more interested in the theological–ecumenical concern of reconciliation, and remedy of what he actually refers to as ‘schism’, within the psychoanalytic community than in either redressing, or rationally and philosophically defending (as can be done, but must be done rationally), the anti-Popperian ethos of psychoanalysis. This applies in at any rate to Popper’s own sense, which does not preclude another kind of falsifiability than Popper’s as more appropriate to psychoanalysis, but neither does Mitchell argue that case.

However, despite this limitation, there is a genuine spirit of mixed phenomenological–hermeneutic enquiry in Mitchell’s work, which it shares with a great deal of psychoanalytic writing, including major aspects of Freud himself; Mitchell’s twin admired figures, Loewald and Fairbairn; Winnicott; Kohut; and many others; and, in this broader sense, the empiricism of Bowlby and Daniel Stern (1985, 1995) belongs, if equivocally, within the ethos of psychoanalysis.

But the work of Erskine et al. has, on the other hand, the certainty of tone of authoritative teaching and revelation, a kind of certainty which one might expect of a first generation follower of the great (but not tentative, or hostile to authoritative ways of approach) hypno-psychotherapist, Milton Erickson, and it comes at first sight as a surprise that this lack of tentativeness should be found within the heritage of the humanistic culture. This, as Erskine et al affirm, in its beginnings in Carl Rogers’ work, emphasised the cooperative humanness of the process of the work on a scale on which had never been done before, although pioneers like Ferenczi, Rank, and Groddeck, had gone as far as they could in this direction within the authoritarian frame of Freudian psychoanalysis.

Rogers, also, was one of the earliest pioneers of controlled scientific outcome research into psychotherapy, and this was part of what led him to formulate the ‘core conditions’ (or, better, perhaps, ‘preconditions’—but thereby hangs an argument!) of the work, considerably earlier than, for instance, Greensons work upon the ‘treatment alliance’ (e.g., Greenson and Wexler, 1969).

Yet this alone is not enough to resolve the matter; ‘tentativeness’ inhabits more than one level of enquiry. A commitment to certain kinds of scientific enquiry is compatible with, at other levels, a kind of theological utopianism, as we have seen many times in the last 400 years or so. In Rogers’ case (along with huge tracts of humanistic psychotherapy as a whole), there is a fundamental, and fundamentally unquestioned (as, to be sure, the opposite mainly is in psychoanalysis), Pelagian or Rousseauian belief in an essential human goodness, which has the potential for a person-centred fundamentalism, of the sort which we are familiar with so often in one orientation or another in psychotherapy (cf. e.g. Heath, 2000).

Now we are not arguing that such fundamentalism is to be found in Erskine et al. But a certain oversimplifying tendency, and confinement to the level of level 3 and level 1, issues and interventions, common in the manner of humanistic and integrative psychotherapy’s way of dealing with the psychoanalytic legacy, is to be found. Thus, there is simply assumed a nearly purely ‘corrective emotional experience’ account of therapeutic change, though ‘insight’ is recognised somewhat, particularly at initial inquiry level, and again at the time of assimilation, but without the sheer recognition of curiosity and co-inquiry which Mitchell’s work illustrates with certain clients, and, again, there is a basically energetic, non-dualistic, account of that nature of ‘internalisation’ or ‘introjection’, upon which object relations and Lacanian theory have expended so much effort.

**Dialectical tension in psychoanalysis**

Lost sight of is that dialectical tension so
TABLE 1. Dimensions of integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Mitchell</th>
<th>Erskine et al.</th>
<th>Goldberg</th>
<th>(Grotstein)</th>
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<td>Metapsychological overview</td>
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rarely absent in psychoanalysis, whichever side of the argument a theorist is on, and which has its prototype in Freud’s own endlessly varied irresolution—or, positively framed, ‘negative capability’ (Keats, 1817; Bion, 1970)—about which type of accounting for human life-positions to adopt. This maintained dialectical tension (which Grotstein, 2000, has evoked as that between the already mentioned autochthonous, ‘creationism’, and alterity, ‘adaptionism’, and which Mitchell’s use of Loewald honours in its own way) is one of the things which makes Mitchell’s work pre-eminently psychoanalytic, despite its thoroughgoing relationalism, which psychoanalysts as different as Lacan, Klein, Kernberg, and Grotstein would, in various measure, agree in regarding as, at best, a partial dissolving of the essence of psychoanalysis. And this dialectical tension, also, Goldberg has, in the depth of his recognition of evil, self-deception, and moral responsibility in a Kantian sense, combined with the humanity of his appreciation of attachment theory aspects, and social contractual/equity theory. But Erskine et al., as indicated, have unique things to offer in terms of methodology.

Final remarks

We could go on for a long time, and write far, far more about the riches, as well as the partialnesses, of these three very fine books. Our final point is to repeat that they offer, as a connected whole, in a way which ought to be routinely discussible within all traditions, but is not, things which none of the three by themselves fully offer. We have therefore drawn up in tabular form a set of criteria of integration, and we include Grotstein’s position, as offered in his new book, as a further term of comparison, in view of his greater recognition of the autochthonous aspects of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. This comparison bears out our relative valuation of the range and maturity of Goldberg’s work. The selection of dimensions is of course somewhat arbitrary, as is the ‘rating’, and could be modified by the reader according to their own preference, if so wished. But it offers a starting point which may suggest similar comparisons in other contexts.

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References
KEATS, J. (1817) Letter to George and Georgiana Keats.

Abstract   This conjoint review, of three fine books, of: i. the synoptic work which Stephen Mitchell published only shortly before, alas, his untimely death: ii. the integrative vision of Erskine et al., and: iii. Goldberg’s examination of the primacy of the moral dimension in the psychoanalytic treatment of those who commit evil, explores the relationship between different types of psychoanalytically grounded integrations, drawing on Mitchell’s valuable model of four modes, 1) behavioural; 2) primary identifications; 3) secondary adaptations and scripts; and 4) the autonomous ethical-existential level. Mainly, Mitchell is seen as between level 2 and three, Erskine et al. mostly at level 3, and Goldberg alone fully and mainly at level four. The relative value and limitations of these positions are explored, with recognition of the importance of each of them, and an integration is glimpsed which would encompass them all.

Résumé   La critique de ces 3 livres excellents est faite conjointement. Le premier est le travail synoptique publie par S. Mitchell peu de temps avant sa mort prématurée. Le second est la vision intégrative d’Erskine et al. Dans le troisième Goldberg s’interroge sur la primauté de la dimension morale dans le traitement psychoanalytique de ceux qui ont commis des atrocités et explore la relation entre différents types d’integrations psychoanalytiques en utilisant le modèle des 4 modes de Mitchell: 1) béhaviorisme 2) identifications primaires 3) adaptations secondaires et scénarios 4) niveau autonome éthique-existential.

Il semble que Mitchell se situe entre les niveaux 2 et 3. Erskine et al. en plus grande partie au niveau 3 et seul Goldberg se retrouve en quasi totalité au niveau 4. On explore la valeur relative et les limitations de ces positions et tout en reconnaissant l’importance de chacune s’elles on envisage un modèle qui permettrait l’intégration de chacune.

Zusammenfassung   Diese ist eine Besprechung dreier Bücher:

1. Das synoptische Werk, das Stephen Mitchell noch kurz vor seinem unerwarteten Tod veröffentlichte.
2. Die integrative Vision Erskine und anderen.
3. Goldbergs Untersuchung der Priorität der Moraldimension in psychoanalytischer Behandlung derer, die Böses begehen.